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Abstract 
 
Interval Management Alternative Clearances (IMAC) was a human-in-
the-loop simulation experiment conducted to explore the Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) Technology Demonstration (ATD-1) Concept of 
Operations (ConOps), which combines advanced arrival scheduling, 
controller decision support tools, and aircraft avionics to enable multiple 
time deconflicted, efficient arrival streams into a high-density terminal 
airspace.  Interval Management (IM) is designed to support the ATD-1 
concept by having an “Ownship” (IM-capable) aircraft achieve or 
maintain a specific time or distance behind a “Target” (preceding) 
aircraft. The IM software uses IM clearance information and the Ownship 
data (route of flight, current location, and wind) entered by the flight crew, 
and the Target aircraft’s Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast 
state data, to calculate the airspeed necessary for the IM-equipped aircraft 
to achieve or maintain the assigned spacing goal. 
IMAC investigated three different types of IM operations: CAPTURE, 
CROSS, and MAINTAIN. Two weeks of data collection were conducted. 
Each week a new group of 12 subject pilots and four subject controllers 
flew 10 high-density arrival scenarios into Denver International Airport. 
The experiment objective was to explore the acceptability and system 
performance of the ATD-1 ConOps and IM procedures. Overall, both the 
ConOps and the IM procedures were rated very favorably in terms of 
acceptability, workload, and pilot head down time. The mean IM spacing 
error at the planned termination point was 1.0 second, with a standard 
deviation of 6.3 seconds, and the interaction of IM with non-IM operations 
in the same arrival stream was generally compatible and acceptable. 
Several critical issues were identified that must be resolved prior to 
real-world implementation, including: high frequency of IM speed 
changes and speed reversals (especially if on final approach), the use of 
vertical navigation speed mode to conduct the IM operation, and 
ambiguous IM cockpit displays not triggering the intended pilot action. 
The results from this experiment will be used to prepare for flight test 
operations and in developing the advanced IM concept. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Experiment Description 
Interval Management Alternative Clearances (IMAC) was a human-in-the-loop simulation 
experiment conducted by the Air Traffic Management Technology Demonstration-1 (ATD-1) 
Project in 2015 at NASA Langley Research Center. The ATD-1 Concept of Operations (ConOps) 
utilizes the Time Based Flow Management (TBFM) advanced arrival scheduling, the Terminal 
Sequencing and Spacing (TSAS) controller decision support tools, and the Interval Management 
(IM) aircraft avionics to enable multiple time-deconflicted, efficient arrival streams into a high-
density terminal airspace. IM is designed to support the ATD-1 concept by enabling an en route 
air traffic controller to issue a single strategic clearance to the flight crew of an IM-equipped 
(“Ownship”) aircraft to achieve or maintain a specific time or distance behind the preceding 
(“Target”) aircraft. This onboard IM software uses 1) Ownship data (route of flight, current 
location, forecast and actual wind information), 2) information contained in the controller-issued 
IM clearance, and 3) the Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) state data 
received from the Target aircraft to calculate the airspeed necessary for the Ownship aircraft to fly 
in order to achieve the assigned spacing goal behind the Target aircraft. 
The experiment objective was to assess the acceptability and system performance of three IM 
operations in realistic, high-density arrival operations. They were the CROSS operation (used in 
previous ATD-1 research and capable of supporting in-trail and merging route geometries), and 
the CAPTURE and MAINTAIN operations (new procedures for when the Target and Ownship 
aircraft are in-trail). Additional objectives were to identify implementation issues for real-world 
operations, and to investigate the integration of these new IM operations with the TBFM and TSAS 
tools. While the CROSS operation is able to support complex merging geometries by the IM and 
Target aircraft, when the aircraft are in trail, much of the information in the clearance does not 
need to be included in the controller’s instruction. Thus the CAPTURE and MAINTAIN 
operations are alternatives that offer a lower workload for the controller and flight crew to 
accomplish essentially the same procedure. 
Two subject groups, each consisting of twelve pilots and four controllers, participated in this 
experiment. Eight of the twelve pilot participants flew two-crew desktop simulators, and the 
remaining four pilots each flew in two-crew high-fidelity full-scale aircraft simulators. The four 
air traffic controllers in each group consisted of two en route controllers, one feeder controller, and 
one final controller. Confederate pilots and controllers were also used to provide background 
traffic and to control the airspace outside the simulated airspace. Scenarios included arrivals from 
all directions ending in either north or south arrival flows into the Denver International Airport, 
with a mixture of Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and Instrument Landing System (ILS) 
approach procedures. A total of 79 IM operations and 150 non-IM operations were flown by the 
subject and confederate pilots in this experiment. 
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Experiment Results 
The ATD-1 ConOps, and in particular the IM procedure as tested in IMAC, was very successful 
and met most of the key metrics it was designed to achieve. Using the ATD-1 procedures, 
controllers were able to conduct high-density arrival operations into Denver without requiring the 
use of vectors within the terminal airspace. The mean IM spacing error at the Planned Termination 
Point (PTP) during IM operations was 1.0 second (STANDARD DEVIATION = 6.3 seconds). 
Eighteen percent of the IM operations were canceled by the controller (overwhelmingly the 
MAINTAIN operation which is not designed to be used as tested in this research), and none of the 
IM operations were canceled by the flight crew. 
Overall, both controllers and flight crew rated the ATD-1 ConOps, IM procedures, and IM displays 
as operationally acceptable, workload as acceptable, and pilots rated the amount of head down 
time required to conduct IM operations as acceptable. 
Although the ATD-1 concept and IM procedure demonstrated promise, many significant 
challenges were identified that must be resolved prior to the IM procedure being implemented in 
real-world operations. A partial list of issues identified during this experiment include:  
• the high frequency of IM commanded speed changes relative to non-IM operations, 
• the IM software commanding a speed increase (reversal), particularly on final approach, 
• confusion when a long time delay occurred between entering the IM clearance and the IM 
operation could commence, 
• issuing MAINTAIN clearances in the Air Route Traffic Control Center that continued into 
the Terminal Radar Approach Control facility, 
• the use of the Vertical Navigation (VNAV) Speed mode (which does not offer the same 
altitude protection as VNAV Path) to conduct IM operations, and 
• ambiguous cockpit displays indicating the IM spacing operation was no longer feasible. 
To the extent possible, each of these positive results and remaining challenges will be evaluated 
during the IM flight test scheduled for the spring of 2017. The results and recommendations of the 
IMAC experiment and the IM flight test will be used to inform follow-on development of the 
advanced IM concept (currently underway and led by the Federal Aviation Administration). 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
To prepare the National Airspace System (NAS) for a predicted increase in traffic volume, and to 
improve the efficiency of the air transportation system, the Airspace Operations and Safety 
Program in NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate created several Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) Technology Demonstrations (ATD), numbered one to three. These ATD 
Sub-Projects are designed to support commercial aviation stakeholders including the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), manufactures, and airspace users, with relevant and timely 
research. 
The Langley Research Center Interval Management (IM) research team has been part of NASA’s 
ATD-1 Project for the past four years. This team was an integral part of the joint NASA Ames 
Research Center (ARC) and NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) effort to develop the ATD-
1 Concept of Operations (ConOps), which integrates three NASA technologies to achieve high 
throughput, fuel-efficient arrival operations into a busy terminal airspace (ref. 1). These three 
technologies are: the Traffic Management Advisor with Terminal Metering (TMA-TM), which 
generates a precise arrival schedule to the runway threshold and other points within the airport 
terminal area; the Controller-Managed Spacing (CMS) decision support tools, which provide 
information to help terminal area air traffic controllers manage aircraft delay using speed control; 
and IM, which provides the speed guidance necessary to allow flight crews to manage their spacing 
behind an assigned lead aircraft. 
The LaRC IM research team has also worked closely with the FAA and industry partners for the 
past 15 years to support the development of performance standards for an array of aircraft 
surveillance applications (ref. 2) and the requirements for the airborne IM application (ref. 3). 
These two documents are the foundation for the IM Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
(MOPS, ref. 4), written by the FAA, NASA, and industry partners. Since this document was not 
published prior to this experiment, the ATD-1 Project used draft version 7.0 to create the ATD-1 
IM System Requirement Document (SRD), the system requirements for NASA’s IM avionics 
prototype (ref. 5).  
To evaluate the ATD-1 ConOps using the new IM application and performance standards, the 
ATD-1 Project chartered the Interval Management Alternative Clearances (IMAC) human-in-the-
loop simulation experiment to assess the acceptability and system performance of three proposed 
IM operations in realistic, high-density arrival operations. To accomplish this, the spacing software 
in the simulated aircraft avionics was expanded to enable two new IM operations, and new cockpit 
interfaces, displays, and alerting messages were developed and integrated into the simulation 
software to conduct this testing and validation (ref. 6).  
This document presents the results of this human-in-the-loop simulation experiment, a 
collaborative effort in the summer of 2015 by NASA Langley and NASA Ames, with input from 
the FAA. These results have contributed to the definition of requirements for the planned ATD-1 
flight demonstration in 2017 and to the FAA’s most recent concept of operations for Interval 
Management (ref. 7). 
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1.2 Current Operational Need 
The 2015-2035 FAA Aerospace Forecast predicts U.S. commercial aviation revenue passenger 
miles will grow on average 1.8% annually throughout these twenty years (ref. 8). By 2035, U.S. 
commercial air carriers are projected to fly 1.71 trillion available seat-miles – approximately 167% 
of the seat-miles flown in 2014. Arrivals into high-density airports, especially during peak traffic 
periods and inclement weather, experience inefficiencies due to the use of miles-in-trail procedures 
and step-down descents. These procedures not only fail to achieve the airport’s maximum capacity, 
but also increase controller workload, arrival delay, aircraft fuel burn, emissions, and noise. While 
advanced Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) procedures exist at a limited number of sites (e.g., 
area navigation (RNAV) arrivals and optimized profile descents), they are not well utilized due to 
the lack of supporting scheduling and spacing tools. 
There is a need in airspace operations for deconflicted traffic operations that provide coordinated 
and achievable scheduling. Trajectories currently proceed to the airport terminal area, but do not 
necessarily connect to specific runways. While step-down arrivals and vectors by controllers help 
provide greater controllability of the aircraft’s trajectory, they are less fuel efficient than a PBN 
derived schedule. Decision support tools for controllers and pilots are needed to better manage 
arrival scheduling and throughput, thereby allowing the controller foreknowledge of known 
delays, which can be managed sooner using smaller speed variance. The use of speed control in 
place of step-downs and vectoring allows pilots to maintain their aircraft closer to optimum 
trajectories, thereby improving fuel efficiency. 
1.3 ATD-1 and IM Goals 
The high-level goals of the integrated ATD-1 ConOps include increasing the throughput of high-
density airports, increasing efficiency of arrival operations, and promoting aircraft Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) equipage. The ATD-1 concept provides deconflicted 
and efficient operations of multiple arrival streams of aircraft from a point prior to Top-of-Descent 
(TOD) to the Final Approach Fix (FAF). Aircraft on these arrival streams primarily use speed 
control along their optimized profile descents to maintain adequate separation from other aircraft 
and to achieve precise schedule conformance, thereby decreasing the number of instances that 
aircraft are vectored off path or required to fly level-flight segments after the aircraft has passed 
the TOD (ref. 9). 
The goal of IM is to improve the precision of spacing between aircraft, thereby improving traffic 
flow and airport throughput and potentially reducing the overall voice communication requirement 
for controllers. 
1.4 Previous ATD-1 Research 
The IMAC experiment leveraged the knowledge gained from previous ATD-1 simulation research. 
From 2011 through 2015, the ATD-1 Sub-Project directed sixteen different simulation 
experiments that explored many aspects of the ATD-1 ConOps, in various traffic scenarios and at 
different airports (see Appendix C of ref. 1 for a summary of the experiments, objectives, and 
findings). These experiments used a range of benign medium-density operations to very complex 
and dynamic high-density operations based on the focus of the research. The ATD-1 research itself 
typically focused on enhancements to arrival scheduling automation and the acceptability of new 
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decision support tools designed to help the controllers achieve the arrival schedule, on cockpit 
displays and the workload and acceptability to pilots, or on analyzing the overall system 
performance of the three NASA technologies in an integrated operation. 
As the final simulation experiment in the ATD-1 research effort, IMAC used all three ATD-1 
technologies, collected data from participating controllers and pilots, and incorporated all the 
lessons learned and best practices of previous ATD-1 research. This experiment also incorporated, 
for the first time in ATD-1 research experiments, two new IM operations (CAPTURE and 
MAINTAIN), and utilized continuous trajectories for the en route airway structure to the runway 
threshold (the arrival procedures and approach procedures into Denver International Airport 
(KDEN) connect to each other). 
Grouped by the three ATD-1 technologies, below are some of the operational procedures and 
techniques used in this experiment that were derived from previous NASA research. 
• TMA-TM (TBFM schedule): 
o A 0.3 nm spacing buffer is added to the minimum wake vortex separation criteria 
(ref. 10, 16, and 20) to account for variability in controller technique, pilot response 
time, and variation in the final approach speed between final approach fix and the 
runway (ref. 28, 29, and 30) 
o Trajectory used by TMA-TM should be almost identical to trajectory used by 
aircraft flight management system to reduce schedule error (led to decision to use 
Denver since arrivals and approaches connect to each other) (ref. 31) 
• CMS: 
o Feeder controllers use CMS displays to minimize the required delay; Final 
controllers use displays to manage the spacing between aircraft (ref. 31) 
o Controllers can use the CMS displays to more precisely control aircraft, and the 
flight crew find the procedures acceptable (ref. 20 and 32) 
• IM: 
o Controllers to issue IM clearance after IM aircraft has less than 60 seconds of delay 
(reduce the probability that the IM aircraft will require vectors off path) (ref. 33) 
o Controllers may use the Target aircraft’s call sign when issuing the IM clearance, 
however using the phonetic or alpha-numeric identifier is also acceptable (ref. 33) 
o Flight crew to use VNAV speed mode (enter IM speed into mode control panel 
instead of the flight management system) to reduce pilot head down time (ref. 11) 
o Flight crew should respond to a change to the IM speed within 10 seconds; the IM 
displays show the speed in reverse video for up to ten seconds until that speed is 
set in the mode control panel, then flashing reverse video is used (ref. 11) 
1.5 Terminology 
Over the course of the ATD-1 Project, the naming convention for some technologies and 
procedures has evolved, particularly when transferred to the FAA. The bulleted items below 
describe the terms used primarily in this document and the corresponding terms found in the 
reference material and in operational FAA use. 
• Time Based Flow Management (TBFM) is the FAA technology that incorporates NASA’s 
TMA-TM software. The terms are interchangeable in this document, with TMA-TM used 
when describing the original NASA technology in Section 2 and Appendix A, and TBFM 
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used when describing the scenarios, operations, and results in the remainder of the 
document. 
• Terminal Sequencing And Spacing (TSAS) is the FAA term for enhancements to the 
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) for controllers in the 
Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON), with Initial Operational Capability 
planned for 2019. These enhancements incorporate NASA’s TMA-TM and CMS 
technologies. The term TSAS is used predominately throughout the document, and TMA-
TM and CMS when describing the original technology in Section 2. 
o TSAS operations as used in this document are essentially identical to current day 
operations in Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) airspace, but within 
TRACON airspace, the controller has enhanced TSAS decision support tools 
available to create a more precise arrival flow. 
• The term Flight deck Interval Management (FIM) originally described cockpit-specific 
equipment or displays, whereas IM described the overall integrated system of both ground 
tools for controllers and airborne tools for flight crews. The terms are interchangeable for 
the purposes of this document, with the term IM used almost exclusively in this document, 
while the references use the term FIM. 
o The term FIM is also used in the aircraft data tag of  the controller displays to 
indicate an IM clearance has been issued to the flight crew, but the operation has 
not yet commenced (Section 2.2.2) 
• The IM “operation” occurs when the flight crew of the IM equipped aircraft fly the IM 
commanded speeds. The IM “clearance” is the voice instruction given by the controller to 
the flight crew. 
• The names of the three IM operations explored in this experiment were coordinated with 
an FAA data communication working group to ensure clear and concise terminology. The 
terms and the corresponding reference material definition are: 
o CROSS: Achieve-By and Then Maintain 
o CAPTURE: Capture and Then Maintain 
o MAINTAIN: Maintain Current Spacing 
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2 ConOps, Technologies, Clearances, and Procedures 
2.1 ATD-1 Concept of Operation 
The ATD-1 ConOps combines advanced arrival scheduling, controller decision support tools, and 
aircraft avionics to enable deconflicted and multiple efficient arrival streams in high-density 
terminal airspace. To achieve increased fuel efficiency during periods of high traffic demand, 
aircraft use optimized profile descent procedures that include a transition from the arrival 
procedure to the instrument approach procedure of the assigned runway.  
When an arriving aircraft crosses a Freeze Horizon (tailored to each airport, nominally 150 to 250 
nautical miles from the airport), the TMA-TM tool assigns the most suitable runway and freezes 
the Scheduled Times of Arrival (STA) for the Meter Fix, terminal Meter Points, and runway 
threshold. The relevant schedule information is then shown to both en route and terminal 
controllers. 
En route controllers issue a clearance specifying the arrival procedure and expected runway to all 
aircraft, and they use the Delay Countdown Timer (DCT) shown on their displays to issue speed 
instructions for aircraft to achieve the STA calculated at the Meter Fix by TMA-TM. When the 
required delay is predicted to exceed the capability of speed-only operations, the en route controller 
will use path stretching (vectors) or step down the aircraft to lower altitudes to absorb the delay, 
then reverting to speed-only control when feasible. At that point, the controller will issue the flight 
crew the clearance to descend via the arrival procedure, and for equipped aircraft, issue the IM 
clearance. If the delay is not absorbed as expected, the controller interrupts the descend-via arrival 
procedure (and suspends the IM operation if applicable), then uses speed control instructions, 
vectoring, and/or altitude step-downs until the delay has been reduced. 
Terminal controllers are shown aircraft data, STA information, graphical slot markers, and speed 
advisories on their displays to correct the remaining schedule error or delay. The Feeder controller 
uses the slot marker as a spatial indicator to adjust the aircraft in order to meet the STA, and may 
also use the speed advisories as a guide. The Final controller may use the TMA-TM schedule 
information to assist in merging arrival flows, and use the TSAS speeds if appropriate; however, 
the Final controller’s primary responsibility remains ensuring proper separation on final approach. 
All flight crews fly the ATC assigned speed, the IM commanded speed, or the published speed 
during the arrival and approach. Flight crews of IM equipped aircraft are issued the IM clearance 
after the Freeze Horizon and after delay vectors are no longer expected. Depending on the type of 
operations, the IM information contained in the clearance consists of: the Target aircraft’s ID 
(identification, i.e., the airline code and flight number), the Target’s route of flight, the Assigned 
Spacing Goal (ASG), and the Planned Termination Point (PTP). The ASG is calculated by the 
TBFM software and is the desired interval (in time or distance) between the Target and IM aircraft 
at a particular waypoint, defined as the Achieve-By Point (ABP). (Note: during the MAINTAIN 
operation, the ASG is calculated by the IM avionics onboard the aircraft.) During IMAC, the ABP 
was set as the PTP, which was the FAF on the IM aircraft’s route. 
In the ATD-1 ConOps, controllers retain responsibility for the safe separation of all aircraft (TSAS 
or IM operations). For IM operations, the Ownship may be on either the same or different arrival 
procedure as the Target aircraft. Controllers will “suspend” IM operations if the need exists to 
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momentarily vector either the IM aircraft or Target aircraft, and controllers or pilots may “cancel” 
the IM operation if conditions are no longer appropriate for that operation. 
2.2 The ATD-1 Technologies 
The three integrated NASA technologies described in the ATD-1 ConOps are (Figure 1): 
• Traffic Management Advisor with Terminal Metering (TMA-TM), providing precise 
arrival scheduling in the terminal airspace;  
• Controller Managed Spacing (CMS), providing TRACON controllers with decision 
support tools that enable precise schedule conformance; and  
• Interval Management (IM), providing flight deck automation that enables flight crew to 
achieve or maintain precise in-trail spacing behind the preceding aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 1. Integrated NASA technologies used in the ATD-1 ConOps. 
 
2.2.1 Traffic Management Advisor with Terminal Metering (TMA-TM) 
A key element of the ATD-1 ConOps is an advanced ground tool for ATM that generates a time 
deconflicted arrival schedule. This schedule sets the landing time interval between aircraft based 
on wake vortex separation criteria specified in ref. 10 (this interval is the ASG in the IM clearance) 
and calculates the airspeed required for an aircraft to achieve that interval. TMA-TM extends the 
basic TBFM scheduling capability by including terminal meter points, improved trajectory 
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modeling inside TRACON airspace, and optimized flow of multiple arrival stream merges into an 
airport. The terminal delay model is enhanced to be more compatible with PBN procedures, and 
to enforce separation constraints at merge points within the terminal area. 
When TMA-TM has determined the STA for an aircraft, its position in the arrival stream, the 
amount of delay (if any), and the data necessary for an IM clearance, all of that information is 
displayed on the ARTCC controller’s meter list. All arriving aircraft are included in the meter list, 
with the appropriate meter fix STA (hhmm format) and delay (mm:ss format, with “+” indicating 
additional delay required) shown for each. The appropriate IM clearance information (i.e., Target 
aircraft call sign and route, the assigned spacing interval, and landing runway) is displayed for 
only the IM capable aircraft (Figure 2). 
The following items are contained within the list: 
• Aircraft call sign 
• Meter fix STA 
• Amount of delay to the meter fix 
• Achieve-By Point (*) 
• Spacing Goal (+) 
• Target aircraft 
• Target aircraft route (*) 
• Runway 
 (*) Note – These two items are only applicable to CROSS clearance operations. 
 (+) Note – This item is only applicable to the CROSS and CAPTURE operations. 
 
Figure 2. IM information displayed on the controller’s meter list. 
 
An example of the CROSS voice clearance that the ARTCC controller would issue based on the 
IM information displayed on the meter list in Figure 2, would be: 
“LOF3368, for Interval Spacing, CROSS LEETS 95 seconds behind ACA4255 on the CREDE 3 
Arrival. Report PAIRED.”  
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2.2.2 Controller Managed Spacing (CMS) 
CMS are tools for TRACON controllers that assist in achieving their goal of maximizing 
throughput on capacity-constrained runways by ensuring they have knowledge of the same arrival 
schedule that en route controllers are using to manage arrival flows into the terminal airspace. The 
CMS tools provide the information necessary to more accurately achieve arrival schedule 
conformance using speed commands. This information is expected to allow TRACON controllers 
to reduce the use of tactical vectoring, thereby minimizing interruptions to fuel-efficient PBN 
arrival procedures. These CMS tools (Figure 3) function as follows: 
• Schedule Timeline (left panel) 
The timeline displays the TMA-TM-computed schedule at the scheduling point 
relevant for a particular controller position. Entries for each aircraft show the aircraft 
identification code and a symbol that identifies the aircraft’s weight class. Estimated 
time-of-arrival (ETA) entries appear on the left side of the timeline (always shown in 
white); STA entries appear on the right side. The STA is colored green for aircraft that 
have not initiated hand-off to the sector, bright white when the upstream controller 
initiates hand-off, and the same white as the ETA when the receiving controller accepts 
the hand-off. 
• Slot markers (top right and bottom right panels) 
Slot markers translate the schedule into a spatial target on a controller’s display. The 
slot marker circle indicates where an aircraft should be at a given time if it were to fly 
the arrival and approach procedures, meet the TMA-TM calculated STA at the Meter 
Fix and Meter Points, and arrive at the runway threshold on schedule. The 
instantaneous indicated airspeed of the slot marker is also displayed adjacent to the slot 
marker circle.  The aircraft shown are travelling left to right (eastbound). In the top 
right panel, an aircraft that is close to on-time appears inside the circle, while in the 
bottom right panel an aircraft that is slightly early appears ahead of the circle. Note that 
the slot markers are always positioned along the arrival procedure used to schedule the 
aircraft, even if the associated aircraft has been temporarily vectored off the procedure. 
• Early/Late Indicators (top right panel) 
The Early/Late indicator is located in an aircraft’s data block and shown only when a 
speed advisory (described below) is not shown; i.e., when speed control is insufficient 
to absorb the required delay. It enables controllers to quickly assess the schedule 
conformance of that aircraft in a manner similar to the delay countdown timer presently 
available to ARTCC controllers. An early/late indicator is displayed using three 
characters in the third line of the data block, displaying the required delay with one-
second precision when the absolute delay is less than 100 seconds (e.g., -15 indicates 
an aircraft is fifteen seconds late); larger delay values are shown with one-minute 
precision (e.g., +2M indicates an aircraft is approximately two minutes early). Thus, 
the SWA353 example in Figure 3 is indicating that the TMA-TM schedule is estimating 
it to be three seconds early. 
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• Speed advisories (bottom right panel) 
Speed advisories display airspeeds computed to put the aircraft back on schedule and 
are shown only when an early/late indicator (above) is not shown. The advised airspeed 
is computed using information about the TBFM reference speed profile along the 
assigned arrival and is displayed in ten-knot increments. If an aircraft is late, a speed 
increase may be advised. The speed advisories appear in the same three-character field 
on the third line of the data block that is used to display the early/late indicator. Thus, 
the speed advisory for SWA1184 is 190 knots, which is slower than the nominal speed 
of 210 knots for that segment, causing the aircraft to move towards the slot marker. If 
TMA-TM cannot compute a speed advisory different than the nominal speed, or the 
required speed is outside the available speed control margin, the early/late indicator is 
displayed instead. 
 
 
Figure 3. CMS tools and displays. 
 
Additional displays beyond the basic CMS tools have also been developed to help controllers 
monitor the status of IM operations in ARTCC (Figure 4) and TRACON (Figure 5) airspace. 
On ARTCC controller workstations, a special yellow “@” symbol above the aircraft’s call sign in 
its data tag indicates to the controller which aircraft are IM capable along with the status of the IM 
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operation (Figure 4, left panel). When controllers issue an IM clearance to the flight crew, they 
enter a two character keyboard command that changes the “@” symbol from yellow to magenta in 
the aircraft’s data tag (Figure 4, center panel). The IM symbol in the aircraft data tag is a visual 
reinforcement that the IM clearance has been issued but the aircraft is not actively PAIRED with 
its Target. Upon receiving notification from the flight crew that the aircraft is PAIRED with its 
Target, the controller updates the data tag with a different keyboard command that changes the 
magenta “@” symbol to a magenta colored capital “S” (Figure 4, right panel). During the time 
period between when the controller issues the IM clearance until the flight crew reports PAIRED, 
TSAS operations remain in effect and the controller issues vectors, speed instructions, or altitude 
step-down instructions as required. 
If the IM operation is suspended with the intention of resuming the operation at a later time, the 
controller reverts the “S” in the data tag to the magenta “@”. This indication shows that the flight 
crew still has an IM clearance but is not actively PAIRED. When the IM operation is resumed, the 
controller changes the magenta “@” back to a magenta “S”. If the controller has no intention of 
resuming the IM operation and cancels it, the controller reverts the “S” to a yellow “@”. 
 
 
Figure 4. IM status indications on the ARTCC controller workstations. 
 
On TRACON controller workstations, from left to right in Figure 5, the TRACON data tag 
symbology indicates which aircraft do not have an IM clearance, which aircraft have an IM 
clearance but are not PAIRED (“FIM” located in the lower line), and which aircraft are PAIRED 
(magenta “SPC” in the lower line). If the aircraft enters the TRACON’s airspace indicating “FIM” 
(i.e., aircraft has been issued an IM clearance but has not initiated the IM operation) and 
subsequently reports PAIRED, the TRACON controller makes a two-character keyboard 
command that changes the “FIM” indication to “SPC”. 
If the IM operation is suspended with the intention of resuming the operation at a later time, the 
controller reverts the “SPC” in the data tag to “FIM”. This indication shows that the crew still has 
an IM clearance but is not actively PAIRED. When the IM operation is resumed, the controller 
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changes the “FIM” back to a magenta “SPC”. If the controller has no intention of resuming the IM 
operation and cancels it, the controller removes the “SPC”. 
The CMS tools also provide the TRACON controller with the arrival sequence number of each 
aircraft to that runway. In Figure 5, the number ‘26’ in the bottom line of the data block indicates 
that UAL781 is the twenty-sixth aircraft in sequence to land on runway 35R. 
 
 
Figure 5. IM status indicators on the TRACON controller workstations. 
 
2.2.3 Interval Management (IM) 
2.2.3.1 IM Procedure 
The IM procedure enables the flight crew to achieve and/or maintain an ATC assigned spacing 
interval behind a specific aircraft landing on the same runway immediately in front of the IM 
aircraft, i.e., Target aircraft. Depending on the operational need of the controller and the 
geometrical relationship between the IM and Target aircraft, the controller may issue the IM 
clearance in either time or distance, and may dictate whether the ASG is to be achieved 
immediately or as late as the FAF. 
After the flight crew enters the clearance information into the IM user interface (procedurally 
designed to occur after the flight crew have already entered the Ownship route information and 
forecast wind) and once the software receives the position of the Target (from ADS-B transmitted 
messages), the algorithm calculates an airspeed for the flight crew to fly to meet the clearance. 
Once an airspeed is displayed to the flight crew, they assess the speed and determine as a crew if 
it is operationally acceptable or not. If it is, they manually enter this airspeed into the autoflight 
system via the Mode Control Panel (MCP). This procedure was recommended by an airline partner 
in previous simulation experiments to limit the head down time of the pilots, especially when 
operating below 10,000 feet (United Parcel Service in ref. 36). 
When the flight crew use this procedure to fly the IM commanded airspeed, shown both on the 
side-mounted Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) and the forward-mounted Configurable Graphics 
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Display (CGD), previous research has indicated that the aircraft can cross the specified waypoint 
after the Target aircraft within five seconds of the ASG (ref. 11). 
2.2.3.2 IM Spacing Algorithm 
The basic goal of an airborne spacing algorithm is to provide an airspeed to the flight crew, which 
if flown, nulls the spacing error. The NASA-developed Airborne Spacing for Terminal Arrival 
Routes (ASTAR) algorithm uses detailed route information for both aircraft to allow spacing 
procedures to begin any time after the Target aircraft’s route is communicated to the IM aircraft. 
A more detailed description of the ASTAR algorithm is provided in Appendix A. 
In 2015, the algorithm was updated to version ASTAR13 to support new IM operations described 
in the IM industry standards (ref. 3 and ref. 4). These standards define five different IM clearance 
types: Achieve-by Then Maintain (CROSS), Capture Then Maintain (CAPTURE), Maintain 
Current Spacing (MAINTAIN), Final Approach Spacing (SPACE), and IM Turn (TURN). 
Prior versions of ASTAR consisted of only a trajectory-based speed control law, and therefore 
could only support the Achieve-by portion of the CROSS clearance. To enable the full 
implementation of the IM operations (except for the IM TURN), the previous ASTAR Trajectory-
Based Operation (TBO) speed control law (ref. 12) was augmented with a state-based Constant 
Time Delay (CTD) speed control law (ref. 13 and ref. 14). In these supported clearance types, 
ASTAR ceases to provide speed commands for spacing at the PTP, which is a point on the 
Ownship’s route that is either designated by ATC, part of the planned procedure, or a default 
location close to the FAF. 
The TBO speed control law in ASTAR13 is designed to support IM operations both when the IM 
and Target aircraft are in-trail and when they are on merging routes. The spacing error is calculated 
using the time-to-go of the IM and Target aircraft along their predicted 4D trajectories. A 
proportional control algorithm with an additional ground speed compensation term is then used to 
determine the amount of speed compensation that is required to achieve a precise spacing interval 
at a controller designated achieve-by point. The IM commanded speed is calculated by adding the 
speed compensation to predicted 4D trajectory airspeed. A discretized IM command speed is 
shown to the pilots, who are expected to close the control loop by entering the speed into their 
aircraft’s mode control panel speed window. An instantaneous commanded speed is used to drive 
a FAST/SLOW indicator to help pilots maintain better speed conformance when decelerating or 
accelerating toward the discrete commanded end speed. Additional details of the TBO speed 
control law are described in Appendix A.3.1. 
The state-based CTD speed control law measures spacing error differently than the TBO speed 
control law, and can only be used when the IM and Target aircraft are in-trail. The measured 
spacing interval is measured as the difference in time between when the Target aircraft arrived at 
a particular along-path position and when the IM aircraft arrived at the same along path position. 
The spacing error is the difference between the measured spacing interval and the assigned spacing 
goal. A proportional control law is used to determine the amount of speed compensation that is 
needed to capture or maintain the assigned spacing goal. The IM commanded speed is calculated 
by adding the speed compensation to the Target aircraft’s time-history speed, i.e., the speed that 
the Target aircraft flew when it was at the IM aircraft’s current along path position. The IM 
commanded speed is discretized and filtered before being displayed to the flight crew, who are 
expected to close the control loop by entering the speed into their aircraft’s mode control panel 
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speed window. Similarly to the TBO speed control law, an instantaneous commanded speed is 
used to drive a fast/slow indicator to help pilots maintain better speed conformance when 
decelerating or accelerating toward the discrete commanded end speed. Additional details of the 
TBO speed control law are described in Appendix A.3.2. 
2.2.3.3 IM Cockpit Human-Machine Interfaces 
The cockpit avionic devices used during this experiment to conduct IM operations included an 
EFB and a CGD for each pilot (Figure 6). A detailed description and illustrations of the EFB and 
CGD displays are given in Appendix B.  
 
      
Figure 6. IM Cockpit Interfaces: EFB (left) and CGD (right). 
 
 
  
 16 
A high-level description of the functionality of the IM displays to assist the flight crew in 
accomplishing the IM procedure and conduct the IM operation is given below. 
• A design goal of the IM cockpit display was to allow for intuitive data entry of Ownship 
data, forecast wind data, and IM clearance data. When entered in the typical sequence, the 
flight crew enters data in the EFB from left to right, top to bottom. Active data fields are 
highlighted in green, and arrows within the data field indicate another page will be 
presented when selected (similar to aircraft flight management systems). This functionality 
exists only on the EFB. 
• To minimize the time required for the flight crew to monitor the IM equipment, changes to 
the IM commanded speed were made salient (noticeable difference) by changing the 
background from black to green to highlight the new IM speed. For additional saliency, if 
the flight crew did not set the new IM speed within 10 seconds in the mode control panel 
speed window, the IM speed display cycles from black to green. Once the flight crew sets 
the new IM speed in the mode control panel, the background returns to black with the speed 
shown in green. This functionality exists on both the EFB and CGD. 
• The state of IM spacing algorithm (ARMED, PAIRED, etc.) and alert messages (Target 
off path, Ownship off path, etc.) are displayed to the flight crew. Although this 
functionality exists on both the EFB and CGD, only a subset of the most critical messages 
needed to conduct the IM operation are shown on the CGD. 
• A rate cue for decelerating the aircraft, called the FAST/SLOW indicator, allows pilots to 
quickly compare the relationship between the IM instantaneous speed to the aircraft’s 
current speed. This functionality exists on both the EFB and CGD. 
• A cue for the along-path position of the aircraft, called the EARLY/LATE indicator, 
provides the flight crew an awareness of their ability to meet the assigned spacing goal 
within the expected tolerance. This functionality only exists on the EFB due to insufficient 
space on the CGD, and only at certain times (as specified in ref. 4). 
 
The EFB is mounted on the outboard panel and the CGD just outboard of the aircraft’s navigation 
display (see Figures in Section 4). Since pilots frequently use the EFB for non-IM tasks (e.g., 
reviewing approach charts) and it is mounted outside of the pilot’s optimal primary field of view 
(FAA defined as within ± 15 degrees horizontally of a level line of sight, and vertically level to a 
30 degree downward line of sight), the smaller CGD is designed to show, within the pilot’s optimal 
forward field of view, only the critical subset of information needed to conduct the IM operation. 
 
2.3 IM Operation Types 
While the industry standard (ref. 3) defines five IM operations, the IMAC experiment assessed 
only three of the five IM operations: the CROSS, CAPTURE, and MAINTAIN. 
Of the three IM operation types used in this experiment, the CROSS operation is the one used in 
all previous IM research and ATD-1 experiments and requires the most information to be issued 
by the controller and entered into the IM software by the flight crew. While the CROSS operation 
is able to support complex merging geometries by the IM and Target aircraft, when the aircraft are 
in trail, much of the information in the clearance does not need to be included in the controller’s 
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instruction. Thus the CAPTURE and MAINTAIN operations are alternatives that offer a lower 
workload for the controller and flight crew to accomplish essentially the same procedure. 
2.3.1 CROSS 
The goal of the CROSS operation is to achieve the ATC specified ASG at a designated ABP and 
then maintain that spacing interval until the PTP. The CROSS operation can be used either when 
the Ownship and Target aircraft are on different routes or when they are on the same route. CROSS 
is the appropriate IM operation type when the controller has a specific ASG to be met at an ABP. 
If the ABP and PTP coincide, there is no maintain phase of the IM operation. 
The CROSS operation type requires both the Ownship and Target aircrafts’ route information to 
be entered into the IM avionics, even if the routes are the same. Although the PTP is required by 
the IM industry standard and by the ASTAR algorithm, the ATD-1 ConOps makes it optional for 
the controller to issue it as part of the voice instruction since it is procedurally defined as the FAF. 
If the controller issues a PTP that is not the FAF, the flight crew modifies the PTP data field on 
the IM interface to comply.  
Data elements, their source, and entry type for the CROSS clearance are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Data Required for IM CROSS Clearance 
Data element Source of data Type of entry 
IM clearance type ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Achieve-By Point (ABP) ATC instruction Auto by software, modifiable by pilot 
Assigned Spacing Goal (ASG) ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Target aircraft identification ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Target aircraft routing ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Planned Termination Point (opt) ATC instruction Auto by software, modifiable by pilot 
Wind Data (optional) Weather service Manually by pilot 
2.3.2 CAPTURE 
The goal of the CAPTURE operation is to capture an ASG and then maintain that goal until the 
PTP (that is, there is no defined point at which the ASG must be achieved, rather a rate of closure 
specified in the IM industry standard is used). The CAPTURE operation is used when the Ownship 
and Target aircraft are on the same route and the controller has a specific ASG (in time or distance) 
to be kept between the two aircraft. There is no ABP since the spacing algorithm provides for a 
moderate rate of closure to the assigned spacing goal interval. 
Although the Target aircraft’s route is required by the IM industry standard and by the ASTAR 
algorithm, it is not issued verbally by the controller since it is procedurally defined as to be the 
same as the Ownship’s route. Although the PTP is required by the industry standard and by the 
ASTAR algorithm, the ATD-1 ConOps makes it optional for the controller to issue it as part of the 
voice instruction since it is procedurally defined as the FAF. If the controller issues a PTP that is 
not the FAF, the flight crew modifies the PTP data field on the IM interface to comply. The forecast 
wind entry is not required since the CTD speed control law does not use that data in the calculations 
for the IM commanded speed. 
Data elements, their source, and entry type for the CAPTURE clearance are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Data Required for IM CAPTURE Clearance 
Data element Source of data Type of entry 
IM clearance type ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Assigned Spacing Goal (ASG) ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Target aircraft identification ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Target aircraft routing (optional) ATC instruction Auto by software, not modifiable 
Planned Termination Point (opt) ATC instruction Auto by software, modifiable by pilot 
 
2.3.3 MAINTAIN 
The goal of the MAINTAIN operation is to maintain the current spacing interval between the 
Ownship and Target aircraft until the PTP. Similarly to the CAPTURE operation, the MAINTAIN 
operation can only be used when the Ownship and Target aircraft are on the same route. Unlike 
the CROSS and CAPTURE operations that are intended for use during arrival operations when 
metering is in effect, the MAINTAIN operation is intended for use during en route metering 
operations or when metering is not in effect during arrivals. 
The ASG is calculated by the aircraft’s IM spacing software, and therefore is not included in the 
voice instruction by the controller. The Target’s route is also not included in the voice instruction 
since procedurally it must be the same as the Ownship aircraft’s route. Similar to the CROSS and 
CAPTURE clearance, if the PTP was not included in the controller’s voice instruction, the 
software auto-populates the FAF as the PTP and no action is required by the pilot. If the controller 
does issue a PTP waypoint, the pilot manually enters that waypoint into the IM interface. 
Since the TBFM scheduling function calculates the ASG to meet wake turbulence separation 
criteria at the FAF and that value is not passed to the flight crew, there is no expectation that a 
MAINTAIN operation initiated in the ARTCC would be suitable at the FAF. 
Data elements, their source, and entry type for the MAINTAIN clearance are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Data Required for IM MAINTAIN Clearance 
Data element Source of data Type of entry 
IM clearance type ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Target aircraft identification ATC instruction Manually by pilot 
Target aircraft routing (optional) ATC instruction Auto by software, not modifiable 
Planned Termination Point (opt) ATC instruction Auto by software, modifiable by pilot 
2.4 Controller and Pilot Procedures 
This section provides a cursory overview of the controller and pilot procedures used during the 
experiment to conduct non-IM (TSAS only) and IM (TSAS plus IM for those aircraft equipped) 
operations. A more complete description of the pilot procedures and the controller-pilot 
phraseology required for these procedures are listed in Appendix C. 
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2.4.1 Controller Procedures 
2.4.1.1 General 
Subject controllers had the responsibility for maintaining separation at all times during both TSAS 
and IM operations. They were also expected to avoid compromising the TBFM schedule by 
vectoring other aircraft to accommodate IM operations. All aircraft were considered RNAV 
equipped, and capable of Instrument Landing System (ILS) and Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP) approaches. 
The two confederate controllers assisted the research team in conducting the experiment and 
creating as realistic a simulation environment as feasible. The “Ghost” controller had the 
responsibility of communicating to all subject pilots and pseudo-pilots flying aircraft that did not 
initiate at the start of the scenario within one of the en route subject controller’s airspace. At the 
appropriate time, the “Ghost” controller used normal ARTCC hand-off procedures to ensure the 
pilots checked in to the correct en route controller at the sector boundary. The “Tower” controller 
had the responsibility to clear the pilots to land on the appropriate runway and to monitor the 
separation between aircraft while on final approach. 
2.4.1.2 En Route Subject Controllers 
For both non-IM and IM operations, the procedures began when the en route subject controller 
issued the descent clearance and advised the flight crew of which runway to expect. 
For non-IM operations, the en route subject controllers were expected to meter aircraft using 
conventional methods (i.e., speed changes, altitude step-downs, and vectoring) to achieve precise 
schedule conformance. If the en route controller had assigned the flight crew a speed other than 
that shown on the published Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR), that controller must either 
coordinate the speed assignment with the Feeder controller, or have the flight crew “resume normal 
speed” prior to entering the terminal airspace. 
For IM operations, the en route subject controllers were expected to absorb any metering delay in 
excess of one minute prior to advising the flight crew that an IM clearance was available. Once 
the crew responded they were ready to copy the IM clearance, the controller issued one of the three 
IM clearance types described in the previous section. 
The controller registered the IM clearance into TBFM using their keyboard, which caused the  
associated aircraft data tag to be displayed as a magenta colored @ symbol above the aircraft call 
sign (Figure 4). Upon notification that the aircraft was actively PAIRED and conducting the IM 
operation, the controller registered that information which caused the data tag to be displayed as a 
magenta colored S symbol above the aircraft call sign (Figure 4). The en route controllers’ 
procedures were completed when the aircraft was handed off to the TRACON Feeder controller. 
2.4.1.3 Terminal Controllers 
After receiving the handoff, the Feeder controller would issue the type of approach (ILS or RNP) 
and runway to expect. All “short side” (i.e., aligned with the landing traffic) aircraft were assigned 
the ILS approach, and all aircraft on the “long side” (i.e., on downwind and requiring a 180 degree 
turn to land) were assigned the RNP approach to the runway closest to their direction of arrival. 
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This procedure was used to ensure the flight crew could be issued a continuous, published 
trajectory, from the en route airway structure to the landing runway. 
For non-IM operations, the controller used the TSAS decision support tools (i.e., slot markers, 
speed advisors, and delay count-down timer) to assist in issuing speed instructions or vectors to 
safely maximize throughput and achieve the schedule. 
For IM operations, TRACON controllers did not have information available to them to issue an 
IM clearance within the terminal airspace, nor was there indication of which aircraft were IM 
capable (based on discussions with the FAA on what functionality and capability would exist by 
2017 in their operational systems). Hence, all IM operations were initiated by en route controllers.  
The aircraft data-tag used by the terminal controller provided IM status information. If an aircraft 
had received an IM clearance but was not actively PAIRED with its Target, the data-tag would 
have FIM displayed in the bottom line. If the aircraft was actively PAIRED with its Target, a 
magenta colored SPC would appear in the bottom line. 
In the event that the IM aircraft entered the terminal airspace with FIM status shown and then 
became PAIRED with its Target within the terminal airspace, the controller would enter an FS 
keyboard command (same entry as the en route controller). This entry would then update the data-
tag from FIM to SPC to indicate active pairing.  
If the controller needed to suspend the IM operation momentarily with the expectation of allowing 
the operation to resume at a later time, the keyboard command FS would toggle the data-tag from 
SPC to FIM. This would indicate that the aircraft had an IM clearance but was following ATC 
commands versus those that were actively conducting IM operations. 
2.4.2 Flight Crew Procedures 
2.4.2.1 Non-Subject Pilots 
The six non-subject pilots flying the Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS) pseudo-pilot stations 
(described in 4.1.4) used command line entry commands to control from one to eight different 
aircraft, which varied based on the scenario and time frame within that scenario. These aircraft 
directly correlated to one of the six controller stations, that is, the same MACS pseudo-pilot 
remained on the same controller frequency throughout the entire run, and any aircraft within that 
controller’s sector would be controlled by that MACS pilot. The MACS pilots used their displays 
to hand-off the aircraft to the next MACS pilot when directed by the current controller to change 
to the next controller. 
2.4.2.2 Subject Pilots Flying Non-IM Operations 
During BASELINE scenarios, and during any other scenario when an IM operation was not being 
conducted, the flight crews were expected to comply with published procedures and ATC 
instructions as they do during current real-world operations. A partial list of responsibilities 
included: (1) ensuring FMS was programed correctly; (2) responding to ATC instructions and 
queries; (3) initiating descent when instructed; (4) meeting lateral, vertical, and speed constraints 
as depicted on the published procedure or as directed by ATC; and (5) configuring the aircraft for 
final approach and landing. 
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2.4.2.3 Subject Pilots Flying IM Operations 
When flying IM operations, the subject pilots were expected to meet the requirements and 
accomplish the tasks for current-day non-IM operations. In addition to these tasks, the pilots were 
also expected to conduct the tasks and procedures required for the IM operation. 
A design goal of the IM flight crew procedures was to make them consistent with the normal 
workflow of the pilots and mirror current-day arrival procedures. The procedures are divided into 
three distinct phases: programming the EFB, flying the arrival in vertical navigation (VNAV) 
speed mode, and configuring and landing in VNAV Path mode. 
The flight crew are expected to enter two categories of information into their EFB display: 
Ownship and wind information, and the IM clearance (see Appendix B for descriptions of the IM 
software, displays, messages, indications, and data entry). This programming may occur at 
different times throughout the flight, depending on the type of data entry and the flight crews’ 
workload. Ownship and wind information were entered by the flight crew well prior to arriving at 
the destination airport, and preferably during a low workload phase of flight, such as prior to top-
of-descent. Using the EFB interface, the destination airport, arrival routing with transition, and the 
approach were selected. Forecast descent and surface winds were then loaded by Aircraft 
Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) uplink or manually entered. While 
the forecast winds were not required to be entered, they provide improved system performance by 
enabling the IM spacing software to more accurately calculate the Ownship and Target time-to-
go. Therefore, an alert message was displayed on the EFB when the flight crew did not enter the 
forecast winds. 
The IM clearance information was provided to the flight crew in a voice instruction from an 
ARTCC controller either prior to top of descent or shortly thereafter. This information included 
the type of IM clearance as well as the data elements required by that clearance type. Once the IM 
clearance was received, the flight crew was required to enter the clearance into the EFB.   
When all required data had been entered for the clearance type, the flight crew activated the IM 
system. If all requirements were satisfied, the IM system switched to ‘PAIRED’ mode and the IM 
commanded airspeed was displayed to the flight crew. At that time, the pilot was required to open 
the MCP speed window and set the commanded speed. During the remainder of the arrival, the 
flight crew flew the IM commanded speed displayed on the IM avionics while using thrust and 
drag to stay on their VNAV path. For large speed changes, the pilot followed a FAST/SLOW 
indicator that graphically showed the deviation between the airspeed of the Ownship aircraft and 
the speed expected by the spacing algorithm. The EFB may have been used for other functions at 
this time since all the information that the pilot needed to conduct IM operations was displayed on 
the CGD in the pilot’s forward field of view. 
Once the aircraft was on a published portion of the approach and in VNAV path mode, the pilot 
used thrust and drag to maintain the IM commanded airspeed. As the aircraft approached the 
destination, the EARLY/LATE indicator activated and graphically showed the spacing error. At 
the PTP (set as the FAF in this experiment), the IM operation is complete, and the IM information 
was removed from the CGD and EFB displays. At this time the flight crew configured the aircraft 
for landing, and slowed to the final approach speed. 
Other IM procedures enabled controllers to suspend, amend, or terminate an IM operation. The 
flight crew could also notify ATC if they desired to terminate the IM operation.  
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3 Experiment Design 
3.1 Objectives and Scope 
The objectives of this experiment were to assess the acceptability and system performance of three 
IM operation types in realistic, high-density arrival scenarios and to identify implementation issues 
for real-world operations. In particular, IMAC was intended as a risk reduction activity to explore 
the new IM operations (CAPTURE and MAINTAIN), prototype a new avionics design, and 
investigate changes to the IM algorithm design, in preparation for an ATD-1 flight demonstration 
planned for 2017. Therefore, the anticipated capabilities and limitations of the air traffic system at 
that time were modeled in this experiment. 
For simulation efficiency and experimental control, during each scenario only one-half of the 
aircraft were controlled by controllers and flown by pilots (all aircraft east of Denver, or all aircraft 
west of Denver). The aircraft on the opposite side of the airfield were autonomously flown aircraft 
that did not interact with the controllers, pilots, or human flown aircraft. These autonomous aircraft 
were not included in any analysis discussed in this paper, and were only present in the simulation 
to provide additional traffic on the controllers’ and pilots’ displays. Thus the experimental scope 
was focused on arrivals to a single runway, and the more complex system-wide events affecting 
multi-runway operations were not explored. 
3.2 Assumptions 
To retain sufficient focus on the experiment’s objectives and obtain statistically significant data, 
several simplifying assumptions were made and are listed below. 
• Reception of ADS-B data from another aircraft was limited to 120 nmi or less. 
• No positional error was added to either ADS-B or radar data. 
• The TBFM runway load-balancing function was turned off. 
• Controllers were restricted to landing aircraft on the originally assigned runway. 
• Aircraft go-arounds or missed approaches were not included. 
• Aircraft emergencies or events requiring priority landing were not included. 
• Changes to the airport configuration were not included. 
• Dynamic convective weather requiring re-routing was not included. 
3.3 Performance Goals and Hypotheses 
The experiment was designed to meet the objectives by evaluating a subset of the ATD-1 Measures 
of Performance (MOP, ref. 19) consisting of: 
• Success rate of PBN operations (MOP 3.2.2) 
• Percentage of controller-interrupted FIM operations (MOP 3.3.3) 
• Percentage of flight deck-interrupted FIM operations (MOP 3.4.3) 
• Flight crew acceptability of FIM operations (MOP 3.4.4) 
• Flight crew workload of FIM operations (MOP 3.4.5) 
• FIM spacing goal conformance (MOP 3.4.1) 
• Inter-arrival spacing error (MOP 3.3.6) 
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• Controller acceptability of ATD-1 operations (MOP 3.3.4) 
• Controller workload of ATD-1 operations (MOP 3.3.5) 
 
All of the hypotheses and performance goals are based on the ATD-1 MOP Specification, and are 
listed in Table 4. The right column of Table 4 lists the section of this document that contains the 
analysis and results for that performance goal or hypothesis. For the four performance goals, the 
limited sample size based on resource constraints was insufficient for statistical hypothesis testing. 
Instead, the MOP performance goals were assessed using descriptive statistics based on the data 
observed in the experiment, and so conclusions cannot be drawn for the larger population. 
Hypotheses for five of these metrics were determined a priori, and the experiment was designed 
to enable the evaluation of these hypotheses via statistical hypothesis testing. 
Additional metrics of interest include the number of aircraft separation violations, the operational 
efficiency of the CMS tools and procedures, ASTAR spacing algorithm performance, aircraft 
schedule deviation at the FAF and Meter Fix, and operational issues with implementing IM 
procedures. These metrics were investigated using exploratory analysis and results are discussed 
in Section 5.    
Table 4. Correlation of Performance Goals and Hypotheses to Section of Results 
# Performance Goals Section of MOP 
Section of 
Results 
1 The percentage of IM arrivals that have spacing errors at the ABP within 10 seconds will be ≥ 95% 3.4.1 5.3.1 
2a The inter-arrival spacing error of 68% of IM operations following either a TSAS or an IM operation will be ≤ 8 seconds 3.3.6 5.4.2 
2b 
The inter-arrival spacing error of 68% of TSAS operations 
following a TSAS operation or an IM operation will be ≤ 12 
seconds 
3.3.6 5.4.2 
3 The mean controller acceptability rating of ATD-1 operations will be ≥ ‘8’ on a scale of 1 – 10 3.3.4 5.7.1 
4 
The mean controller workload rating for Mental Demand, 
Physical Demand, Time Pressure, and Effort will be ≤ ‘5’, and 
for Success and Frustration will be ≤ ‘3’ on a scale of 1 – 7 
3.3.5 5.7.2 
# Hypotheses Section of MOP 
Section of 
Results
1 The percentage of uninterrupted PBN operations within the TRACON using ATD-1 tools will be > 70% 3.2.2 5.4.2 
2 The percentage of IM operations terminated by ATC prior to the Planned Termination Point will be < 30% 3.3.3 5.5.1 
3 The percentage of IM operations terminated by the flight crew prior to the Planned Termination Point will be < 30% 3.4.3 5.6.1 
4 The mean flight crew acceptability rating of IM operations will be ≥ ‘5’ on a scale of 1 – 7 3.4.4 5.8.1 
5 The mean flight crew workload ratings of IM operations will be ≤ ‘3’ on a scale of 1 – 10 3.4.5 5.8.2 
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3.4 Test Matrix 
The experiment utilized the 1x5 test matrix shown in Table 5 to assess the acceptability and 
performance of three different types of IM operations. Although hypothesis tests were not 
conducted to formally compare the operation types, differences were investigated using 
exploratory analysis. Two replicates of each scenario were conducted – one with the Captain as 
the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the First Officer as the Pilot Flying (PF), and the other replicate 
with the roles reversed. Therefore, each flight crew flew a total of ten scenarios during data 
collection. 
Table 5. IMAC Experiment Test Matrix 
BASELINE CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN MIXED 
Scenario A 
Scenario B 
Scenario C 
Scenario D 
Scenario E 
Scenario F 
Scenario G 
Scenario H 
Scenario I 
Scenario J 
 
A within-subject design was employed, and the run order for the BASELINE, CAPTURE, 
CROSS, and MAINTAIN scenarios was partially counterbalanced using a Latin square design 
(ref. 18). No IM operations were conducted in BASELINE scenarios (TSAS only operations), and 
IM operations of the type corresponding to the cell name were conducted in the three remaining 
scenarios. 
These eight scenarios were followed by the two MIXED scenarios in which the controllers could 
issue a clearance for any of the three IM operations to any suitably equipped aircraft, based on 
their preference and judgment. The MIXED scenarios were intended to emulate a more dynamic 
air traffic control environment, thereby providing the subject controllers a more realistic 
operational context in which to explore the usability and acceptability of the different IM clearance 
types and their corresponding operation. 
Data were collected and analyzed from two groups of subjects, each consisting of four retired air 
traffic controllers and six two-person crews of commercial airline pilots, for a total of eight subject 
controllers and 24 subject pilots. In addition, each group also had two confederate controllers and 
six confederate pilots that assisted the research team in creating realism in the high-density arrival 
operations.  
3.5 Independent Variable 
The independent variable in the experiment was the type of TSAS or IM operation conducted: 
BASELINE, CAPTURE, CROSS, MAINTAIN, and MIXED. The baseline condition (i.e., TSAS 
tools and operations with no IM operations) was included to allow for comparison of system 
performance with and without IM operations. The CAPTURE, CROSS, and MAINTAIN 
scenarios provided the ability to individually assess each of the three IM alternative clearance 
types. In the MIXED scenarios, controllers had the flexibility to issue a clearance for any of the 
three IM operations. 
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3.6 Dependent Measures 
This section briefly describes six categories of dependent measures analyzed in the experiment. A 
seventh category, case studies, illustrates various salient issues or conclusions observed 
independent of the primary metrics. Some of the calculations used in the analysis are further 
described in the ATD-1 Measures of Performance Specification document (ref. 19).  
3.6.1 IM Algorithm Performance 
The three main IM algorithm performance metrics analyzed as part of the experiment were: the 
IM spacing error at the PTP (typically the FAF), the frequency of IM speed changes, and the 
number of IM speed reversals. These metrics focused on verifying that the IM operations provided 
acceptable performance. Analysis and results for these dependent measures are presented in 
Section 5.3. 
The first metric (and Goal #1), the spacing goal conformance at the PTP, is the difference in time 
between the ASG and the difference in the time between when the Target and the Ownship crossed 
the PTP. The spacing goal conformance at the PTP is calculated using data from the ASTAR 
spacing algorithm for every IM aircraft that successfully conducted IM operations to the PTP. The 
minimum success criteria for this metric was for at least 95% of the spacing errors to be within 10 
seconds of the assigned spacing goal (ref. 19, para 3.4.1). 
The second metric was the number and frequency of IM speed changes commanded by ASTAR. 
The frequency of IM speed changes is the number of speed changes commanded by ASTAR 
divided by the total number of minutes that IM operations were conducted. The number and 
frequency of speed changes do not include the initial speed commanded by ASTAR at the 
beginning of an IM operation. The number and frequency of IM commanded speed changes 
includes published speed changes, since the pilot is still responsible for recognizing the new speed 
command and manually entering it into the aircraft. The criteria is for the speed change frequency 
to be less than two speed changes per minute. This criteria is based on a heuristic that was 
developed based on previous IM research (ref. 11). 
The third metric in the IM algorithm performance section was the number of IM commanded 
speeds that reversed direction, that is, commanded an increase to the aircraft’s speed where the 
typical (and operationally preferred) speed command during arrival operations is to slow down. 
3.6.2 Air Traffic System Performance 
The three system performance metrics analyzed for the experiment were: the inter-arrival spacing 
error at the FAF, the PBN success rate, and slot marker deviation in the TRACON. These air traffic 
system performance and results are presented in Section 5.4. 
The first metric (and Goal #2a and #2b), is the inter-arrival spacing error at the FAF, which is a 
measure of how well aircraft achieved their scheduled time intervals at the FAF. The inter-arrival 
spacing error at the FAF is calculated using the following equation: 
Inter – arrival Spacing Error  = (ܣܶܣ௜ − ܣܶܣ௜ିଵ) − (ܵܶܣ௜ − ܵܶܣ௜ିଵ) 
where ATA୧ is the actual time of arrival (ATA) of the aircraft of interest, ATA୧ିଵis the actual time 
of arrival of the preceding aircraft that arrived at the FAF, STA୧ is the scheduled time of arrival of 
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the aircraft of interest, and STA୧ିଵ is the scheduled time of arrival of the preceding aircraft that 
arrived at the FAF. The inter-arrival spacing error at the FAF was calculated for all aircraft in the 
simulation using state data from the aircraft and schedule information from TBFM. For all IM 
operations except for the MAINTAIN operation, the difference between the scheduled times of 
arrival (ܵܶܣ௜ − ܵܶܣ௜ିଵ) was used to establish the ASG, and was provided to the flight crew in the 
IM clearance. For the MAINTAIN operation, the spacing goal was calculated by the IM software 
and was the interval between the Ownship and Target aircraft when the Target was within ADS-
B range and the flight crew pressed the EXECUTE button. 1 The criteria for this metric was for 
68% of the non-IM aircraft to have inter-arrival spacing errors less than or equal to 12 seconds, 
and for 68% of the IM aircraft to have an inter-arrival spacing error less than or equal to 8 seconds 
(ref. 19, para 3.3.6). 
The second metric (and Hypothesis #1), the success rate of PBN operations (that is, both non-IM 
and IM operations), is a measure of how consistently aircraft stayed on their planned routes when 
in the TRACON, and it is measured as the percentage of aircraft that were not vectored in the 
TRACON (ref. 20). The criteria for this metric is that less than 30% of aircraft receive vectors off 
path in the TRACON (ref. 19, para 3.2.2). This ATD-1 Project defined metric and criteria was 
established to provide continuity to previous ATD-1 research, and may not be appropriate for 
evaluating real-world operations. 
The third metric, the slot marker deviation, is the root mean square (RMS) of the distance between 
the center of the slot marker and corresponding aircraft’s position throughout the arrival and 
approach operation. Since the slot markers are only displayed in the TRACON, only the data 
accrued when the aircraft of interest was in the TRACON was used for this metric. This metric 
was established by the research team to provide a method to compare how TRACON controllers 
interacted with aircraft conducting IM operations and those not conducting IM operations, and 
may not be appropriate for evaluating real-world operations. 
3.6.3 Controller Objective Performance 
The two controller performance metrics analyzed for the experiment were: percentage of 
controller-interrupted IM operations, and schedule deviation at the FAF and Meter Fix. Analysis 
and results for these dependent measures are presented in Section 5.5. 
The first metric (and Hypothesis #2), the percentage of controller-interrupted IM operations, is the 
number of IM operations that were either canceled or suspended by an air traffic controller. The 
criteria for this metric is that air traffic controllers should interrupt less than 30% of the IM 
operations (ref. 19, para 3.3.3). This ATD-1 Project defined metric and criteria was established to 
provide continuity to previous ATD-1 research, and may not be appropriate for evaluating real-
world operations. 
The second metric, the schedule deviation, is the difference between an aircraft’s scheduled time 
of arrival and the actual time of arrival at the FAF and TRACON meter fix. This metric was 
                                                 
1 Since the ASG is used in the CAPTURE and CROSS clearances is derived from the TMA-TM schedule and issued 
as part of the IM clearance, the inter-arrival spacing error will be the same as the spacing goal conformance metric 
presented in section 4.6.1 (with the exception of small differences caused by sampling from different data sources). 
The inter-arrival spacing error and spacing goal conformance for the MAINTAIN clearance will be different, since 
the ASG is not derived from the TMA-TM schedule. 
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established by the research team to provide a method to compare how TRACON controllers 
interacted with aircraft conducting IM operations and those not conducting IM operations, and 
may not be appropriate for evaluating real-world operations. 
3.6.4 Flight Crew Objective Performance 
The five flight crew performance metrics analyzed for the experiment were: percentage of flight 
crew interrupted IM operations, flight crew reaction time to changes in the IM commanded speed, 
flight crew conformance to the IM speeds, missed altitude constraints, and unstable approaches. 
The flight crew performance analysis and results are presented in Section 5.7. 
The first metric (and Hypothesis #3), the percentage of IM operations terminated by the flight 
crew, is the number of IM operations that were initiated successfully, but then terminated by the 
flight crew (but not due to controller instruction) prior the PTP. The criterion for this metric is for 
flight crew to terminate less than 30% of the IM operations (ref. 19, para 3.4.3). This ATD-1 
Project defined metric and criteria was established to provide continuity to previous ATD-1 
research, and may not be appropriate for evaluating real-world operations. 
The second metric, flight crew reaction time, was the time it took from when the IM software 
commanded a new speed until the flight crew began to set that value in the MCP speed window as 
recorded in the data log. This ATD-1 Project defined metric was used to provide continuity to 
previous ATD-1 research. 
The third metric, flight crew conformance to the IM speed, measured the RMS of the difference 
between the IM instantaneous speed and the aircraft’s actual airspeed. This metric was established 
by the research team to provide a method to assess how closely pilots decelerated the aircraft 
compared to the speed calculated by the spacing algorithm, and may not be appropriate for 
evaluating real-world operations. 
The fourth metric, altitude constraints missed by the flight crew, analyzed the number of waypoints 
where the aircraft did not meet an altitude crossing constraint. These events were examined by 
simulator type and by IM operation type to understand their impact on the missed constraints. This 
metric was established by the research team to provide a method to assess how difficult the pilots 
found the use of VNAV speed while conducting IM operations. 
The fifth metric, not achieving a stabilized approach at 1000 feet above the ground (specified in 
Section 5.7.5), was examined by simulator type. This metric was established by the research team 
to provide a method to assess how difficult the pilots found the use of VNAV speed while 
conducting IM operations. 
3.6.5 Controller Subjective Assessments 
Subject questionnaires were developed using Lime Survey (ref. 35).  A background questionnaire 
was completed by subjects prior to the start of the experiment on the first day.  Post-run 
questionnaires were issued at the end of the final training run and immediately following all 
experimental runs thereafter.  Upon completion of the final post-run questionnaire, a post-
experiment questionnaire was completed by all subjects.  Researchers remained on-hand to clarify 
questions relating to the questionnaires, if asked.  All the questionnaires themselves are available 
in Appendix E. 
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The primary controller subjective assessments from post-run and post-experiment surveys 
discussed in the body of this document (Section 5.6) are: the acceptability of ATD-1 operations, 
the workload of ATD-1 operations, and comments about the ATD-1 ConOps and IM operations. 
The entire results and controller assessments are in Appendix F.3 and F.5. 
The first metric (and performance goal #3), the controller acceptability rating of the ATD-1 
operation, used the Controller Acceptance Rating Scale (CARS, ref. 21). The criteria for this 
metric is for the mean rating to be equal to or greater than ‘8’. (ref. 19, para 3.3.4). 
The second metric (and Performance goal #4), the controller workload rating, used a measurement 
derived from the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) scale (ref. 19, para 3.3.5). The criteria for this 
metric is the mean for Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Time Pressure, and Effort will be equal 
to or less than ‘5’, and for Success and Frustration will be equal to or less than ‘3’. 
3.6.6 Flight Crew Subjective Assessments 
Subject questionnaires were developed using Lime Survey (ref. 35).  A background questionnaire 
was completed separately by each subject pilot (two questionnaires per crew) prior to the start of 
the experiment on the first day.  Separate post-run questionnaires were also issued to each subject 
pilot at the end of the final training run, and immediately following all experimental runs thereafter.  
Upon completion of the final post-run questionnaire, a post-experiment questionnaire was 
individually completed by all subject pilots.  (This Section is intentionally labeled “flight crew” to 
imply that the simulators were flown as two-person crews, and each pilot was assigned specific 
PF or PM duties per scenario.) Researchers remained on-hand to clarify questions relating to the 
questionnaires, if asked.  The questionnaires are available in Appendix E. 
The primary flight crew subjective assessments from post-run and post-experiment surveys 
discussed in the body of this document (Section 5.8) are: the acceptability of ATD-1 operations, 
the workload of ATD-1 operations, comments about situation awareness, comments about the 
ATD-1 ConOps and IM operations, and comments about the intuitiveness and usefulness of the 
IM interface and displays. The entire results and flight crew assessments are in Appendix F.4 and 
F.6. 
The first metric (and Hypothesis #4), the flight crew acceptability of the IM operation, was 
measured using a 7-point Likert scale. The criteria for this metric is for the mean rating to be equal 
to or greater than ‘5’. Additional analysis was conducted to confirm different aspects of the flight 
crew level of acceptance of the IM operation. 
The second metric (and Hypothesis #5), the flight crew workload of the IM operation, was 
measured using a 10-point Modified Cooper-Harper scale (ref. 22). 2 The criteria for this metric is 
the mean rating to be equal to or less than a ‘3’. 
3.7 Case Studies 
Five different types of case studies were conducted to identify and communicate more complex 
behaviors and events observed separately from the above analysis, and to provide a better 
                                                 
2 The Modified Cooper-Harper workload scale was used for pilots and the TLX scale was used for air traffic controllers 
to maintain consistency with the methodologies used in previous ATD-1 research. 
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understanding of IM algorithm performance and the impact of various controller and pilot actions 
that occurred during the simulation. The case studies described in Section 5.9 include: 
• loss of separation between aircraft; 
• an example of undesirable propagation of IM speed changes through an arrival stream; 
• an example of desirable IM algorithm performance; 
• variations to the normal IM clearance and operations; and 
• the impact of the Target aircraft not flying the published speed. 
3.8 Environment and scenario description 
The experiment environment was the airspace and instrument arrival procedures into KDEN. 
KDEN was specifically chosen since the published STARs connected to either to a RNP or ILS 
approach, a requirement for ATD-1 operations in general, and IM in particular. Although 
becoming more common, few other major airports currently have this characteristic. 
3.8.1 KDEN Instrument Arrival and Approach Procedures 
Part of the FAA’s contribution to the IMAC experiment was having Denver air traffic control 
experts come to LaRC to brief the research team on arrival operations and real-world challenges 
at KDEN. In addition, they arranged a site visit to the Denver ARTCC and TRACON facilities for 
some of the research team members. The discussions with the controllers during this visit were 
invaluable in making the scenarios as realistic as possible, as was the documentation of standard 
operating procedures they provided (ref. 23, paragraphs 3-4-7 and 3-4-8). 
From these discussions and documentation, STAR/approach/runway combinations were selected 
for the scenarios. The north-flow combinations are shown in Figure 7 and Table 6, and the south-
flow combinations are shown in Figure 8 and Table 7. (Note: the WAHUU1 STAR does not 
connect to runway 17R when landing to the south, therefore this arrival to approach combination 
was not used in the experiment.) Both north and south flow landings were used in the experiment 
to reduce the possibility of learning effect by the subject controllers and pilots by having a wide 
range of scenarios in the experiment. 
Two characteristics incorporated into the scenarios to facilitate the research of the ATD-1 ConOps 
and IM procedures that do not exist yet in current day operations at KDEN are: 
• the simultaneous ILS and RNP approach operations to the same runway, and 
• simultaneous RNP approaches to parallel runways (incorporated to create a visually more 
complex and complete appearance of airport operations, but had no impact on data 
collection or results since the arrival streams did not interact). 
To facilitate the software development of a consistent experimental environment, the 1408 (18 
September 2014) navigation database was used for the KDEN RNAV STARs and RNP Z 
approaches. This ensured that the flight management systems in the three different aircraft 
simulators matched the controller waypoints and graphics as well as the TBFM adaptation needed 
to create the arrival schedule. 
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Figure 7. Arrivals into KDEN for north-flow landing. 
 
 
Table 6. STARs and Approaches by Sector for North-Flow Landing 
Sector STAR Meter Fix Common 
Waypoint 
Approach 
AR1 (SW) LDORA2 LARKS LDORA ILS 35L 
AR1 (SW) TELLR2 POWDR TELLR ILS 35L 
AR2 (NW) FRNCH3 TOMSN HIMOM RNP Z 35L 
AR2 (NW) MOLTN3 RAMMS HIMOM RNP Z 35L 
AR3 (NE) ANCHR2 LANDR DOGGG RNP Z 35R 
AR3 (NE) KOHOE2 SAYGE DOGGG RNP Z 35R 
AR4 (SE) PURRL2 DANDD PURRL ILS 35R 
AR4 (SE) BOSSS2 QUAIL BOSSS ILS 35R 
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Figure 8. Arrivals into KDEN for south-flow landing. 
 
 
Table 7. STARs and Approaches by Sector for South-Flow Landing 
Sector STAR Meter Fix Common 
Waypoint 
Approach 
AR1 (SW) PEEKK3 LARKS CLFFF RNP Z 16L 
AR1 (SW) CREDE3 POWDR CLFFF RNP Z 16L 
AR2 (NW) KAILE2 TOMSN KAILE ILS 16L 
AR2 (NW) TSHNR2 RAMMS TSHNR ILS 16L 
AR3 (NE) KIPPR2 LANDR KIPPR ILS 17R 
AR3 (NE) WAHUU1 SAYGE n/a n/a 
AR4 (SE) JAGGR3 DANDD QWIKE RNP Z 17R 
AR4 (SE) ZPLYN3 QUAIL QWIKE RNP Z 17R 
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3.8.2 KDEN Airport and Landing Runways 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the discussion with controllers in the Denver FAA facilities 
and their standard operating procedures (ref 23, paragraphs 3-4-7 and 3-4-8) led to the selection of 
specific runways for this experiment. These runways are typical configurations for dual instrument 
approaches. The runways used during north-flow landing scenarios (35L and 35R) are shown in 
orange in Figure 9, and the runways used during south-flow scenarios (16L and 17R) are shown 
in purple. 
 
Figure 9. KDEN runways used for landing during IMAC. 
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3.8.3 Truth and Forecast Wind 
Wind and wind error were not independent variables in this simulation; therefore, one truth and 
one forecast wind was used throughout the experiment. Since only one wind was used, it had to 
not only emulate winds typically observed at Denver, but also allow for aircraft landing either to 
the north or the south. Each simulator provided the subject pilots a simulated ACARS data link 
message containing the descent forecast winds, which the flight crew loaded via a button press 
into the FMS. Once the forecast descent wind information was loaded in the FMS, a button 
becomes available on the IM equipment (Figure 69). Pressing this button loaded the same descent 
forecast winds into the IM equipment. The flight crew were given a text version of the airport 
surface winds, which they entered manually into the surface forecast wind data field of the IM 
interface. 
To ensure a representative wind condition was used, Denver airspace wind data over a one year 
period was analyzed, and the following characteristics were incorporated into the one truth and 
one forecast wind field used in the IMAC experiment: 
• winds west of Denver were very strong from the west and varied little by altitude; 
• winds east of Denver were strong from the west and varied significantly by altitude; 
• surface winds at the Denver airport was a light cross wind from the west. 
Particular values from the wind fields include: 
• Average speed of truth wind: 67 knots @ FL350, 32 knots @ 10,000’, 14 knots @ 5000’ 
• Average speed of forecast wind: 69 knots @ FL350, 16 knots @ 10,000’, 13 knots @ 5000’ 
• Truth winds at KDEN: 279/71 @ FL350, 206/19 @ 10,000’, 023/12 @ 5000’ 
• Forecast winds at KDEN: 277/69 @ FL350, 322/15 @ 10,000’, 328/11 @ 5000’ 
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3.8.4 Training Scenarios 
A training program was conducted that began with several part-task runs, which consisted of each 
simulator type operating in a stand-alone mode to allow subjects to gain familiarity with their 
particular simulator and the basic mechanics of conducting the TSAS (controllers) and IM (pilots) 
operations. Once basic proficiency was obtained, the training then progressed to four scenarios 
that covered each of the four arrival directions and two landing runway configurations. These four 
“connected runs” were similar to the data collection scenarios discussed in the next section.  A 
description of the training scenarios is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Description of Training Scenarios 
Scena
rio 
Controllers & Non-Subject Pilots Subject Pilots 
 Arrival
(E or W) 
Land 
(N or S)  
Arrival 
(E or W) 
Land 
(N or S) 
Part-task training runs (controllers and pilots independent in their respective simulator) 
M1 
normal operations   
(BASELINE) 
E N (35R) 
normal ops, ILS W N (35L) 
RNP & configure W N (35L) 
M2 
normal operations   
(BASELINE) 
W S (16L) 
IM, ILS E S (17R) 
IM, RNP E S (17R) 
Connected training runs (controllers and pilots together in the same interactive run) 
M3 IM CROSS Captain PM E N (35R) 
M4 any IM First Officer PM W S (16L) 
M5 IM CROSS Captain PM W N (35L) 
M6 any IM First Officer PM E S (17R) 
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3.8.5 Data Collection Scenarios 
Ten scenarios were developed for the three IM operation types (Table 9). For each scenario, the 
location of the subject aircraft within the arrival sequence of aircraft conducting IM operations 
was intentionally varied, and their route geometry with the Target (i.e., in-trail, merge in the 
ARTCC, or merge in the TRACON) was 1) intentionally set in order to ensure a variety of IM 
operation types appropriate for that clearance, and 2) to make each scenario appear very different 
to controllers and pilots. Different arrival directions and landing runways were used to minimize 
the learning effect for the controllers and pilots. Each pilot of the two-person crew flew equal 
number of scenario runs as the PM and PF. 
Table 9. Description of Data Collection Scenarios 
Scenario Operation Geometry Arrival Land PM 
A BASELINE n/a W N First Officer 
B BASELINE n/a E S Captain 
C CAPTURE In-trail W S First Officer 
D CAPTURE In-trail E N Captain 
E CROSS In-trail & merge E S First Officer 
F CROSS In-trail & merge W N Captain 
G MAINTAIN In-trail E N First Officer 
H MAINTAIN In-trail W S Captain 
I MIXED In-trail & merge E N First Officer 
J MIXED In-trail & merge W S Captain 
 
The call signs for the six aircraft conducting IM operations were kept the same for each crew for 
all data collection scenarios to simplify data analysis and to make it easier to graphically display 
the status of the aircraft. The call signs of the remaining aircraft were intentionally varied in each 
scenario to minimize any learning effect for controllers. 
To provide data to the FAA on call sign confusion and the use of a call sign as a third party in a 
controller issued instruction, some of the remaining call signs were also intentionally selected to 
be similar to each other, for example actual callsigns used during the experiment included 
UAL461, UAL561 and UAL651 (United Airlines), and ASH3708 and ASH5708 (Air Shuttle). To 
provide data to the FAA about controllers issuing instructions using the aircraft data tag, a range 
of call signs were used that were both common and uncommon, for example, LOF for Water Ski 
(Trans States Airlines) and EJM for Jet Speed (Executive Jet Management). A complete list of 
airlines used in this experiment is in Appendix D. 
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3.8.6 Example of Aircraft Location at Scenario Start 
Each scenario contained aircraft arriving from all four directions, and landing on one of two 
runways. To simplify data analysis and accommodate lab space limitations, only aircraft in half of 
the airspace in each scenario were controlled by air traffic controllers, while the aircraft in the 
other half of the airspace were flown by completely automated simulated aircraft. This required 
the aircraft in each half of the airspace to land on the runway closest to their direction of arrival, 
which was facilitated by turning off the TBFM runway load-balancing function. There were no 
departures from KDEN in the scenario; however, there were overflight aircraft to create more 
realistic visual presentations on the controller workstations and cockpit traffic displays. 
The initial location of aircraft during data collection varied from scenario to scenario, and an 
example is shown in Figure 10. The blue icons were the six aircraft flown by subject pilots, and 
the green aircraft on the same side of the airspace (the east) were flown by MACS confederate 
pilots. All of the aircraft arriving from the east land on the eastern runway. The green aircraft on 
the opposite side of the airspace (the west) were automated simulated aircraft landing on the 
parallel runway to the west, and they did not interact with any of the aircraft arriving from the east. 
The orange aircraft were overflights not landing at Denver (flown by MACS pilots) and were 
added to create a more realistic environment for the controllers and more realistic cockpit traffic 
displays for pilots. There were no aircraft departing Denver in any of the scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of aircraft location at scenario start.  
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3.9 Controller and Pilot Participants 
3.9.1 Qualification and Currency Requirements 
Each week of data collection employed two confederate controllers, four subject controllers, six 
confederate pilots, and twelve subject pilots, for a total of eight subject controllers and 24 subject 
pilots across the entire experiment. The following sections describe the qualification and currency 
requirements for each of the four categories. 
3.9.1.1 Confederate Controllers 
The “Ghost” and “Tower” ATC positions were manned by confederate controllers, that is, retired 
professional controllers who assisted the research team in creating high-density arrival operations, 
and from whom no data was collected. Both positions were manned by the same two individuals 
throughout the experiment, ensuring a high quality and consistent performance. 
3.9.1.2 Confederate Pilots 
The six confederate pilots operated the Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS) pilot stations, and 
the rank ordered qualifications for them were: 
• Required: Private Pilot Certificate with an Instrument Rating 
• Required: actual flight time flown within the past three years  
• Desired: commercial aircraft flight experience 
• Desired: previous experience using the MACS pseudo-pilot stations 
The confederate pilots met all requirements, were a mix of active and retired pilots, and most had 
flown commercial aircraft. One requirement not specified was experience with the operation of an 
FMS, in particular the various modes of VNAV. A significant portion of the operational issues by 
the MACS aircraft were caused by the few pilots that did not have FMS and VNAV flight mode 
experience. 
3.9.1.3 Subject Controllers 
The four controller subjects within each of the two groups operated two ARTCC and two 
TRACON stations. Controllers worked the same position throughout their time as a participant. 
The rank ordered qualifications for ARTCC controllers were: 
• Required: previous certification in a sector that fed arrivals to one of the major US airports 
• Desired: retired less than three years or are technically proficient training instructors 
• Desired: experience with RNAV Standard Terminal Arrival Routes 
• Desired: experience with Traffic Management Advisor or time-based metering 
• Desired: previous experience with arrival operations to KDEN 
The rank ordered qualifications for TRACON controllers were: 
• Required: previous job experience at a TRACON that served one of the major US airports 
• Required: previous certification on Feeder or Final positions 
• Desired: retired less than three years or are technically proficient training instructors 
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• Desired: experience with RNAV Standard Terminal Arrival Routes 
• Desired: experience with Terminal metering 
• Desired: experience with RNP approach procedures 
The eight subject controllers ranged from 54 to 60 years in age, with a median of 25 years of 
experience. While six of the eight controllers had been retired for more than three years, four of 
them were active instructors which significantly helped their ability to learn and use the ATD-1 
tools and procedures. Their meeting of the desired qualifications varied significantly. Four of the 
controllers had experience with RNAV arrivals, five had experience with RNP approaches, and 
none had experience with operations into KDEN. See Appendix F.1 for a more detailed summary 
of subject controller backgrounds. 
One of the ARTCC controllers had been retired for greater than five years and had not had 
experience with time-based metering into busy TRACON sectors. His performance and ratings of 
the ATD-1 concept and procedures were significantly lower than the other controllers. 
3.9.1.4 Subject Pilots 
The twelve subject pilots within each of the two groups were paired into two-person crews and 
flew one of the three flight simulators (see Sections 4.1.3, 4.2 and 4.3). Crews remained paired 
throughout training and data collection, and they flew the same simulator in the same position 
throughout the experiment. 
The rank ordered qualifications for subject pilots were: 
• Required: currently or within the prior five years have flown the B-777, B-747-400, B-
767-400, B-757, or B-737NG (to align with simulator type) 
• Desired (all): experience flying RNP operations 
All the pilots met the required qualification, with the exception of one senior Captain who still 
served as an instructor at a major airline. They ranged from 39 to 68 years in age, with an average 
of 34 years and 17,000 hours of military and commercial flight experience. Every pilot had 
experience with both RNAV arrivals and RNP approaches, with the frequency ranging from almost 
daily to only several times per year. Half of the pilots had previous experience with IM operations, 
either at NASA Langley or NASA Ames in simulation experiments. See Appendix F.2 for a more 
detailed summary of subject pilot backgrounds. 
3.9.2 Protocol for Training and Data Collection 
To the maximum extent possible, the pilots were scheduled with other pilots from the same airline 
and in the position they normally occupied. This procedure was intended to minimize adverse 
effects from differing standard operating crew procedures or crew resource management 
principles. The PF and PM duties varied for each run, with each pilot acting as PF on half of the 
scenarios and PM on the other half. 
Pilots completed a computer-based training program prior to arriving at NASA Langley, while the 
controllers did not receive any prior training or information. All controllers and pilots participated 
in one week of training, followed approximately a month later by one week of data collection (each 
week began Tuesday morning at 8 am and ended Friday by 2 pm). 
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The schedule and events for the training week were: 
• Tuesday: welcome orientation, academics (ATD-1 concept of operations, IM procedures, 
local Denver procedures, etc.), part-task training runs, two training runs 
• Wednesday: five training runs, post-run questionnaires, end of day debrief 
• Thursday: five training runs, post-run questionnaires, end of day debrief 
• Friday: two training runs, post-run and post-experiment questionnaires, debrief 
The schedule and events for the data collection week were: 
• Tuesday: refresher training, four training runs 
• Wednesday: four data collection runs, post-run questionnaires, end of day debrief 
• Thursday: four data collection runs, post-run questionnaires, end of day debrief 
• Friday: two data collection runs, post-run and post-experiment questionnaires, debrief 
Since this experiment employed a training protocol different from previous research (bringing in 
the subjects for an entire week of training, then bringing them back later for refresher training and 
data collection), a cursory analysis of the results was done to determine the impact this approach 
had. Post-analysis of controller and pilot subjective acceptability and workload rating from the 
data collection scenarios was assessed as a function of sequence order to provide an indication of 
whether the training was adequate. That is, if the acceptability and workload ratings as the data 
collection runs progressed remained fairly consistent, it can be inferred there was not significant 
learning still occurring during data collection runs. Appendix H contains the results of that 
analysis, and relatively constant acceptability and workload ratings indicates that the training was 
likely sufficient.  
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4 Facilities and Software 
This section describes those simulator facilities and their software capabilities. Multiple simulators 
were used at NASA LaRC to conduct the IMAC human-in-the-loop experiment.  
4.1 Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL) 
The Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL) is a NASA LaRC research facility used to evaluate 
contemporary and future ATM concepts and procedures, while maintaining appropriate 
compatibility with real-world national airspace infrastructure and aircraft avionics system 
architectures. It consists of multiple configurable spaces for controllers and pilots. The ATC spaces 
can be established as en route and terminal facilities (with the appropriate hardware and displays). 
The pilot spaces support a range of different aircraft simulator types (Figure 11). 
The MACS controller stations were configured for ARTCC operations in ATC Room A and 
TRACON operations in ATC Room B. The TBFM schedule display was located in ATC Room 
A, as were the Ghost controller and Tower controllers. 
The aircraft simulator types in the ATOL included dual-crew and single-crew Aircraft Simulation 
for Traffic Operations Research (ASTOR) desktop simulators in Pilot Room A, and single-crew 
MACS pseudo-pilot simulators in Pilot Room B. 
 
 
Figure 11. Controller and pilot room configuration in ATOL for the IMAC experiment. 
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4.1.1 MACS Controller Stations 
MACS is a NASA Ames designed research tool that provides both air traffic control and pseudo-
pilot functionality for air traffic management simulations (ref. 15). MACS can be configured to 
provide high-fidelity emulations of both en-route controller workstations and terminal-area 
controller workstations, controllable either by regular keyboard and mouse inputs, or by using 
specialized controller keyboard/trackball input devices. Additionally, the workstations are 
configurable to include prototype controller tools.  
Figure 12 shows the setup of MACS controller workstations configured for ARTCC operations. 
Controllers were provided a headset foot-pedal and a hand-held switch that actuated the Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communication (the controller had the option of using either device). 
A computer mouse and controller specific keyboard set allow the controller to interact with the 
MACS display. 
In the experiment, MACS provided four ATC stations used by subject controllers: north and south 
ARTCC positions, and Feeder and Final TRACON positions. MACS was also used for two 
confederate controller stations: a Ghost controller used to hand off aircraft to the ARTCC 
controllers at the appropriate time, and a Tower controller to clear aircraft to land and ensure proper 
performance of the MACS pseudo-aircraft simulators at touchdown. 
 
 
Figure 12. MACS workstations for controllers. 
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Figure 13 shows a MACS emulation of an En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) 
workstation for an ARTCC controller, and Figure 14 shows a MACS emulation of a Standard 
Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) workstation for a TRACON controller. 
 
Figure 13. MACS display for ARTCC controller workstation. 
 
 
Figure 14. MACS display for TRACON controller workstation. 
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4.1.2 Time Based Flow Management (TBFM) 
TBFM is an advanced air traffic control decision support tool for sequencing and scheduling 
aircraft developed by NASA Ames (ref. 16). The Traffic Graphic User Interface uses a timeline 
format to represent sequence information including delay values for aircraft with ETAs up to 
ninety minutes from the meter fix (Figure 15). Using foreknowledge of near-future traffic 
conditions, controllers can use this information to mitigate periods of heavy traffic flow by 
comparing expected demand against estimated capacity for the facility. 
Using the outcome from previous human-in-the-loop experiments (ref. 16 and ref. 20), an 
additional spacing buffer of 0.3 nmi was added to the minimum aircraft separation required for 
wake vortex as specified in the air traffic control regulation (ref. 10, paragraphs 4-5-1 and 5-5-4). 
This additional buffer accounts for a range of things that cause error in achieving the TBFM 
calculated spacing between aircraft: the variance of controller technique, variance in flight crew 
technique in decelerating the aircraft, and TBFM uses a single final approach speed for all turbo-
class aircraft whereas those aircraft have a range of final approach speeds. This turbo-class specific 
speed (135 knots) is used to convert the distance based criteria in ref. 10 into the ASG time shown 
on the controller workstations for the controller to issue to the flight crew as part of the IM 
clearance. 
 
   
Figure 15. TBFM screen and display. 
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4.1.3 Aircraft Simulation for Traffic Operations Research (ASTOR) 
The ASTOR is a computer-based simulator that can be configured as a two-crew or single-crew 
pilot station, with either two or three monitors, and emulates a commercial transport category 
aircraft. The ASTOR simulators were used in order to obtain greater pilot participation in the 
simulation experiment than would have be possible with only the full-scale simulators, and both 
the high-fidelity DTS and IFD full-scale simulators were used to ensure realistic flight crew 
interactions. 
For this experiment, there were six two-crew stations (Figure 16). Two single-crew stations were 
used only for training.  
 
 
Figure 16. Three-monitor ASTOR station for a two-person flight crew. 
 
The two-crew ASTOR stations consist of three touch sensitive display screens that contain dual 
Primary Flight Displays, dual Navigation Displays, an Engine Indication and Crew Alerting 
System, and dual EFBs and CGDs (both specifically configured for IMAC). All three simulators 
in this experiment were configured with a left and right EFB, where data entered by one pilot was 
visible on the other EFB once data entry in a given field is completed by pressing the ENTER 
bezel button or soft-key, or by selecting a different data field. 
Thrust control, flaps, speed brakes, and radio tuning are also displayed and manipulated via an 
externally connected mouse or by touching the screen itself.  Pilots used a headset and foot pedal 
actuator to transmit and receive radio communications. The single-crew ASTOR stations have the 
same capabilities as the two-crew station, except the right-side display and associated dual-display 
options are removed. 
The ASTOR displays and controls are based on current commercial cockpit avionics. ASTOR 
aircraft performance is generated by a six degree of freedom real-time aerodynamic and engine 
model. ASTOR also includes a research prototype Flight Management System (FMS) with 
trajectory generation providing lateral and vertical path guidance using an ARINC 424 navigation 
database. Autopilot and flight director systems are incorporated, along with an ARINC 429 digital 
data bus. 
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4.1.4 MACS Pseudo-Pilot Station 
MACS ‘pseudo-pilot’ functionality enables individual confederate pilots to control a large number 
of aircraft.  The ‘pseudo-pilot’ performs frequency changes and check-ins, clearance read back, 
multiple aircraft monitoring, and clearance input so that the experiment subject pilots flying the 
other simulators see and hear a realistic high-density flight environment. Pilot workstations are 
configured using a combination of generic input devices and contemporary glass cockpit displays 
to accept and quickly enter both standard and non-standard clearance commands for multiple 
aircraft. The display setup consists of nine control fields: Aircraft State Panel, Control Display 
Unit (CDU), FMS Route Panel, Aircraft List, FMS VNAV Panel, Map Display, Primary Flight 
Display, MCP, and Pilot Hand-off Panel. 
Six MACS ‘pseudo-pilot’ stations were used during the experiment, each one paired one-to-one 
with one of the six controller stations. 
 
 
Figure 17. MACS workstation for a single pseudo-pilot. 
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4.2 Development and Test Simulator (DTS) 
The DTS (Figure 18) is a full-scale, high-fidelity, fixed-base simulator representative of a large 
generic commercial transport category aircraft. It features Boeing 757-200 subsystem panels, a 
Boeing 767 center aisle stand with throttle quadrant, Honeywell Pegasus flight management 
computer, Research Mode Control Panel, dual Collins Business radio tuning units, and dual EFBs. 
(Note: the EFBs in both the DTS and IFD were Astronautic devices used to display the NASA-
created IM displays described in Appendix B.) 
The DTS is driven by a high-fidelity B757-200 aerodynamic mathematical model. There are three 
Smiths Industries Boeing 737 Multifunction Control Display Units – two located in the normal 
forward outboard sections of the aisle stand and a third in the aft center section of the aisle stand 
for use by the researcher. The overhead panel was not populated.   
Cockpit displays are incorporated in four 17-inch liquid crystal display screens and include dual 
Primary Flight Displays, dual Navigation Displays, an Engine Indication and Crew Alerting 
System, and dual CGDs to support IM operations. The stand-by altimeter, airspeed indicator, and 
attitude indicator are located forward of the throttle quadrant. Pilots control the simulator by using 
dual back-driven side-stick controllers and dual rudder pedals. 
The simulator’s out-the-window visual system provided a 210 degree horizontal by 45 degree 
vertical field-of-view. The visual scene used for this experiment was the Denver International 
Airport local flight environment in day visual meteorological conditions (VMC). 
 
 
Figure 18. The Development and Test Simulator (DTS). 
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4.3 Integration Flight Deck (IFD) 
The IFD (Figure 19) is a full-mission, full-scale, high-fidelity Boeing 737-800 flight deck 
simulator with a full suite of flight deck panels replicating aircraft functionality. The forward panel 
consists of six ARINC D-sized display monitors which provide fully programmable heads-down 
displays. Displays include dual Primary Flight Displays, dual Navigation Displays, an Engine 
Indication and Crew Alerting System, dual EFBs, and dual CGDs. A Boeing 737 Mode Control 
Panel is positioned above the forward panel and directly overhead is the B737 NextGen forward 
overhead panel. 
The Control Aisle Stand hosts a Boeing 737 Dual Auto-throttle System and two tunable navigation 
and communication radios. Guidance and navigation flight management is interfaced through three 
Smiths Industries Aerospace Color Boeing 737 MCDUs, also on the aisle stand. A General Electric 
Flight Management Computer facilitates operations within the cockpit simulator. The IFD has dual 
hydraulic wheel/columns and dual digital rudder pedals.   
The simulator’s out-the-window visual system provided a 200 degree horizontal by 40 degree 
vertical field-of-view. The visual scene used for this experiment was the Denver International 
Airport local flight environment in day VMC.  
 
 
Figure 19. The Integration Flight Deck (IFD). 
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The IFD can be operated on either a fixed base or a motion base, and for this experiment, the 
motion base was used. The cockpit motion base (Figure 20) is comprised of a 6 degree-of-freedom, 
76” stroke, hydraulically actuated Stewart Platform motion base synergistic motion platform for 
aerospace research (ref. 17).   
Commercial airline pilots and subject matter experts were used to establish the approximate feel 
of light to moderate turbulence, which resulted in 0.7 feet per second of motion. The IFD 
experienced the light to moderate turbulence throughout all scenarios to assess the impact it had 
on flight crews when entering information into the EFB.  
 
 
Figure 20. IFD on the cockpit motion base. 
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5 IMAC Experiment Results 
5.1 Caveat to Experiment Results 
Two caveats to the research results were caused by intentional design decisions early in the 
experiment build-up phase that had unintended consequences when subsequent software capability 
and functionality was not completed in time for data collection. These two decisions and their 
impact on the IMAC results are described below. 
1) The ATD-1 ConOps was expanded to include three types of IM operations; however, it was 
assumed based on previous research that en route controller’s display should recommend a 
specific IM operation depending on the relative geometry of the IM and Target aircraft.  The 
functionality and logic to show the most appropriate IM operation, and just the data relevant 
for that specific clearance, was not complete in time for this experiment; therefore, the IM 
displays for the en route controller were not tailored to the specify IM clearance type, and 
always showed all the IM data. This had the following repercussions: 
• The controller had to mentally track which scenario run was being conducted, then issue 
the appropriate IM clearance with only the relevant IM data. Therefore the ARTCC 
controller workload ratings for IM operations may be higher than if the intended 
functionality and logic had been implemented. 
• The MIXED scenarios, intended to represent more challenging and realistic operations as 
well as a mix of different IM operations, ended up being almost exclusively CROSS 
operations, the IM operation type implied by the complete IM information on their 
displays. As a result, the controller feedback about the usefulness of different IM operation 
types may not be as insightful compared to the intended system, although good comments 
were made by both en route and terminal area controllers. 
2) Requiring the flight crew to enter the Ownship cruise Mach and cruise/Mach descent speed 
into the IM software was deemed a minor additional workload to the crew and a task that could 
be done internally by the IM software. As a consequence, the display of these data fields on 
the crew interface to the IM software (the EFB) was removed. However, when this new 
software capability was not completed prior to data collection, the experiment commenced 
without a mechanism by which the IM spacing software could obtain the Ownship Mach speed, 
meaning an IM commanded speed could not be calculated if the Ownship was still in the Mach 
regime. (Based on the selected Mach and calibrated airspeed selected by the flight crew, the 
transition altitude ranged between 28,000 and 33,000’ mean sea level.) 
• When the flight crew expressed uncertainty or lack of understanding about the IM 
operation, the single greatest contributor to this issue was when a long delay occurred 
between entering the IM clearance into the EFB (the aircraft was typically above the 
transition altitude) and when the IM commanded speed would appear on the EFB (only 
when the aircraft descended below the Mach/airspeed transition altitude). 
• Some of the operationally undesirable behavior of the MAINTAIN operation occurred 
because the spacing error was calculated and set when the flight crew pressed the 
EXECUTE button; however, the operation itself did not commence until the aircraft had 
descended into the calibrated airspeed regime (the IM commanded speed was suppressed 
in the Mach regime). If there was an airspeed difference between the Target and Ownship 
in the Mach regime, a spacing error is created which can trigger an IM commanded speed 
increase or decrease when the software does engage. 
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5.2 Preconditioning of Data 
Prior to analysis, the collected data was preconditioned, that is, aircraft removed from analysis, 
using the following criteria: 
• Autonomous aircraft (arriving from the opposite direction and landing on the parallel 
runway to the subject controlled aircraft) had all data removed. 
• The first two aircraft in each scenario had all data removed. 
• All aircraft landing after the final subject-piloted aircraft landed (scenario terminated one 
minute after last subject-piloted aircraft landed) had all data removed. 
• All aircraft with simulation artifacts were removed (see Appendix G); however, in some 
cases the qualitative data (surveys) were retained and included in the analysis. 
This resulted in 229 valid flights analyzed during the two week IMAC test period, of which the 
subject pilots flew 79 IM operations and 34 non-IM operations, and the confederate pilots flew 
116 non-IM operations. Appendix G contains additional details on the preconditioning of the data. 
5.3 IM Algorithm Performance Results 
5.3.1 IM Spacing Error 
Performance goal #1 states the minimum success criteria for the IM spacing error is for at least 
95% of the errors to be within 10 seconds of the ASG (ref. 19, para 3.4.1). Results are shown in 
Figure 21 and Table 10 below, with all values expressed in seconds since all IM clearances were 
issued using time-based spacing. The PTP in all IM operations was the FAF. The CAPTURE and 
MAINTAIN operations do not have an ABP, and therefore those ABP boxplots are not shown, 
and the table cells are shown as “n/a.” Also, the ABP and PTP were both set as the FAF in the 
CROSS clearances; therefore, the ABP cell is shown as “see PTP cell.” The ABP was different 
than the PTP for four of the clearances issued during the MIXED scenarios; therefore, the values 
in the two cells associated with the MIXED scenario are different. 
Performance goal #1 was not met for any of the IM operations. The green dashed lines in Figure 
21 represent the 10 second success criteria. Figure 21 is shown without the 31 second MAINTAIN 
and 37 second MIXED outliers to allow a smaller y-axis scale to improve visual clarity. 
   
Figure 21. Graphs of IM spacing error at the ABP and PTP. 
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Table 10. IM Spacing Error at ABP and PTP by Scenario Type in Seconds 
Scenario CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN MIXED 
 Mean    SD Mean    SD Mean     SD Mean     SD 
Achieve-by Point (ABP) n/a see PTP cell n/a -0.3 10.0 
Planned Termination Point (PTP) 0.1 5.4 1.0 6.2 -5.2 9.1 -2.6 11.1 
N 20 24 12 23 
Performance Goal #1 
(95% IM ≤ 10 s) 
NO 
(18, or 90%) 
NO 
(21, or 87.5%) 
NO (1) 
(9, or 75.0%) 
NO (2) 
(17, or 73.9%) 
 
Note (1): The MAINTAIN operation had a large standard deviation at the PTP due to a 31 second 
outlier caused by the Target aircraft flying at an extremely slow speed, which in turn caused the 
IM aircraft’s spacing software to be speed limited. That is, the 15% bound around the published 
speed prevented the IM aircraft from flying slow enough to null the spacing error (see Section 
A.3.1 for a detailed description of the speed control logic). Removing the outlier data resulted in a 
mean of -2.6 seconds and standard deviation of 4.8 seconds. 
Note (2): 22 of the 23 IM clearances issued during the MIXED scenarios were for CROSS 
operations. The ABP was different than the PTP in four of the 22 CROSS operations (see Section 
5.7.4.1). A review of the data indicates that one of those four CROSS operations was an outlier 
with a -37 seconds (early) spacing error due to control law behavior described as a case study in 
Section 5.9.5, and is the third example of loss of aircraft separation described as a case study in 
Section 5.9.1. Removing the outlier data resulted in mean of -1.0 second and standard deviation of 
8.4 seconds. The research team postulates the high incidence of CROSS clearances issued during 
the MIXED scenarios were due to 1) most of the Target and IM aircraft were on merging routes, 
and 2) the controller displays showed all IM information (a caveat noted in Section 5.1), leading 
the controller to issue a CROSS clearance (the only clearance type to require all IM information). 
5.3.2 Frequency of IM Speed Changes during IM Operations 
ARTCC and TRACON controllers issue speed instructions as required to ensure a safe and 
efficient arrival flow, and do not attempt to have those instructions coincide with speed changes 
on the published procedure. The consequence of the Target aircraft decelerating at a point other 
than the published waypoint is that ASTAR perceives this as two speed changes (a deceleration 
prior to the waypoint and then back on speed at the waypoint), which in turn causes ASTAR to 
issue multiple IM speeds to the flight crew. This behavior is indicative of a system without accurate 
Target aircraft intent data being shared with the IM equipment. 
Figure 22 shows the IM speed change frequency (rate) observed for each of the scenarios types 
where IM operations were conducted. The MAINTAIN scenarios had the lowest mean speed 
change frequency, likely because the MAINTAIN operation started without any spacing error. 
Both the CAPTURE and Mixed scenarios had the highest speed change frequency (Table 11). The 
frequency of IM speed changes during this experiment is similar to results obtained during 
previous ATD-1 research experiments (ref. 11). 
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Figure 22. Graph of IM of speed change frequency by scenario type. 
 
Table 11. IM Speed Change Frequency per Minute by Scenario Type 
CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN MIXED 
Mean       SD Mean       SD Mean        SD Mean        SD 
0.70 0.27 0.62 0.18 0.55 0.22 0.70 0.17 
 
Of note is the six subject piloted aircraft had an approximate mean frequency of 0.25 speed changes 
per minute during TSAS scenarios. 
 
Further analysis of the frequency of IM commanded speed changes for all IM operation types was 
conducted by examining the time between consecutive speed changes as a function of the 
remaining distance-to-go to the runway threshold (Figure 23). The histogram on the y-axis shows 
that the time between consecutive speed changes became smaller as the IM aircraft approached to 
the runway, indicating that the speed change frequency increased. The histogram on the x-axis 
shows that the number of speed changes increased as the IM aircraft approached the runway. 
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Figure 23. Scatterplot of time between all IM speed changes by distance-to-go. 
The number of IM speed changes by IM operation type as a function of the remaining distance-to-
go was also plotted (Figure 24). The CROSS algorithm commanded a greater percentage of speed 
changes when the aircraft was close to the ABP, whereas the CAPTURE and MAINTAIN 
algorithm speed changes were more evenly distributed along the arrival. 
 
Figure 24. Histogram of IM speed changes by IM operation type by distance-to-go. 
In summary, two conclusions can be drawn from the data. First, Figure 24 shows that the highest 
localized frequency of IM speed changes occurring during CROSS operations when the aircraft 
were on final (within 20 nmi of the runway). During these CROSS operations, the TBO speed 
control law was being used (CAPTURE and MAINTAIN use the CTD law), indicating that further 
research and refinement is needed to reduce the number of changes generated by the TBO speed 
control law, particularly when the aircraft is close to the ABP. 
Secondly, the CAPTURE operations had more speed changes than the CROSS or MAINTAIN 
operations (Table 11), and had a slightly higher average number of IM speed reversals than CROSS 
operations, and much greater than MAINTAIN operations (Figure 25). Since the CAPTURE and 
MAINTAIN operations use the same CTD speed control law (the only difference is that the 
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MAINTAIN operation starts with zero spacing error), it can be hypothesized that the larger number 
of the speed reversals in CAPTURE operations occur during the ‘capture’ phase of flight. 
5.3.3 Number of IM Speed Reversals per IM Operation 
The number and magnitude of IM commanded speed reversals (that is, a speed increase during an 
arrival operation where typically only speed decreases are expected) were analyzed and are shown 
in Figure 25. The data indicate there was an average of one to two speed reversals per IM operation, 
with the MAINTAIN operations having the smallest number of speed reversals and the CAPTURE 
operation having the largest number of speed reversals. Since the MAINTAIN and CAPTURE 
operations used the same speed control law, this suggests that many of the additional speed 
reversals observed during the CAPTURE operation occurred when the IM aircraft was capturing 
the assigned spacing goal. 
One particular behavior that appears to have contributed to the speed reversals was air traffic 
controllers decreasing the Target aircraft’s altitude in order to absorb the delay required for that 
Target aircraft. In these cases, the altitude difference between the Target and IM aircraft causes a 
difference in their ground speeds, in turn causing ASTAR to issue a slower IM commanded speed 
(the same end effect described in Section 5.3.2 although the root cause is different). When the 
Target aircraft subsequently rejoins the published altitude profile, the Target’s ground speed 
returns to the expected speed profile, causing ASTAR to increase the IM commanded speed; i.e., 
a speed reversal. The case study in Section 5.9.5 describes an example of this behavior. 
Another contributing factor unique to the speed reversals in CROSS operations is the Target 
aircraft slowing at a location different than what ASTAR expects (at waypoints specified on the 
published procedure). This causes the spacing algorithm to calculate a ground speed deviation, in 
turn causing a decrease to the IM commanded speed. When the Target subsequently rejoins the 
published speed profile, the ground speed deviation returns to zero which causes ASTAR to 
increase the IM commanded speed; i.e., a speed reversal. A more thorough description of the cause 
for ASTAR speed reversals are discussed in ref. 24 and 25. 
 
Figure 25. Number of IM speed reversals per flight by scenario type. 
Of note is that during the BASELINE (TSAS only) scenarios, there were four instances where the 
controllers issued a speed increase to one of the six subject piloted aircraft during the arrival 
operation.  
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5.4 Air Traffic System Performance Results 
5.4.1 Inter-Arrival Spacing Error at the Final Approach Fix 
Performance goal #2a states the inter-arrival spacing error of 68% of IM operations following 
either a TSAS or an IM operation will be ≤ 8 seconds, and performance goal #2b states the inter-
arrival spacing error of 68% of TSAS operations following a TSAS operation or an IM operation 
will be ≤ 12 seconds. 
Figure 26 and Table 12 list the results for both non-IM and IM operations by scenario type, as well 
as if the performance goal was met or not. The scenarios with IM operations were sub-divided into 
two categories: “non-IM” and “IM”. The non-IM category was any aircraft flown by either a 
subject pilot or pseudo-pilot that was not conducting an IM operation at the PTP (the FAF), and 
the IM category was any aircraft flown by subject pilots that was conducting an IM operation at 
the PTP. 
 
Figure 26. Graph of inter-arrival spacing error at Final Approach Fix. 
 
Based on the data in Table 12, the performance goal #2a was met for the CAPTURE and CROSS 
scenarios. The performance goal #2b was also met for the CAPTURE scenario. The results indicate 
that aircraft conducting a CAPTURE operation had approximately the same mean inter-arrival 
spacing error as aircraft conducting non-IM operations; however, the standard deviation of the 
aircraft conducing CAPTURE operations (6.1 seconds) was smaller than the standard deviation of 
non-IM operations (11.3 seconds). Similarly, aircraft conducting a CROSS operation had a smaller 
standard deviation (6.2 seconds) than non-IM operations (14.4 seconds). These results suggest that 
IM helps aircraft achieve more precise spacing at the FAF. 
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Table 12. Inter-Arrival Spacing Error Data at Final Approach Fix 
Scenario BASELINE CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN MIXED 
Type Operation Non-IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM 
Mean (sec) 4.1 -1.2 -1.5 2.4 -0.1 -1.2 -7.3 3.9 -3.3 
SD (sec) 19.2 11.3 6.1 14.4 6.2 17.5 13.8 14.3 11.2 
N (1) 33 23 20 20 24 29 12 22 23 
% of ops ≤ 8 s   80%  83%  42%  65% 
Performance Goal 
#2a met? 
(68% IM ≤ 8 s) 
  YES  YES  NO (2)  NO (3) 
% of ops ≤ 12 s 61% 83%  55%  59%  77%  
Performance Goal 
#2b met? 
(68% TSAS ≤ 12 s) 
NO YES  NO  NO  YES  
Note (1): The N value of 206 is less than the Appendix G value of 229 operations because the first 
aircraft of each of the 20 scenarios did not have an aircraft in front of it to calculate an inter-arrival 
error, and the inter-arrival error for four other aircraft could not be calculated because their 
preceding aircraft were excluded from data analysis. 
Note (2): the MAINTAIN clearance issued by the ARTCC controller is based on their visual 
perception of a desirable spacing at that time and is not expected to align with the TBFM schedule. 
Note (3): 22 of the 23 IM arrivals during the MIXED scenarios were CROSS operations, and four 
of those 22 CROSS operations were with the ABP not the same as the PTP (see Section 5.7.4.1). 
One of those four CROSS operations was a 37 seconds early outlier due to control law behavior 
(Section 5.9.5), and is also described in a loss of separation case study (Section 5.9.1.3). Without 
that outlier, the MIXED mean is -1.0 second, and the standard deviation is 8.4 seconds. 
 
The MAINTAIN operations were controlling to a time-based spacing goal calculated by the IM 
spacing software, and this spacing interval was determined by the ARTCC controller while the 
aircraft were at cruise altitude. Therefore, there is no expectation that 30 minutes later the 
MAINTAIN operation would achieve the time value calculated by the TBFM software for spacing 
at the FAF (note: the TRACON controllers were instructed and given training to terminate the IM 
operation if the ARTCC assigned spacing was not appropriate for the arrival operation within the 
TRACON). The standard deviation of inter-arrival spacing error in the MAINTAIN scenarios was 
also smaller for the IM operations than the non-IM operations. 
The MIXED operations are comprised of all three IM clearance types issued at the discretion of 
the controllers. Although the inter-arrival spacing error mean and standard deviation in the MIXED 
scenarios indicate a slight improvement of IM compared to non-IM operations, the difference was 
smaller than the differences observed for the CAPTURE and CROSS operations. Since the 
MIXED scenarios were predominantly composed of CROSS operations, it is hypothesized that the 
degradation in performance was due to the fact that the MIXED scenarios were always conducted 
last and an outlier where the inter-arrival spacing error was -37 seconds. 
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5.4.2 PBN Success Rate 
Hypothesis #1 states the percentage of uninterrupted PBN operations with ATD-1 tools will be 
greater than 70%.  A successful PBN operation was defined by ATD-1 as an aircraft that was not 
vectored within the TRACON airspace. 
To determine the results of this metric, the latitudes and longitudes of all the aircraft in the 
simulations were plotted and then visually inspected to determine the number of aircraft that were 
vectored in the TRACON. Figure 27 shows the latitude and longitude of the paths flown by all of 
the aircraft in this experiment, grouped by the landing runway, with the small circles depicting the 
locations of the TRACON meter fix waypoints. Any off path vector between the circle and landing 
runway indicates a failure of the PBN operation.  
A visual inspection of the plots in Figure 27 did not reveal any cases where aircraft were vectored 
off path while in the TRACON. Furthermore, there were no post-run comments by controllers or 
pilots that indicated vectors had been issued inside the TRACON. Thus, the success rate of PBN 
operations in the TRACON during the experiment was 100%, and hypothesis #1 was true. 
While the lack of vectors within the TRACON is a positive result, a definitive conclusion about 
the efficacy of ATD-1 operations cannot be established since a range of different traffic density 
scenarios and different wind conditions could not be performed as part of this experiment.  
Figure 27. The latitude and longitude of all aircraft for all four landing runways. 
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5.4.3 Slot Marker Deviation in the TRACON 
The CMS tools provide terminal controllers with a graphical depiction of the location an aircraft 
should be when it is on schedule, referred to as a slot marker. The RMS of the slot marker deviation 
is a measurement of the proximity of an aircraft from its slot marker. The goal of this analysis is 
to determine how well the IM aircraft conformed to the slot marker compared to non-IM aircraft.  
The results shown in Figure 28 and Table 13 indicate that the IM aircraft in the CAPTURE scenario 
had less slot marker deviation (Mean = 0.9, standard deviation = 0.6) than the non-IM aircraft 
(Mean = 1.1, standard deviation = 0.4). Conversely, the IM aircraft in the CROSS scenario had 
greater slot marker deviation (Mean = 1.3, standard deviation = 0.6) than the non-IM aircraft 
(Mean = 1.0, standard deviation = 0.7). Additionally, the IM aircraft in the Mixed scenario, which 
primarily consisted of CROSS operations, had greater slot marker deviation (Mean = 1.3, standard 
deviation = 0.6) than the non-IM aircraft (Mean = 0.9, standard deviation = 0.6). This data suggest 
that the CAPTURE algorithm conforms slightly better to the CMS tools than non-IM operations 
(BASELINE) as tested in this experiment, although the values for the CROSS and MAINTAIN 
operations also appear to be close to the BASELINE values. Further work is needed to determine 
if this conclusion can be generalized to other wind and traffic scenarios. 
 
Figure 28. The RMS of the slot marker deviation in the TRACON. 
 
Table 13. RMS Data for Slot Marker Deviation in TRACON 
Scenario BASELINE CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN MIXED 
Operation Non-IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM 
Mean (nmi) 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.3 
SD (nmi) 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 
N (1) 37 28 20 24 24 33 13 26 23 
Note (1): the total N value of 228 is one operation less than described in Appendix G due to one 
aircraft not having a TRACON Meter Fix assigned.  
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5.5 Controller Objective Performance Results 
5.5.1 Percentage of Controller-Interrupted IM Operations 
Hypothesis #2 states the percentage of IM operations terminated by ATC (i.e., a vector or speed 
instruction was issued to the flight crew conducting that operation) prior to the Planned 
Termination Point will be < 30%. 
Of the 79 IM operations conducted, 14 (18%) of the operations were interrupted by ARTCC or 
TRACON controllers by issuing speed instructions. Statistical analysis using the one-sample 
proportion test found that significantly less than 30% of IM operations were interrupted by ATC 
(p = 0.001), therefore the criteria for this hypothesis was met. The 14 interrupted events occurred 
during CAPTURE (3), CROSS (1), and MAINTAIN (10) operations, therefore the percentage of 
controller-interrupted IM operations designed for arrival operations (CROSS and CAPTURE) was 
4% (3 of 79). Post-analysis of the controller post-run and post-experiment surveys indicate the 
reasons for the cancellations included controller unease, controller confusion, controller desire to 
expedite spacing, miscommunication, algorithm performance (too aggressive in capture phase), 
and the spacing goal did not match the schedule (MAINTAIN operations only). 
There were five instances where the controller issued a speed command to supersede the IM 
commanded speed, but did not verbally state “Suspend IM” as specified by the ATD-1 procedures 
and practiced during training. This led to confusion in the cockpit whether IM spacing was still in 
effect or not, as receiving the speed instruction alone was contrary to training. Both controllers and 
pilots had received training for this possibility, and stated they understood that training during the 
post-experiment debrief session.  
In summary, this analysis indicates that generally the controllers felt the CROSS and CAPTURE 
IM operations (designed for arrival operations) behaved appropriately and interacted well with 
non-IM operations. However, the delay from when the controller issued the IM clearance until the 
IM operation commenced presented challenges, and to a lesser degree the phraseology did as well. 
5.5.2 Schedule Deviation 
The schedule deviation results discussed in this section differ from the inter-arrival spacing error 
results in Section 5.4.1 in that this section compares the aircraft’s actual time of arrival with the 
scheduled time of arrival. These results are typically not as operationally significant as the inter-
arrival spacing error discussed earlier, where the Final controller is focused on optimum spacing 
between aircraft and not attempting to meet a specific time for each aircraft. Therefore there is no 
hypothesis associated with this metric. 
5.5.2.1 Schedule deviation at the Final Approach Fix 
The schedule deviation is the difference in time between an aircraft’s scheduled time of arrival and 
its actual time of arrival at the FAF. Results for the 229 flight operations in IMAC are shown in 
Figure 29 and Table 14, grouped by scenario type and separated by non-IM and IM operations. 
• Note: whether an aircraft is conducting an IM operation or not is determined by whether 
the IM software is in the PAIRED state and the flight crew are flying the IM speed. 
Therefore, the number of IM operations may be different at different waypoints. For 
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example, the different number of IM operations in the MAINTAIN scenario in Table 14 
and Table 15 indicates six (6) aircraft had their IM operation suspended or canceled 
between entry into the TRACON at the Meter Fix and the FAF. 
The results indicate that the schedule deviation was similar for BASELINE, CAPTURE, and 
CROSS operations, as reflected in similar means and standard deviations. For the MAINTAIN 
operation, the mean schedule deviation at the FAF for IM operations was less than for non-IM 
operations, however the standard deviation of the IM operations was substantially greater. This 
was in part due to the spacing goal being visually assigned by the ARTCC controller and not being 
associated with the scheduled time of arrival estimated by the ground software. 
 
Figure 29. The schedule deviation at Final Approach Fix. 
 
Table 14. Schedule Deviation Data at Final Approach Fix 
Scenario BASELINE CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN MIXED 
Operation Non-IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM 
Mean (sec) -7.9 -7.7 -4.7 -8.9 -8.9 -14.2 0.4 -1.3 -4.6 
SD (sec) 17.3 10.4 10.0 10.1 9.7 17.2 29.4 8.5 13.6 
N (1) 39 28 20 24 24 33 12 26 23 
Note (1): there were 90 IM operations conducted within in the TRACON during this experiment, 
therefore the N value of 79 for all IM operations at the FAF indicates 11 IM operations were 
canceled in the TRACON prior to the FAF (all by controllers). 
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5.5.2.2 Schedule Deviation at the Meter Fix 
The goal of an IM operation is to achieve or maintain a single assigned spacing goal. However, 
the TBFM and CMS ground tools provide air traffic controllers with guidance to achieve the 
schedule at several different meter points along an aircraft’s route. The schedule deviation at the 
meter fix (the entry into the TRACON) was examined to determine if the schedule deviation of 
IM aircraft was worse than the schedule deviation of non-IM aircraft. 
The results indicate that there were differences between the schedule deviation of IM aircraft and 
the schedule deviation of non-IM aircraft at the meter fix; however, the differences are relatively 
small and are not necessarily problematic (Figure 30 and Table 15). 
 
Figure 30. The schedule deviation at the TRACON Meter Fix. 
 
Table 15. Schedule Deviation Data at TRACON Meter Fix 
Scenario BASELINE CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN MIXED 
Operation Non-IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM Non-IM IM 
Mean (sec) 9.3 -8.8 -2.9 -1.7 -0.2 -7.5 4.8 1.0 -4.4 
SD (sec) 21.9 14.5 15.5 24.6 NA 17.6 17.1 20 27.3 
N (1) (2) 37 25 23 47 1 26 20 42 7 
Note (1): the N value of 228 is one less operation than shown in Table 14 due to the aircraft not 
having a TRACON Meter Fix assigned, which occurred when they initialized inside the TRACON. 
Note (2): there were a total of 90 IM operations in the TRACON, therefore the N value of 51 
operations in Table 15 indicates that 39 of those IM operations were initiated just inside the 
TRACON boundary, due to all the criteria for initiation of those IM operations not being satisfied 
until within the TRACON.  
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5.6 Controller Subjective Assessment Responses 
5.6.1 Controller Acceptability of ATD-1 Operations 
Performance goal #3 states the mean controller acceptability rating of ATD-1 operations (from the 
CARS on the controller post-run survey), will be ≥ ‘8’, where a rating of ‘8’ on the CARS indicates 
that the system has mildly unpleasant deficiencies, is acceptable, and minimal compensation is 
needed to meet desired performance. 
A boxplot of the subjective assessment data is shown in Figure 31. There were only two CARS 
ratings less than ‘8’ (indicated by the dashed green line), indicating that, in general, controllers 
found the ATD-1 operations to be acceptable. 
The first of the two ratings below ‘8’ was a Feeder controller who rated the acceptability of 
operations during a MAINTAIN scenario as ‘7’ due to excessive IM aircraft spacing. (Note: even 
though it was part of their training, it is unclear from the survey whether or not the Feeder 
controller understood that a MAINTAIN clearance issued by an ARTCC controller is not intended 
to meet the TBFM schedule.) The second rating below ‘8’ was a ‘7’ given by a Final controller 
during a MIXED scenario, who reported that several IM aircraft did not adequately slow down on 
final. Additional analysis is in Appendix F.3, questions #10 - #16. 
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Figure 31. Controller acceptability of ATD-1 operations. 
 
The controller post-experiment ratings of acceptability of IM operations aligns with the post-run 
ratings. On a scale of 1 – 7 with ‘4’ being “Acceptable” and ‘7’ being “Completely Acceptable”, 
the mean rating from the eight subject controllers was 6.6, 6.4, and 5.9 for CAPTURE, CROSS, 
and MAINTAIN, respectively. Complete data is in Appendix F.5, question #7. 
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5.6.2 Controller Assessment of Workload of ATD-1 Operations 
Performance goal #4 states the mean controller rating (from the controller post-run survey using a 
NASA TLX with a 7-point Likert scale as defined in reference 19) for Mental Demand, Physical 
Demand, Time Pressure, and Effort will be ≤ ‘5’, and for Frustration and Success will be ≤ ‘3’. A 
7-point scale ranging from ‘1’ = “Very Low” to ‘7’ = “Very High” was used for the Mental 
Demand, Physical Demand, Time Pressure, Effort, and Frustration subscales, and ‘1’ = “Good” to 
‘7’ = “Poor” was used for the Success subscale.  
Descriptive statistics for controller workload ratings are shown in Table 16. There were no TLX 
ratings above ‘5’ for Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Time Pressure, and Effort during all 
operations; two ratings above ‘3’ for Frustration; and one rating above ‘3’ for Success. These 
results indicate that controllers generally found the workload of ATD-1 operations acceptable. 
There was one TLX rating of ‘5’ for Success during a BASELINE scenario by one of the Final 
controllers who reported that an aircraft on final slowed too much, the controller tried to speed it 
up but was too late, and the following aircraft had to be sent around. That same Final controller 
also rated his Frustration as ‘4’ during a MAINTAIN scenario indicating that he felt the IM aircraft 
didn’t always slow as he expected. One of the Center controllers also provided a TLX rating of ‘4’ 
for Frustration during a CAPTURE scenario commenting that he was still adapting to using time 
over mileage for separation and still learning the sequence for issuing various clearances. 
Accompanying plots and additional analysis are in Appendix F.3, questions #4 - #9. 
Table 16. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Workload Ratings (1 of 3) 
Operation TLX Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 
Mental 
Demand 
Center 8 1.9 1.4 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 2.3 0.5 2 2 3 
Final 4 2.3 1.9 1 1.5 5 
Physical 
Demand 
Center 8 1.5 0.9 1 1 3 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Time 
Pressure 
Center 8 1.6 1.2 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Final 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Effort 
Center 8 1.9 1.4 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 3.0 1.2 2 3 4 
Final 4 2.3 1.9 1 1.5 5 
Frustration 
Center 8 1.1 0.4 1 1 2 
Feeder 4 2.0 0.0 2 2 2 
Final 4 1.5 1.0 1 1 3 
Success 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 2.3 1.9 1 1.5 5 
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Table 22. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Workload Ratings (2 of 3) 
Operation TLX Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 
Mental 
Demand 
Center 8 2.6 1.6 1 2 5 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Physical 
Demand 
Center 8 2.0 1.1 1 2 4 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Time 
Pressure 
Center 8 2.3 1.3 1 2 4 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Effort 
Center 8 2.5 1.4 1 2 5 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Frustration 
Center 8 1.6 1.1 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Success 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
CROSS 
Mental 
Demand 
Center 8 2.1 1.4 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Physical 
Demand 
Center 8 2.0 1.1 1 2 4 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Time 
Pressure 
Center 8 1.9 0.8 1 2 3 
Feeder 4 1.8 0.5 1 2 2 
Final 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Effort 
Center 8 2.1 1.1 1 2 4 
Feeder 4 2.3 1.0 1 2.5 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Frustration 
Center 8 1.1 0.4 1 1 2 
Feeder 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Success 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
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Table 22. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Workload Ratings (3 of 3) 
Operation TLX Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
MAINTAIN 
Mental 
Demand 
Center 8 1.9 1.1 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 1.8 0.5 1 2 2 
Final 4 2.5 0.6 2 2.5 3 
Physical 
Demand 
Center 8 1.6 0.9 1 1 3 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Time 
Pressure 
Center 8 1.8 1.2 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Effort 
Center 8 1.9 1.1 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 2.8 0.5 2 3 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Frustration 
Center 8 1.1 0.4 1 1 2 
Feeder 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Final 4 1.8 1.5 1 1 4 
Success 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.5 1.0 1 1 3 
MIXED 
Mental 
Demand 
Center 8 2.1 1.5 1 1.5 5 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Physical 
Demand 
Center 8 1.8 1.2 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Time 
Pressure 
Center 8 2.0 1.3 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Effort 
Center 8 2.0 1.3 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Frustration 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Success 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
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5.6.3 Controller Comments about ATD-1 ConOps and IM Operations 
Controller post-experiment comments about IM operations varied greatly based on what position 
the controller occupied (ARTCC, Feeder, Final), and sometimes the comments were counter to 
comments made by other controllers. A complete listing of their comments is in Appendix F.5, 
and a synthesis of those comments by question number is below: 
• #8: Rate the impact of the addition of IM operations on expediting traffic flow. 
- “Adds a little to your workload, but spacing is more efficient.” 
- “Allowed for more attention complying with metering duties.” 
• #9: When IM aircraft were in your sector, how acceptable was it for the controller to be 
responsible for maintaining standard separation between aircraft. 
- “Increased vigilance required to scan aircraft from separate routes increased workload.” 
- “The MAINTAIN operations were the easiest and required the least work, but 
frequently resulted in less than optimum spacing and had to be canceled in the 
TRACON.” 
• #12: Describe any changes you would make to the IM operation. 
- “Using the arrival sequence numbers as a reference made it easy to determine who the 
IM aircraft was paired with.” 
• #13 & #14: What additional information would your like for IM aircraft and Target aircraft? 
- Most controllers found the displays acceptable as currently configured. 
-  “The meter list and ATD-1 specific information in the aircraft data block was helpful.” 
- “Slot markers, spacing cone and speed advisories were useful.” 
• #15 & #18: Rate the operational acceptability of the IM phraseology, and suggest any 
improvements for clarity or completeness. 
- Overall the controllers rated the IM phraseology as acceptable and clear. 
- “Report paired” should be part of ATC’s acknowledgement of the flight crew’s read 
back of the IM clearance, not the part of the initial issuing of the IM instruction. 
o For example, Delta 1415 read back correct, report paired 
• #16 & #17: Describe any confusion using the Target call sign in the IM instruction, and rate 
the operational acceptability of it. 
- All eight responses stated it was acceptable to use the Target call sign when issuing an 
IM clearance. 
- Seven of the eight responses stated there was no confusion due to using the Target’s 
call sign in a voice instruction to the IM aircraft, with the remaining response noting 
that the Target call sign occasionally had to be spelled phonetically. 
- The “report paired” should be moved to ATC’s acknowledgement of the flight crew’s 
read back of the IM instruction, and not as part of the initial issuing of the instruction. 
• #19: Describe any challenges to implementing IM operations. 
- “Using data link to transmit IM clearances would improve/increase the delivery of said 
clearances and reduce misunderstandings.” 
- “Adjusting the scanning technique. Currently most scanning is altitude, speed, and then 
time when determining separation. With IM it was time, altitude, and then speed.” 
In summary, there was a wide range of responses that did not appear to be related to the role 
(ARTCC or TRACON) or experience of the controller. 
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5.7 Flight Crew Objective Performance Results 
5.7.1 Percentage of Flight Crew Interrupted IM Operations 
Hypothesis #3 states the percentage of IM operations terminated by the flight crew (i.e., pressing 
the CANCEL button) prior to the Planned Termination Point will be less than 30%. 
Of the 79 IM operations, there were no IM operations terminated by the flight crew, and therefore 
the criteria for this hypothesis was met (p < 0.0005). However, there were several instances where 
the subject pilots verbally commented after the scenario that they would have terminated the IM 
operation if it had been a real-world operation. Examples of rationale they provided include: an 
IM speed of 210 knots commanded at FL210 (traced to a software error); the IM aircraft perceived 
to be too close to the preceding aircraft (see Section 5.9.1); and instances of high frequency of IM 
speed changes and speed reversals (see Sections 5.8.1.8 and 5.9.2). 
5.7.2 Flight Crew Reaction Time to IM Speed Command Change 
The flight crew reaction time to IM commanded speed changes is defined as the seconds between 
the new IM commanded speed being first displayed and the flight crew beginning to enter that 
speed in the MCP speed window (Table 17 and Figure 32). The overall mean of 4.0 seconds and 
standard deviation of 3.0 seconds is better than the flight crew reaction time observed in previous 
IM research simulation (for example, a mean of 10.5 seconds and standard deviation of 9.2 seconds 
in ref. 11). The research team have several possible theories to be explored in future research, but 
no evidence to postulate the reason for the faster flight crew reaction time to IM commanded speed 
changes. 
Reaction time when blocked by simulator type shows a somewhat shorter reaction time in the full-
scale high-fidelity simulators (the DTS and IFD) when compared to the medium-fidelity 
simulators (the ASTORs). This was done to validate results obtained from the ASTOR, where the 
flight crew had to time-share a single input device to both respond to ATC and enter the speed in 
the MCP. The 1.4 second difference in flight crew mean reaction time to an IM speed change 
indicates the ASTOR is slightly more challenging to operate than the full-scale simulators, 
however the time difference is not operationally significant. 
The reaction time was also examined to determine if it was different at lower altitudes (less than 
11,000 feet) where the flight crew must begin to configure the aircraft for landing. The results in 
Table 17 show a negligible difference by altitude. 
Table 17. Flight Crew Reaction Time to IM Commanded Speed Change in Seconds 
Simulator or Altitude Band N Mean SD N’ 
All simulators, all altitudes 783 4.0 3.0 36 
• ASTOR only 536 4.3 3.3 22 
• DTS only 142 3.4 2.2  4 
• IFD only 105 2.9 1.9 10 
• Above 11,000’ MSL 469 3.9 2.9  5 
• Below 11,000’ MSL 314 4.0 3.2 31 
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The N’ value in the far right column indicates the number of times a second speed change happened 
prior to the flight crew responding to the first speed command, which is an indirect measure of the 
frequency of the IM speed changes and the ability of the crew to respond based on their other 
cockpit tasks. Approximately 1% of the speed changes above 11,000’ MSL (prior to the crew 
beginning to configure the aircraft for landing) were not responded to prior to the next speed 
change, while below 11,000’ MSL a non-response was recorded for 10.0% of the speed changes. 
This is operationally significant and reemphasizes the importance of reducing the frequency of 
changes to the IM speed command, particularly in the higher workload environment created when 
the crew configures the aircraft. 
 
Figure 32. Scatter plot of pilot reaction time in seconds by altitude by simulator type. 
Note: a 40 second outlier from an ASTOR simulator during a CROSS operation was removed from 
Figure 32 for clarity (but the value retained in calculations and Table 17). 
5.7.3 Flight Crew Conformance to the IM Speed 
The RMS of the difference between the IM instantaneous airspeed (see Section B.4.2 for a detailed 
description) and the aircraft’s actual airspeed was analyzed as a method of determining the 
similarity/dissimilarity of the three different simulator types while conducting the IM operation. 
The 1.2 knot difference in the mean and standard deviation by simulator type is operationally 
insignificant, indicating that in terms of the flight crew maintaining the appropriate speed, the 
simulators are comparable. Based on Boeing provided documentation of auto-throttle behavior, 
and pilot responses on the surveys, the speed conformance is well within the range of expected 
flight operations. 
Table 18. RMS of Aircraft Deviation from IM Commanded Speed in Knots 
Simulator N Mean SD 
All simulators 79 7.70 3.19 
• ASTOR only 53 7.70 2.94 
• DTS only 13 8.88 4.10 
• IFD only 13 7.70 2.94 
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5.7.4 Missed Altitude Constraints 
Based on pilot and controller subject matter expert feedback during previous IM simulations, there 
was concern that IM operations may be more susceptible to missed altitude constraints than non-
IM operations. The primary reason for this concern is that the aircraft’s FMS trajectory is not 
updated when a new IM speed is provided. This can place aircraft into a less than ideal energy 
state that requires the flight crew to use drag devices to maintain the aircraft’s initial vertical path. 
The objective of this analysis was to try and infer whether IM operations increased the likelihood 
that pilots would miss an altitude constraint. 
A missed altitude constraint was counted every time the aircraft crossed an altitude-constrained 
waypoint in excess of 200 feet above or below the constraint associated to that waypoint. The 200 
feet value was selected to be consistent with the methodology used for aircraft data tags on 
controller displays that show an aircraft’s altitude. Additionally, if the aircraft’s lateral position 
was not within 2 nmi of the altitude-constrained waypoint, it was assumed that the aircraft was 
vectored and that the altitude constraint did not apply to that aircraft. 
During the experiment, 110 arrival operations (Table 19) containing 1,240 altitude-constrained 
waypoint crossings (Table 20) were flown by ASTOR, DTS, and IFD subject pilots. 23 of the 110 
(21%) flights had at least one missed altitude constraint, and during these flights, 32 of the 1240 
(2.6%) waypoints with altitude constraints were missed. In all of these cases, the aircraft crossed 
the altitude constraint too high. The missed altitude constraints do show a correlation to simulator 
type, with the ASTOR desktop simulators having a substantially higher percentage of flights and 
waypoint crossings with missed altitude constraints compared to the DTS and IFD simulators.  
Table 19. Arrival Operations with Missed Altitude Constraints 
Simulator Type ASTOR DTS IFD TOTAL 
Total number of all flight operations (1) 74 19 17 110 
Number of flights with ≥ 1 missed altitude constraint 20 2 1 23 
Percent of flights with ≥ 1 missed altitude constraint 27% 11% 5.9% 20.9% 
Note (1): the 110 operations in this table is less than the 113 operations listed in Appendix G since 
three additional arrival operations were excluded from this specific analysis due to being vectored. 
Table 20. Waypoints with Missed Altitude Constraints 
Simulator Type ASTOR DTS IFD TOTAL 
Number of waypoint crossings with altitude constraint 844 207 189 1240 
Number of waypoints with missed altitude constraint 29 2 1 32 
Percent of waypoints with missed altitude constraint 3.4% 1.0% 0.6% 2.6% 
Subset of waypoints during non-IM operations 2 1 0 3 
Subset of waypoints during IM operations 27 1(2) 1 29 
Note (2): the DTS crew did foresee their inability to meet the upcoming altitude constraint due to 
the IM speed change (slower speed caused the aircraft to decrease the descent rate), therefore 
requested an altitude waiver from air traffic which the controller granted. 
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The missed altitude constraints were also analyzed to determine if there was a correlation by airline 
or by crew. No trend was found by airline or subject group; however, the results by crew indicate 
that 17 of 32 (53%) of the missed altitude constraints were caused by just 2 of 12 (17%) of the 
crews. These two crews, both flying the ASTOR simulators but in different subject groups, had all 
17 missed altitude constraints occur while conducting IM operations, and none when conducting 
non-IM operations.  This provides strong evidence that the single mouse-driven interface of the 
ASTOR simulator was challenging or even prevented independent actin by those flight crews when 
compared to the full-scale DTS and IFD simulators. This ASTOR interface hypothesis is also 
corroborated by the unstable approach data (next section) where ASTOR pilots had a higher rate 
of unstable approaches than the DTS or IFD. Anecdotally, it also appears that some flight crews 
were less experienced at predicting the change in the aircraft’s vertical trajectory resulting from 
the pending speed change.  
The magnitude of the altitude miss were categorized into small (less than 400 ft.) or large (greater 
than 400 ft.) events (Figure 33). One-third of the non-IM operations (1 of 3) and approximately 
half of the IM operations (15 of 29) missed an altitude constraint by greater than 400 ft. 
 
Figure 33. The magnitude of missed altitude constraints by simulator type. 
 
Next, the missed altitude constraints were examined to determine if they were influenced by the 
scenario type (i.e., BASELINE, CAPTURE, CROSS, MAINTAIN, MIXED). Table 21 shows the 
percentage of flights that contained at least one missed altitude constraint for each scenario type, 
and as a percentage of the total number of altitude constraints encountered in each scenario type. 
The BASELINE scenario (non-IM operation) had the smallest percentage of aircraft with at least 
one missed altitude constraint (8.3%), and the smallest percentage of waypoints with missed 
altitude constraints (0.7%). However, the CAPTURE scenario also had relatively few missed 
constraints. It is unclear why the difference in missed altitude constraints between the different IM 
scenarios exists.  
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Table 21. Number and Percent of Missed Altitude Constraints by Scenario Type 
Operation Type BASELINE CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN MIXED 
Total number of flight operations (1) 24 19 24 20 23 
Number of flights with a missed altitude 2 2 4 5 10 
Percent of flights with a missed altitude 8.3% 10.5% 16.7% 25% 44% 
Number of waypoints with altitude constraints 272 241 257 223 247 
Number of waypoints with missed altitude 2 4 5 8 13 
Percent of waypoints with a missed altitude 0.7% 1.7% 1.9% 3.6% 5.3% 
 
Finally, video recordings were also examined for missed altitude constraint events to get more 
insight into why they occurred. It was found that 23 out of 32 of these IM and non-IM events 
occurred relatively soon after the flight crew received a speed change from IM or air traffic control 
(i.e., within 8 nmi prior to a waypoint with an “at” or “at or below” constraint), suggesting that 
speed changes immediately prior to altitude constrained waypoints is a significant pre-condition 
to the missed altitude constraint event. The primary factor contributing to these events continues 
to appear to be the ASTOR single mouse-driven interface that precluded independent action by 
the flight crew (responding to air traffic control, entering a speed, deploying the speed brake, etc.). 
However, based on discussions during the week-long training session and comments made during 
debrief, that some flight crews had rarely or never used the VNAV speed mode, and were 
challenged to predict the change to the aircraft’s vertical trajectory based on a pending speed 
change with enough accuracy to determine if speed brakes were required to meet an altitude 
constraint. Furthermore, they stated the new requirement to maintain vertical path with power and 
speed brake added to their mental workload and required additional head-down time.3 
                                                 
3 Specifically, when flying in VNAV speed mode in the aircraft types used in this experiment, the 
aircraft uses pitch to achieve speed, and the pilots are required to use throttle and drag devices to 
maintain the aircraft’s vertical path. The VNAV speed mode provides protection against crossing 
a waypoint at too low an altitude (the mode will switch to VNAV path); however, there is no 
automatic protection against crossing a waypoint at an altitude higher than the constraint. Within 
this experiment, all of the missed altitude events were above the altitude constraint – where VNAV 
speed mode does not provide protection and the pilot must apply sufficient drag if required. This 
particular root cause occurred in both IM and non-IM operations. 
It should be noted that the IM research teams at NASA Langley and elsewhere have known that 
the VNAV speed mode is not commonly used by all flight crews, and that managing the aircraft’s 
vertical path and correcting with either throttle or speed brake can be high workload. Therefore, 
mitigations were included in the experimental design: (1) each group of subject pilots was selected 
based on their being qualified for that particular simulator type; (2) all subject pilots were given a 
dedicated one-hour classroom discussion about VNAV during the week-long training, and (3) they 
all were given hands-on practice conducting VNAV speed mode operations in the simulator they 
were to fly during this experiment. 
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To summarize this analysis, 21% of the IM and non-IM operations by subject pilots had at least 
one missed altitude constraint. Of these events, 91% occurred during IM operations, 87% were 
committed by the ASTOR simulators, 53% of them were from just two crews (both operating an 
ASTOR desktop simulator), and 72% percent of the missed altitude constraints occurred when the 
flight crew received a speed change from the IM software or air traffic control when less than 8 
nmi prior to an altitude constrained waypoint. 
The conclusion from this missed altitude constraint analysis is the single ASTOR interface 
prevented independent action by the flight crew, which was the primary cause for the 
disproportionate number of missed altitude events occurring by the ASTOR simulators. 
Anecdotally, some of the flight crew did not have familiarity using the VNAV speed mode, and 
did not appear to predict the change in the aircraft’s vertical trajectory due to a speed change with 
enough accuracy to adhere to published altitude constraints. 
5.7.5 Unstable Approaches 
A stabilized approach (ref. 34, chapter 15) is characterized as the aircraft having a constant angle 
and constant rate of descent while meeting the following criteria no later than when descending 
through 1,000 feet above the ground: 
• ± 10 knots of the final approach speed, 
• landing gear down and flaps set to the desired landing position, 
• engines spooled for the aircraft configuration and speed, and 
• on lateral path and on vertical profile. 
A rudimentary analysis was conducted using the first three criteria when the aircraft descended 
through 1000 feet above the airport elevation to determine if the IM procedures impacted how the 
flight crew operated their aircraft during this critical stage of flight (Table 22). 
Table 22. Operations not Meeting Stabilized Approach Criteria 
 ASTOR DTS IFD 
Number of all subject pilot flown operations 78 17 18 
• Total number of non-IM operations 25 4 5 
• Number (%) of unstable non-IM approaches 12 (48%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 
• Total number of IM operations 53 12 13 
• Number (%) of unstable IM approaches 9 (17%) 2 (17%) 1 (8%) 
 
The following conclusions were drawn from the data shown in Table 22: 
• Achieving a stabilized approach appears to have been a more significant challenge in the 
ASTOR simulator as compared to the full-scale DTS and IFD simulators. A significant 
factor is believed to be the use of a single computer-mouse interface, time-shared by the 
two pilots, that was used by one crew member to respond to ATC instructions on the radio, 
and the other crew member making changes to the aircraft’s heading and airspeed. In other 
words, the single mouse-interface prevented normally independent action by the two pilots. 
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• The IM operations had a lower rate of unstable approaches than non-IM (current day) 
operations. The ASTAR spacing algorithm is specifically designed to assist the flight crew 
in achieving a stabilized approach; however, it cannot be conclusively shown from these 
results that the algorithm design itself caused the improved performance. It can be stated 
that the IM operation procedure does not appear to increase the likelihood of an unstable 
approach compared to current day operations.  
 
5.8 Flight Crew Subjective Assessment Responses 
For the flight crew post-run questionnaires, a sample size of N = 48 responses was anticipated for 
each scenario type; however, simulation errors during four flights resulted in N = 46 and N = 42 
for the CAPTURE and MAINTAIN scenarios, respectively. The impacted data includes Table 23 
through Table 32, Table 34, Table 52, and Table 53. 
For flight crew acceptability and workload metrics discussed in this section, statistical analysis 
was performed using the Wilcoxon signed rank test, a nonparametric test appropriate for analyzing 
ordinal data (ref. 27). There were no statistically significant differences between mean responses 
for the PF and PM for any of the pilot post-run questionnaire items (p ≥ 0.100), and therefore data 
were combined for all subsequent analyses. 
5.8.1 Flight Crew Acceptability 
Hypothesis #4 states the mean flight crew acceptability rating of IM operations, using a 7-point 
Likert rating scale (from ‘1’ = “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ = “Completely Acceptable”), 
will be ≥ ‘5’ (i.e., top one-third of the 1-to-7 scale, where a rating of ‘5’ indicates “Slightly Agree”). 
Nine different measures are analyzed in this section (listed from highest to lowest importance) to 
provide in-depth assessment of the flight crew acceptability ratings of IM operations. All nine 
measures used in this research indicate that in general, the flight crew found the IM operations to 
be acceptable during high-density arrival operations.  
5.8.1.1 Post-Run Acceptability of Overall IM Operation 
Descriptive statistics associated with the ratings of overall acceptability of IM are shown in Table 
23 and Figure 34. For all five operations, the mean acceptability ratings were statistically greater 
than ‘5’ (p ≤ 0.006), indicating that flight crews found all IM operation types to be acceptable on 
average. (The ‘5’ criteria is indicated by a dashed green line in Figure 34.) 
Table 23. Descriptive Statistics for Flight Crew Acceptability Ratings 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 48 6.8 0.6 5 7 7 
CAPTURE 46 5.6 1.4 1 6 7 
CROSS 48 5.7 1.1 2 6 7 
MAINTAIN 42 5.8 1.5 1 6 7 
MIXED 48 5.6 1.6 1 6 7 
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Figure 34. Flight crew acceptability of operations by IM operation type. 
 
There were five pilot post-run acceptability ratings of ‘1.’ One of the pilots felt the speed changes 
were too large, and reported receiving commands of 230 to 290 and then to 240 within 45 seconds 
during a CAPTURE scenario. During a MAINTAIN scenario, both pilots in one flight crew 
reported that they received a speed decrease at FL290 from 280 to 230 kts, then a 210 kt speed 
command at FL210, which was soon followed by the controller cancelling IM and assigning a 
speed of 260 kts (the 210 knot speed instruction was due to a software error discovered after data 
collection). Another pilot reported IM speed commands of 180 to 130 and then to 160 while on 
final (due to the ground speed term phase out described in Section 5.9.5), and that pilot stated the 
IM speed changes need to be small and more frequent rather than large speed reductions and speed 
reversals. 
Two pilots provided acceptability ratings of ‘2.’ During a CROSS scenario, one pilot attempted to 
enter the clearance twice in the left EFB and received ‘UNABLE’ and ‘TGT BAD ROUTE’ 
messages; on the third try he used the right EFB at the observer’s suggestion and was able to pair 
(traced to a software logic error). Another pilot reported receiving four speed reductions in 30 
seconds from 180 to 140 on final, while the aircraft’s minimum speed is 144 kts. 
For the eight acceptability ratings of ‘3,’ pilots reported receiving too many speed commands, 
large speed reductions resulting in being unable to meet altitude constraints, speed reversals, and 
commanded speeds below the aircraft minimum speed. Another pilot reported confusion due to 
receiving an assigned speed from ATC without explicitly being told to suspend IM operations, 
while also getting a frequency handoff at the same time. Additional analysis is in Appendix F.4. 
5.8.1.2 Post-Run Acceptability of IM Operation by Phase of Flight 
The flight crew also rated the acceptability of IM operations by phase of flight (from ‘1’ = 
“Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ = “Completely Acceptable”). In general, the flight crew rated 
the acceptability of IM operation types very high (7) when in the higher-segment (> FL180). The 
CROSS and CAPTURE operations were rated very high (7) in the mid-level segment (11,000 – 
18,000’ MSL) and high (6) in the lower-level segment (Surface – 11,000’). The MAINTAIN 
operation was rated slightly differently by the flight crew, with the mid-level rated high (6) and 
the lower-level rated very high (7). Additional analysis is in Appendix F.4. 
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5.8.1.3 Post-experiment acceptability of IM procedures 
The mean flight crew acceptability rating (scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being “Completely Acceptable”) 
of the three IM operation types on the post-experiment survey is shown in Table 24, with a 
summary of flight crew comments immediately below it. All the comments are available in 
Appendix F.6, question #8. 
Table 24. Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Operational Acceptability of IM Procedures 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 24 6.4 0.9 4 7 7 
CROSS 24 6.3 0.8 5 6.5 7 
MAINTAIN 24 5.9 1.5 1 6 7 
 
• Pilots individually provided nearly identical ratings of acceptability for CAPTURE, 
CROSS, and MAINTAIN. There were a couple of exceptions where the acceptability of 
the MAINTAIN operation was rated very low. 
• When the MAINTAIN clearance was issued in the Mach regime, the time delay until the 
IM operation initiated in the CAS regime caused some pilots to believe the IM software 
was ineffective or not working correctly. 
• Getting the clearance early from ATC made it easier to follow IM procedures. 
• Acceleration/Decelerations were sometimes too large and may affect passenger comfort. 
• Excessive broadcast time for some clearances, a suitable solution would be communication 
using data link instead of voice. 
 
5.8.1.4 Post-Run Acceptability of IM Procedures 
Descriptive statistics associated with the acceptability ratings are shown in Table 25 and Figure 
35. For all IM procedures, the mean acceptability ratings were statistically greater than ‘5’ (p < 
0.0005). Therefore, flight crews found the IM procedures to be acceptable overall. 
 
Three pilots rated the acceptability of the IM procedures as ‘1,’ one pilot rated it as ‘2,’ and four 
pilots rated it as ‘3.’ Several factors reported by the pilots may have contributed to these lower 
ratings: being unable to meet altitude constraints due to IM commanded speed reductions, too 
many speed changes especially on final, large speed changes, speed reversals, and speed reductions 
resulting in configuring early followed by speed increases. One pilot who rated the IM procedures 
during the MIXED scenario as ‘2’ felt that things went well until inside the FAF, at which point 
they were closing on the Target aircraft and believed they would have executed a go-around in the 
real world. Another pilot who rated the IM procedures as ‘3’ during the MIXED scenario reported 
that after his aircraft was paired, ATC canceled the operation and then said to be prepared for a 
CAPTURE clearance, but did not provide direction on the desired speed. ATC then issued the 
second IM clearance without asking if the flight crew was ready to copy. Additional information 
is in Appendix F.4, question #18. 
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Table 25. Descriptive Statistics for Flight Crew Acceptability of IM Procedures Ratings 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 46 6.0 1.2 1 6 7 
CROSS 48 6.0 1.0 3 6 7 
MAINTAIN 42 6.0 1.4 1 6 7 
MIXED 48 6.0 1.3 2 6.5 7 
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Figure 35. Flight crew acceptability of IM procedure by IM operation type. 
 
5.8.1.5 Post-Experiment Acceptability of IM Procedures 
The flight crew rated the acceptability (scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being “Completely Acceptable”) of 
the IM procedures on the post-experiment survey as a mean of 6.1 (standard deviation of 0.8).  
This indicates that the pilots found the IM procedures to be acceptable overall, which is consistent 
with the post-run acceptability ratings discussed in Section 5.8.1.4. Additional data is in Appendix 
F.6, question #9. 
5.8.1.6 Post-Run Completeness of IM Procedures 
Descriptive statistics associated with the completeness ratings are shown in Table 26 and Figure 
36. For all IM procedures, the mean completeness ratings were statistically greater than ‘5’ (p < 
0.0005). Therefore, flight crews found the IM procedures to be complete (that is, all crew actions 
required to conduct the IM operation were given during training) overall. 
One pilot rated the completeness of the IM procedures as ‘1,’ one pilot rated it as ‘2,’ and three 
pilots rated it as ‘3.’ One pilot felt there was limited information for the flight crew to know that 
‘TGT BAD ROUTE’ message meant the aircraft would not pair without further intervention from 
them. During a MAINTAIN scenario, one pilot reported that the speed commands were too large 
and the operation was canceled by ATC. Another pilot felt that receiving a speed command from 
ATC without direction to suspend IM caused confusion. A fourth pilot received a speed command 
just prior to the IM system auto-suspending, which was unacceptable for maintaining a stable 
approach. Another pilot also reported that the speed commands were too large on final. Additional 
analysis is in Appendix F.4, question #19. 
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Table 26. Descriptive Statistics for Completeness of IM Procedures Ratings 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 46 6.4 0.9 3 7 7 
CROSS 48 6.3 0.9 3 6 7 
MAINTAIN 42 6.3 1.2 1 7 7 
MIXED 48 6.3 1.1 2 7 7 
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Figure 36. Flight crew completeness of IM procedure by IM operation type. 
Pilots were also asked if there were any steps missing from the IM procedures (Appendix F.4, 
question #20), if there were extra steps that were unnecessary (question #21), and if the steps were 
logical and easy to follow (question #22). The ratings are summarized below in Table 27. 
Comments from these questions are repeated or incorporated in comments elsewhere (for example, 
the high frequency and the location of IM speed changes). 
Table 27. Pilot Percentage Reporting Missing, Unnecessary and Logical Steps by Type 
Operation N 
Missing Steps 
(% No) 
Unnecessary Steps  
(% No) 
Logical Steps 
(% Yes) 
CAPTURE 46 93% 98% 89% 
CROSS 48 92% 98% 92% 
MAINTAIN 42 100% 95% 93% 
MIXED 48 94% 94% 92% 
 
5.8.1.7 Post-Run Acceptability of IM Commanded Speeds 
Descriptive statistics associated with the ratings of operational acceptability of IM commanded 
speeds are shown in Table 28 and in Figure 37. For the CAPTURE and MAINTAIN operations, 
the mean acceptability ratings were statistically greater than ‘5’ (p ≤ 0.026). For the CROSS 
operation and the MIXED scenario, the mean acceptability ratings were not statistically greater 
than ‘5’ (p = 0.062 and p = 0.086, respectively), although the median rating was ‘6.’ This indicates 
that flight crews found the IM commanded speeds to be operationally acceptable for the 
CAPTURE and MAINTAIN operations, but were uncomfortable with some of the commanded 
speeds during the CROSS operation and the MIXED scenario. 
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Nine pilots rated the operational acceptability of the IM commanded speeds as ‘1,’ six pilots rated 
it as ‘2,’ and six pilots rated it as ‘3.’ They reported being unable to meet altitude constraints due 
to IM commanded speed reductions, numerous speed changes, large speed changes, speed 
reversals, and speed reductions resulting in configuring early followed by speed increases, and 
commanded speeds less than the aircraft minimum speed. Additional information is in Appendix 
F.4, question #15. 
Table 28. Descriptive Statistics of Operational Acceptability of IM Speeds  
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 46 5.4 1.7 1 6 7 
CROSS 48 5.2 1.5 1 6 7 
MAINTAIN 42 5.5 1.7 1 6 7 
MIXED 48 5.3 1.7 1 5.5 7 
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Figure 37. Flight crew operational acceptability of IM speeds by IM operation type. 
 
5.8.1.8 Post-Run Acceptability of Frequency of IM Speed Changes 
Descriptive statistics associated with the ratings of acceptability of the frequency of IM speed 
changes are shown in Table 29 and Figure 38. For the CROSS operation, MAINTAIN operation, 
and MIXED scenario, the mean acceptability ratings were statistically greater than ‘5’ (p ≤ 0.007), 
indicating that flight crews found the frequency of IM speed changes to be acceptable. For the 
CAPTURE operation, the mean acceptability rating was not statistically greater than ‘5’ (p = 
0.072). Although the median rating for the CAPTURE operation was ‘6,’ the variability in the 
ratings was slightly higher than for the other scenarios (standard deviation = 1.6).  
Three pilots rated the acceptability of the frequency of IM speed changes as ‘1,’ four pilots rated 
it as ‘2,’ and eleven pilots rated it as ‘3.’ They reported being unable to meet altitude constraints 
due to IM commanded speed reductions, too many speed changes especially on final, large speed 
changes, speed reversals, and speed reductions resulting in configuring early followed by speed 
increases. Several pilots also commented that size and frequency of speed changes would be 
unacceptable with passengers onboard the aircraft. Additional information is in Appendix F.4, 
question #16. 
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Table 29. Descriptive Statistics of Acceptability of Frequency of IM Speed Changes 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 46 5.3 1.6 1 6 7 
CROSS 48 5.5 1.2 2 6 7 
MAINTAIN 42 5.6 1.3 1 6 7 
MIXED 48 5.5 1.5 1 6 7 
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Figure 38. Flight crew acceptability of IM speed change frequency by IM operation type. 
 
5.8.1.9 Post-Run Acceptability of Head Down Time 
Descriptive statistics associated with the acceptability ratings of flight crew head down time are 
shown in Table 30 and Figure 39. For all IM procedures, the mean acceptability ratings were 
statistically greater than ‘5’ (p < 0.0005). Therefore, flight crews found the amount of head down 
time required of the PM to input information from the IM clearance(s) into the EFB to be 
acceptable. 
Six pilots rated the acceptability of the amount of head down time as ‘2,’ and one pilot rated it as 
‘3.’ They felt there was too much head down time required after pairing, especially below 10,000 
feet. Two pilots suggested more aural or visual alerting for CGD changes, and one pilot felt that 
cancelling and revising IM clearances below 10,000 feet should not be considered due to the 
amount of head down time required. Additional information is in Appendix F.4, question #17. 
Table 30. Descriptive Statistics for Acceptability of Amount of Head Down Time 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 46 6.2 1.2 2 7 7 
CROSS 48 6.3 1.0 2 7 7 
MAINTAIN 42 6.3 1.1 2 7 7 
MIXED 48 6.2 1.1 2 6 7 
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Figure 39. Flight crew acceptability of head down time by IM operation type. 
In summary, nine different aspects of the acceptability of IM operations to pilots were assessed, 
and generally the pilots rated the IM procedure and actions required to accomplish it as acceptable. 
However, the frequency of the IM speed changes was rated as slightly less acceptable. 
5.8.2 Flight Crew Workload of IM Operations 
Hypothesis #5 states the mean flight crew workload rating of IM operations, measured using the 
Modified Cooper-Harper (MCH) subjective workload rating scale (ref. 22) on post-run surveys, 
will be less than or equal to ‘3’. 
A rating of ‘3’ on the MCH rating scale indicates that the instructed task is fair and/or has mild 
difficulty, and acceptable operator mental effort is required to attain adequate system performance. 
Descriptive statistics associated with the pilot workload ratings are shown in Table 31 and Figure 
40. For all five operations, the mean MCH workload ratings were statistically less than ‘3’ (p ≤ 
0.010). Therefore, overall, flight crews found the workload level experienced to be acceptable on 
average. 
There were two workload ratings of ‘10.’ The pilot who rated the BASELINE scenario as ‘10’ did 
not indicate any issues during the run. The pilot who rated his workload as ‘10’ during a 
MAINTAIN scenario reported receiving excessive speed reduction from the IM commanded 
speeds, and the operation was canceled. Of the three pilots who rated their workload as ‘9,’ one 
indicated too many speed changes causing the gear to be lowered, raised, and then lowered again. 
The other two pilots both indicated that large IM commanded speed reductions resulted in a failure 
to meet altitude restrictions during MAINTAIN scenarios. The twelve pilots who experienced 
workloads of ‘7’ and ‘8’ reported being unable to meet altitude constraints due to IM commanded 
speed reductions, numerous speed changes, large speed changes, speed reversals, and speed 
reductions resulting in configuring early followed by speed increases. Additional information is in 
Appendix F.4, questions #5 - #10. 
In summary, the flight crews in general found the workload of any IM operation type to be low. 
Workload was rated higher when frequent IM speed changes were commanded, and when a speed 
change caused the flight crew to not meet an altitude constraint.   
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Table 31. Descriptive Statistics for Flight Crew Workload Ratings 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 48 1.4 1.3 1 1 10 
CAPTURE 46 2.3 1.4 1 2 8 
CROSS 48 2.4 1.9 1 2 9 
MAINTAIN 42 2.5 2.5 1 2 10 
MIXED 48 2.4 1.9 1 2 8 
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Figure 40. Flight crew perception of workload by IM operation type. 
 
5.8.3 Flight Crew Ratings and Comments about Situation Awareness 
The pilots rated the situation awareness provided by the IM operation and displays (scale of 1 to 
7, with 1 being “Severely Degraded Situational Awareness” to 7 being “Greatly Improved 
Situational Awareness”) on the post-experiment survey as a Mean of 5.8 (standard deviation = 
1.6). Complete information is in Appendix F.6, question #10. A synopsis of the comments is: 
• Situation awareness was higher due to the ability to see aircraft with ID tags. 
• Task saturation near the FAF during an IM operation reduced situation awareness. 
• An aural warning for speed changes would reduce fixation on the speed command. 
• EFB display and filters enhanced situation awareness of other aircraft on the arrival. 
• While the flight crews’ awareness was enhanced regarding surrounding aircraft, the IM 
operation and displays could distract from the crews’ awareness of the Ownship state. 
 
In summary, the cockpit display of traffic shown on the EFB enhanced the flight crews’ situation 
awareness, while the IM operation itself did not generally impact awareness, except when frequent 
IM speed changes occurred close to the FAF. 
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5.8.4 Flight Crew Comments about ATD-1 ConOps and IM Operations 
5.8.4.1 Controller Retains Separation Responsibility While the Flight Crew Space 
The pilots rated the acceptability of the controller retaining separation responsibility while the 
flight crew ensures proper spacing during IM operation (scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being “Completely 
Unacceptable” to 7 being “Completely Acceptable”) on the post-experiment questionnaire as a 
Mean of 6.4 (standard deviation = 0.8). Complete information is in Appendix F.6, question #11. 
A synopsis of the comments is: 
• “As long as the controller controls the IM pairing message to keep proper spacing.” 
• “As long as the controller controls the IM pairing message to keep proper spacing. We 
have to be able to trust that we have enough spacing.” 
5.8.4.2 IM Commanded Speed Causing Unexpected or Undesired Behavior 
Nineteen of the 24 (79%) pilots reported in the post-experiment survey that the IM commanded 
speeds at some time caused unexpected or undesired behavior. Complete information is in 
Appendix F.6, question #12. A synopsis of the comments is: 
• Multiple large speed changes, especially near the FAF (termination point) are undesired 
especially when affecting passenger comfort. 
• Certain FMS vertical operational modes when following the IM commanded speed 
eliminate altitude protection. 
• On occasion the commanded speed was below landing speed or above over-speed limits. 
• Large speed changes reduced situation awareness, resulting in missed altitude restrictions. 
• The aircraft had to be configured early to meet speed commands. 
 
5.8.4.3 Desired Changes to the IM Operation 
Overall the flight crews indicated the IM operation was acceptable, but had a detailed list of items 
that need to be addressed before being implemented in current-day operations. Complete 
information is in Appendix F.6, question #13. A synopsis of the comments is: 
• Data link is a highly desirable enabling component for IM. 
• IM operations need to engage as soon as the flight crew enters the information, regardless 
of Mach or calibrated airspeed segment, and regardless of prior or after a waypoint with a 
speed constraint.  
• Consideration should be given for an algorithm catered to aircraft specific performance. 
• Minimize the speed changes. 
• No IM speed changes (or operation) within 2 miles of the FAF to allow crew to focus on 
configuring the aircraft and achieving a stabilized approach for landing. 
• The FAST/SLOW indicator should be integrated into the speed tape. 
• An aural or visual alerting system needs to be incorporated to reduce head-down time. 
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5.8.4.4 Flight Crew Comments on IM Phraseology 
Pilots were asked if they experienced any issues with the IM phraseology. The full list of comments 
is in Appendix F.6, with a summary of those comments directly below and Table 32 indicating the 
IM operation type they occurred in. Complete information is in Appendix F.4, question #24. A 
synopsis of the comments is: 
• Received IM clearance prior to receiving ‘descend via’ clearance. 
• ATC issued speed commands after the aircraft paired, but did not issue suspend IM 
command. 
• ATC told flight crew to “discontinue” spacing rather than “suspend” or “cancel.” 
• ATC used call sign for Target aircraft when issuing IM clearance, and the flight crew of 
the IM aircraft did not know the corresponding three letter identifier. 
• ATC issued MAINTAIN clearance and included the Target’s route. 
• ATC issued MAINTAIN clearance and included spacing goal. 
• ATC issued MAINTAIN clearance but did not specify miles or seconds. 
• There was confusion among the pilots as to whether or not they needed to advise the next 
controller that they were paired. 
• Slightly more than half of the pilots felt the phonetic identifier should be used for the 
Target’s call sign during the IM clearance instruction. 
 
Table 32. Pilot Percentage Reporting Issues with IM Phraseology by IM Operation Type 
Operation N % Reporting Phraseology Issue 
CAPTURE 46 4% 
CROSS 48 4% 
MAINTAIN 42 31% 
MIXED 48 10% 
 
The type of third party ID used by the controller to issue the IM clearance is shown in Table 33. 
Three pilots reported that both the call sign and alpha-numeric identifier were used in the same 
clearance. In addition, six pilots received a clearance with the Target aircraft’s call sign and had 
to query ATC for the three letter identifier. Complete information is in Appendix F.4, question 
#25.  
Table 33. Type of Third Party ID Used to Issue the IM Clearance 
Third Party ID N 
Call sign (e.g., Brickyard 123) 158 
Alpha-numeric (e.g., R P A 123) 11 
Phonetic (e.g., Romeo Papa Alpha 123) 4 
Other 14 
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5.8.4.5 Post-Run Acceptability of the Use of Voice Communications 
The acceptability of the use of voice communications was measured using a 7-point Likert rating 
scale (‘1’ = “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ = “Completely Acceptable”). Descriptive statistics 
associated with the operational acceptability ratings are shown in Table 34 and Figure 41. For all 
types of operations, the mean acceptability ratings were statistically greater than ‘5’ (p < 0.0005). 
This indicates that flight crews found the use of voice communications to provide the IM 
clearances to be acceptable.  
 
One pilot rated the acceptability of the use of voice communications as ‘2,’ commenting that ATC 
informed him that his microphone was breaking up, and that there seemed to be a lot of pilots 
stepping on each other on the radio (simulator limitation due to software-based communication 
system). Four pilots provided ratings of ‘3,’ and reported that there was confusion regarding the 
terminology to suspend IM, and also that cancelling IM should be followed by speed instructions 
from ATC. Additional information is in Appendix F.4, question #13. 
Table 34. Descriptive Statistics for Acceptability of the Use of Voice Communications 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 48 6.6 0.7 4 7 7 
CAPTURE 46 6.3 1.2 2 7 7 
CROSS 48 6.3 0.9 4 7 7 
MAINTAIN 42 6.1 1.2 3 7 7 
MIXED 48 6.1 1.2 3 7 7 
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Figure 41. Flight crew acceptability of use of voice communications by IM operation type. 
 
5.8.4.6 Post-Experiment Acceptability of the Use of Voice Communications 
The flight crew rated the operational acceptability of the IM phraseology (scale of 1 to 7, with 7 
being “Very Clear”) in the post-experiment survey. Complete information is in Appendix F.6, 
question #19, and a synopsis of the comments is below. 
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Table 35. Pilot acceptability of Voice Comm during ATD-1 operations 
IM Phraseology N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE clearance 24 6.9 0.3 6 7 7 
CROSS clearance 24 6.9 0.3 6 7 7 
MAINTAIN clearance 24 6.5 1.5 1 7 7 
Reporting “IM Paired” 24 6.9 0.3 6 7 7 
Check in with TRACON 24 6.7 0.7 4 7 7 
Amendments to IM clearance 24 6.5 0.9 4 7 7 
IM clearance Suspension 24 6.0 1.5 2 7 7 
IM clearance Resume 24 6.1 1.3 3 7 7 
IM Status reporting Unable 24 6.0 1.6 2 7 7 
 
• Off-nominal operations may need further development because things become ‘confusing 
when deviations occur’. 
• In a high density environment with voice communication, issuing and reading back IM 
clearances may create unintended workloads 
• Confusion for pilots regarding whether IM is suspended or canceled when given a speed 
command by ATC but not explicitly stating IM has been canceled or suspended. 
• Cancellation and reissuance of the IM clearance was ‘tedious’ in the voice environment. 
 
5.8.4.7 Post-Experiment Confusion about Target or Ownship Call Sign 
Four of 24 (16.6%) pilots responded on the post-experiment questionnaire that they experienced 
confusion during the IM clearance instruction about the Target versus Ownship call sign. Another 
three (12.5%) reported not hearing or noticing the issue, and the remaining 17 (70.8%) reported 
they did not experience any confusion throughout the experiment. Complete information is in 
Appendix F.6, question #20. A synopsis of the comments is: 
• “Heard it happen more than once. It took additional read-backs to get fixed.” 
• “Specifically on call signs that I don't frequently hearing.” 
• “It's a minor distraction, but also aids in situation awareness, as you get to hear who is 
following whom.” 
 
5.8.4.8 Post-Experiment Acceptability of Using Target Call Sign in IM Clearance 
The acceptability of the using the Target’s call sign in the IM clearance was also measured using 
a 7-point rating scale (‘1’ = “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ = “Completely Acceptable”) via 
the electronic post-experiment questionnaire. The mean acceptability ratings were statistically 
greater than ‘5’ (p < 0.0005), indicating the flight crews found the use of the Target call sign in an 
IM clearance to be acceptable. Complete information is in Appendix F.6, question #21. A synopsis 
of the comments is: 
• Training may be necessary to familiarize crews with lesser known airline call signs. 
• Controller should issue the Target call sign using the phonetic or alpha-numeric alphabet. 
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5.8.4.9 Post-Experiment Suggestions to Improve IM Phraseology 
Overall the flight crew reported the phraseology was complete and clear, however would require 
more training and practice to become proficient. Complete information is in Appendix F.6, 
question #22. A synopsis of the comments is: 
• Data link communication is optimal. 
• “United 123" for the usual ATC communications, and “Uniform Alfa Lima 123” for the 
IM Target until we get the clearances by data link. 
• Add a quick reference page on the EFB for call sign and ICAO code. 
• ATC should not have to communicate “report paired”. This should be a required action on 
the part of the pilots. 
• Standardize clearance between CROSS, MAINTAIN, and CAPTURE. Give Target route 
even on MAINTAIN clearance. 
• There is a need for clear delineation between paired/suspend/resume/cancel events that 
both the controller and pilot can understand. 
 
5.8.4.10 Post-Experiment Comments about Challenges to IM Implementation 
Overall many of the flight crew responded that the IM operation and procedures would be fairly 
easy to implement, however there were several issues highlighted that need refinement prior to 
implementation in current-day operations. Complete information is in Appendix F.6, question #24. 
A synopsis of the comments is:  
• Overall the concept and procedures are straight-forward, and training would be easy and 
effective if included in the simulator. However, implementing IM operations by only 
providing a training bulletin will probably be insufficient. 
o “With proper simulator training I would probably rate this as Very Easy. If training 
were just a bulletin, then it could be slightly to moderately difficult.” 
o “It would require training and several LOFTs [line-oriented flight training events] to 
completely train line crews. Integrated training may be helpful but difficult to do.” 
o “I think this is overall very easy to learn.” 
o “Training would be required including at least one simulator flight.” 
 
• Issues that need to be refined include impact on VNAV PATH operations when making 
speed changes, especially close to altitude constrained waypoints. 
o “High rates of distractions trying to slow a Boeing 737 with constant speed changes 
close to the airport. It is relative easy if IM is terminated further out from FAF. I think 
there are too many additive conditions and increased task loading with IM procedures. 
Errors may not be caught by crews trying to comply close to airport.” 
o “The IM speed changes near altitude restrictions in the terminal arrival area interfere 
with configuration changes.” 
o “Large speed changes may be difficult to accomplish. Each crew would also need to 
understand the importance of making a "gradual" adjustment, not a really quick 
adjustment when commanded.” 
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5.8.4.11 Post-Experiment Comments about Most and Least Useful IM Operation 
The responses to these questions were wide-ranging, resulted in no overall conclusion, and 
frequently offered competing suggestions. Complete information is in Appendix F.6, question #25 
& #26. A synopsis of the comments is: 
• All operations seemed acceptable to pilots, and the response of most useful IM operation 
was approximately evenly split between the three IM types. 
• All IM operation types were rated as the least useful, however 9 of the 24 responses was 
the MAINTAIN as the least useful. The rationale for the MAINTAIN being the least useful 
varied widely, and in several cases displayed an incorrect understanding of the operation. 
5.8.5 Flight Crew Comments about IM Interface and Displays 
5.8.5.1 Intuitiveness of Entering Information into the EFB 
The flight crew rated the intuitiveness of entering IM clearance information into the EFB (scale of 
1 to 7, with 7 being “Completely Intuitive”) on the post-experiment questionnaire a Mean of 6.7 
(standard deviation = 0.6). Complete information is in Appendix F.6, question #14. A synopsis of 
the comments is: 
• Every EFB page should have a touch screen HOME option. Several pilots reported at times 
being confused on how to reach the HOME page. 
• The ENTER button should appear in same location on every page. 
• This is very easy, requiring minimal training to master. 
 
None of the pilots that flew the IFD with the constant, light to moderate turbulence, expressed any 
difficulty with data entry of information into the EFB to conduct the IM operation. 
5.8.5.2 The Usefulness of Display Elements on the EFB 
The flight crew rated the usefulness of the EFB display elements in the post-experiment survey, 
and those rated at ‘6’ or higher (on a scale of 1 – 7) are shown below.  
• IM commanded speed:  Mean = 6.7 (standard deviation = 0.6) 
• IM status (i.e. ARMED, PAIRED): Mean = 6.5 (standard deviation = 0.7) 
• Ownship route:   Mean = 6.1 (standard deviation = 1.6) 
• Target route:    Mean = 6.1 (standard deviation = 1.3) 
Complete information is in Appendix F.6, questions #15 & #16. A synopsis of the comments is: 
• EARLY/LATE indicator was considered fairly useless to pilots. 
• FAST/SLOW indicator should be integrated onto the speed tape on the primary display. 
• Target GS/TRK/BRG options within the EFB increased situation awareness and was more 
useful than the EARLY/LATE indicator. 
• Revise the armed/waiting condition messages to make more intuitive. 
• Revise condition messages to either make more sense or else provide a training manual 
with the message description. 
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• Add seconds to the range on the EARLY/LATE indicator (i.e. 45 s). Pilots want some 
indication of what the range values are. 
• Annunciation is desirable when changing from ARMED to AVAILABLE. 
• All information on the EFB should be replicated in the CGD. The EFB is needed for other 
things such as approach plates, airport diagrams, etc. 
• Add functionality to uplink the IM clearance via data link. 
• Filters improved situations awareness and were intuitive to use, but could be better 
presented on the navigation display which already hosts traffic display information 
(elements could be more fully integrated into the aircraft). 
5.8.5.3 The Effectiveness and Usefulness of Display Elements on the CGD 
The mean rating given by the flight crew during the post-experiment questionnaire of the 
effectiveness of the CGD in providing adequate information to conduct an IM operation was 6.3 
(standard deviation = 0.7). Complete information is in Appendix F.6, question #18. Comment 
highlights are: 
• Integrate the CGD into another display, allowing pilots to ‘stow’ display when not in use. 
• EFB commands more attention because it provides more situation awareness. 
• An alert needs to be in place when able to EXECUTE. 
• Pilot recognized it created more heads-down time during critical phases of flight. 
 
The CGD display elements that had a mean rating by the flight crew in the post-experiment survey 
of ‘6’ or higher included the IM commanded speed, Target aircraft call sign, and the IM status 
(i.e., ARMED, PAIRED). Descriptive statistics for the CGD effectiveness and usefulness of the 
display elements are shown in Table 36. Complete information is in Appendix F.6, questions #17. 
A synopsis of the comments is: 
• Have the FAST/SLOW indicator blink or turn red to indicate a large correction is needed. 
• Incorporate aural alerts for speed changes to reduce head down time. 
• Important for this information to be in pilot’s forward field of view. 
• The FAST/SLOW indicator not very useful. 
• Replicate all messages from the EFB on the CGD. 
Table 36. Descriptive Statistics for CGD Effectiveness and Display Element Usefulness 
Effectiveness of CGD 
Display N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Effectiveness of CGD in providing 
adequate information for IM 24 6.3 0.7 5 6 7 
Usefulness of Display Elements on the CGD 
CGD Display Element N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Target Call sign 24 6.2 1.5 1 7 7 
IM Speed 24 6.9 0.3 6 7 7 
IM Status 24 6.3 1.3 2 7 7 
IM Message 24 5.5 1.7 1 6 7 
FAST/SLOW Indicator 24 5.1 2.1 1 6 7 
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Other than the rating given to the EARLY/LATE indicator on the EFB (mean = 4.1, standard 
deviation = 3.0), the lowest rating given to any display element on either the EFB or CGD was the 
FAST/SLOW indicator. The FAST/SLOW indicator was intended to be a deceleration cue for the 
flight crew, since decelerating too quickly or too slowly will trigger additional IM speed changes. 
The low rating and the high number of speed changes due to poor deceleration is strong evidence 
for the need to improve the design and saliency of the deceleration cue provided to the flight crew. 
 
5.9 Case Study Results 
5.9.1 Loss of Separation between Aircraft 
A total of 229 flight operations were assessed in the experiment, of which the subject pilots flew 
79 IM operations and 34 non-IM operations, and the confederate pilots flew 116 non-IM 
operations. All operations were analyzed for loss of separation (LOS), using the air traffic control 
separation criteria defined in reference 10, paragraphs 4-5-1 and 5-5-4. 
There were four LOS events: the first one did not involve IM operations, the second and third 
involved IM software and displays causing the flight crew to fly speeds that resulted in a LOS, and 
the fourth one involved the leading aircraft, conducting an IM operation, to unexpectedly (from 
the controller’s point of view) decelerate and cause a LOS with the aircraft behind it. Therefore, 
the LOS frequency was 0.4% (1 of 229) for reasons not related to the IM software and procedures, 
and 1.2% (3 of 229) for reasons due to IM related software and procedures. 
5.9.1.1 Loss of Separation Event #1 
The first LOS event occurred at the FAF to runway 35R between two non-IM equipped aircraft. 
The controller had the lead aircraft on the RNP turn slightly behind the slot marker, while the 
trailing aircraft flying the ILS straight-in was in its slot marker. The wake vortex separation 
requirement for this aircraft pair was four miles in trail, and minimum separation of these aircraft 
at the FAF was 3.85 nmi. This LOS is attributed to the controller’s control technique and not taking 
action to maintain separation; the IM procedures were not a factor. 
5.9.1.2 Loss of Separation Event #2 
The second LOS event was between a Target and an IM aircraft conducting a CROSS operation, 
and two different separation criteria were not met: the 3 nmi criteria prior to both aircraft being 
established on final, and the 2.5 nmi reduced separation criteria once on final.  
The IM aircraft was issued a TBFM calculated ASG of 81 seconds, which was based on 2.8 nmi 
(2.5 nmi minimum separation plus a 0.3 nmi buffer) behind the Target aircraft at the FAF (both 
the ABP and PTP in this case). Prior to final, the minimum distance between the two aircraft was 
2.58 nmi (required minimum 3 nmi as shown in Figure 42), and the distance at the FAF was 2.4 
nmi (assigned minimum 2.9 nmi). Interestingly, the spacing error of the IM aircraft was zero at 37 
nmi to the runway, 33 seconds early at 11 nmi to the runway, and 16 seconds early at the FAF. 
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A review of the data and video shows that the flight crew properly executed the IM procedures, 
that is they promptly set the proper value in the MCP speed window when a new IM commanded 
speed appeared, and the overwhelming majority of the time they were on speed according to the 
FAST/SLOW indicator. The EARLY/LATE indicator did consistently show the aircraft was very 
early, and the IM SPEED LIMITED message was continuously displayed, indicating the IM 
spacing algorithm wanted to fly a speed slower than the 15% bound around the published speed 
for that segment. This was due to the Target aircraft (also conducting an IM operation) being over 
60 seconds early with only 35 nmi to go to the runway, causing it to fly the remainder of the 
approach at the slowest speed that ASTAR would allow. Since the Target aircraft was flying the 
lowest allowable speed, the IM aircraft could not fly even slower to fix the early time error. 
 
 
Figure 42. Loss of separation case #2 between IM and Target aircraft. 
 
Several conclusions are: 
1) The spacing algorithm was intentionally designed to only consider the spacing at a 
specified waypoint, and safe separation criteria is not part of the algorithm’s consideration. 
In certain geometries and wind conditions, this will continue to present an operational 
safety issue, causing controllers to occasionally have to intervene and thereby possibly 
reducing their confidence in the IM operation. 
2) The large changes to the spacing error are attributed to the phase-out of the ground speed 
term prior (see Section 5.9.5).  
3) If the 2.5 nmi separation criteria for aircraft established on a RNP approach was the 
operational standard, the first loss of separation (3 nmi until established on final) would 
not have occurred. To generalize that statement, as RNP approaches become more 
prevalent, if the 2.5 nmi separation criteria is applied to aircraft on any portion of a RNP 
approach, it should simplify the process to ensure aircraft have the required separation. 
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4) The IM aircraft was not within 15 seconds of the assigned spacing goal at the ABP/PTP, 
and the only IM message displayed was IM SPEED LIMITED. The IM software should 
have given the aircrew an indication that the spacing could not be achieved. 
5) The pilots had no indication that separation criteria was projected to be lost or it actually 
had been lost, and therefore continued the IM operation under the assumption that 
everything was progressing as intended.  
5.9.1.3 Loss of Separation Event #3 
The third LOS event occurred between a Target aircraft and an IM aircraft conducting a CROSS 
operation, again while intercepting final, but this time with the Target on the straight in and the 
IM aircraft flying the RNP curved approach (Figure 43). A significant contributing factor to this 
case was that the non-IM aircraft in front of the Target aircraft was slowed by ATC to 180 knots 
at 21 nmi to the runway, and then to 150 knots at 12 nmi to the runway. This meant the Target 
aircraft, also conducting an IM operation, already flying 30 knots slower than the published 
procedure, had to slow to 135 knots at 10 nmi from the runway to correct a 30 second early spacing 
error. Meanwhile, the IM aircraft continued to fly at or above the published speed from 60 nmi to 
25 nmi to the runway, changing the spacing error from 60 seconds late to 15 seconds early. The 
consequence of the IM software reacting slowly to the change in the Target’s airspeed meant the 
spacing error continued to increase, until at 10 nmi to the runway the IM aircraft was over 40 
seconds early and crossed the ABP (the FAF in this example) 37 seconds early. Given that the IM 
aircraft’s ASG was 79 seconds, the IM aircraft crossed the FAF only 42 seconds after the Target 
aircraft, or approximately 1.5 nmi in trail. 
 
Figure 43. Loss of separation case #3 between IM and Target aircraft. 
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A review of the data and video shows that the flight crew properly executed the IM procedures, 
that is they promptly set the proper value in the MCP speed window when a new IM commanded 
speed appeared, and the overwhelming majority of the time they were on speed according to the 
FAST/SLOW indicator. The EARLY/LATE indicator showed the aircraft essentially on time until 
just prior to beginning the RNP turn to final, at which point the indicator showed the aircraft 
trending early and the IM SPEED LIMITED message was displayed. At no time did the software 
indicate to the crew that the operation was no longer feasible nor did it give any indication that the 
operation was unsafe. The flight crew stated “we need to go-around” as they crossed the FAF, 
however, they did not state their concern to the controller nor did they take any action. 
The primary conclusion from this case is the IM spacing software needs to be able to continuously 
calculate the feasibility of successfully completing the IM operation, and give unambiguous 
indications to the flight crew when it is no longer feasible. 
5.9.1.4 Loss of Separation Event #4 
The fourth LOS event was a non-IM aircraft in trail behind an aircraft conducting an IM operation, 
and the non-IM aircraft closed to within 2.57 nmi when both aircraft were turning onto final (3 
nmi criteria). This LOS was the result of a string of events that caused the leading aircraft 
(conducting the IM operation) to unexpectedly and quite substantially slow from 180 knots to 140 
knots at 14 nmi to the runway. The underlying cause for this change in IM commanded speed of 
the lead aircraft was the phase-out of the ground speed term prior to the ABP (a more detailed 
description is given in Section 5.9.5). Magnifying the issue in this particular event was that the 
aircraft preceding the lead aircraft also decelerated to the final approach speed much more rapidly 
than expected. The combination of the ground speed term phase-out of the lead aircraft, plus the 
rapid deceleration of the preceding aircraft, were the direct causes for this LOS event. 
While technically the controller has the responsibility to maintain separation between all aircraft, 
in this particular case the rapid and unexpected deceleration of the leading aircraft would not have 
happened if it had not been conducting an IM operation. Therefore the IM operation of the lead 
aircraft contributed substantially and directly to the LOS of the trailing non-IM aircraft. 
5.9.2 Undesirable Propagation of Speed Changes 
The IM algorithm performance results described in Section 5.3.2 (Frequency of IM Speed 
Changes) and Section 5.3.3 (Number of IM Speed Reversals) indicate that the CAPTURE 
operation exhibited the largest number of speed changes and the largest number of high-magnitude 
speed reversals, exceeding the values for the MAINTAIN operation even though the same state-
based CTD speed control law was used. Since the main difference between the CAPTURE and 
MAINTAN operations is that the MAINTAIN operations begin with zero spacing error, the data 
suggest that the CAPTURE phase of the CTD speed control law caused additional speed changes 
and high magnitude speed reversals. The case study in Figure 44 is an example of how changes in 
speed propagate through a string of aircraft that were conducting CAPTURE operations. 
From left to right in Figure 44, the columns are data for three IM aircraft in their arrival sequence 
(DAL1605, AAL491, and FFT933). The top plot in each column contains colored lines for four 
speeds of that IM aircraft:  green is the nominal trajectory airspeed, grey is the discrete IM 
commanded end speed (desired speed calculated by the spacing algorithm for the aircraft to 
decelerate to, and entered by the flight crew into the mode control panel speed window), red is the 
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instantaneous IM speed (current estimated airspeed calculated by the spacing algorithm), and blue 
is the IM aircraft’s actual airspeed. The middle plot shows the call sign and speeds of the Target 
aircraft, with green the nominal trajectory (published) airspeed of the Target aircraft, and blue the 
Target aircraft’s actual airspeed. The bottom plot shows the spacing error in time (blue line 
corresponding to left axis) and the actual distance between the IM and Target aircraft (orange line 
corresponding to right axis). 
The middle plot of the left-most column in Figure 44 shows the speeds of the Target aircraft 
(UAL1082) for the first IM aircraft in the string (DAL1605). The Target aircraft was controlled 
by air traffic controllers using the TBFM schedule and CMS decision support tools. Prior to top of 
descent, the Target aircraft was instructed by ATC to descend 4,000 feet below the altitude shown 
on the published approach procedure to help absorb its required delay.  Since the Target aircraft 
was at a lower altitude than the IM aircraft, its ground speed was lower as well. This, combined 
with the fact that the IM aircraft started with a 20 second early spacing error, caused ASTAR to 
command a speed of 250 knots (a very low speed for this phase of flight). Later in the arrival, at 
60 nmi to the runway, the first IM commanded speed increased from 250 knots to 290 knots. There 
were three factors that contributed to this speed increase: first, the lower altitude of the Target 
aircraft relative to the IM aircraft; the Target aircraft was instructed by the controller to increase 
its speed to 300 knots; and the initial 20 second early spacing error was nulled.  This large speed 
reversal propagated through the string of aircraft. 
The state-based CTD speed control law in ASTAR calculates the commanded speed by adding the 
amount of speed control required to null the spacing error to the Target aircraft’s time-history 
speed (see Appendix A.3). Thus, the speed reversal propagated to the second IM aircraft (AAL491) 
in the string, shown in the middle column of Figure 44. The second IM aircraft in the string also 
started with a 20 second early spacing error, and again the speed control required to null the spacing 
error was added to the airspeed flown by the previous aircraft in the string, resulting in an even 
larger speed reversal. 
The third IM aircraft (FFT933) in the string also started out with a 20 second early spacing error 
further amplified the speed reversal, since the speed control required to null the spacing error was 
added to the airspeed flown by the second aircraft in the string. 
The main catalyst for the undesirable speed behavior observed in this case study was an altitude 
step down flown by the first Target aircraft that was not flown by the IM aircraft following that 
Target. It should be noted that this particular case study was one of the worst examples of this 
behavior and is not indicative of the typical behavior observed in this experiment or in previous 
research (although previous experiments also had isolated instances of poor IM spacing algorithm 
performance). Nevertheless, these large speed reversals will likely be operationally unacceptable, 
suggesting that additional work is needed to develop either algorithm requirements or procedures 
to prevent Target aircraft altitude step downs from causing large speed reversals when conducting 
CAPTURE or MAINTAIN operations.      
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Figure 44. Non-ideal IM speed reversals of CTD control law during CAPTURE operation. 
 
Note: this figure is read from left to right, and represents the arrival stream of four sequential aircraft: UAL1082 (non-IM), DAL1605 
(IM), AAL491 (IM), and FFT993 (IM). 
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5.9.3 Desirable IM Spacing Algorithm Performance 
The case study in the previous section described the ASTAR13 algorithm exhibiting undesirable 
performance was not representative of the ASTAR13 behavior observed elsewhere in the 
experiment. For an IM spacing algorithm, similar to the one investigated in this experiment, the 
design goals for the spacing algorithm were for the following desirable characteristics to exist: 
• the spacing error should be smoothly and continuously nulled; 
• once the spacing error is close to being nulled it should remain close to zero; 
• the frequency of IM speed changes should be minimized;  
• the number of IM speed increases (reversals) should be minimized; and 
• the IM speed changes should be intuitive to pilots and controllers. 
This section illustrates desired ASTAR13 algorithm performance that occurred in each of the IM 
operation types. Figure 45 contains plots of three case studies where ASTAR13 exhibited the 
performance described above, that is, desirable IM speeds. The leftmost plot is from a CAPTURE 
operation, the middle plot is form a CROSS operation, and the rightmost plot is from a MAINTAIN 
operation. 
In each of the three plots, the black “CmdEnd” line in the top panel indicates the speed commanded 
by the IM spacing software. The frequency of IM speed changes is low, and there are few 
additional speed changes the flight crew must implement for the IM operation compared to the 
typical Baseline (TSAS only) operation. The blue “SpacingError” line in the bottom panel 
smoothly and continuously moves closer to zero, with the exception of the MAINTAIN operation 
where a 5 second spacing error accumulated within the final 17 nmi. 
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 CAPTURE CROSS MAINTAIN 
 
Figure 45. Desired spacing algorithm performance by IM operation type. 
 
Note: this figure represents three separate and distinct IM operations, one for each IM operation type. 
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5.9.4 Variations to Normal IM Clearances and Operations 
5.9.4.1 Achieve-By Point Dissimilar to the Planned Termination Point 
During the MIXED scenarios, the ARTCC air traffic controllers were given the latitude to choose 
which IM clearances to provide to the IM equipped aircraft. Furthermore, it was intended for some 
of the CROSS clearances to be issued with the ABP different than the PTP (which was to remain 
the FAF). Ideally, the ABP would be the waypoint where the routes of the IM aircraft and the 
Target aircraft merged. There were four instances (Table 37) where the ARTCC controller issued 
a CROSS IM clearance with the ABP prior to the PTP (which remained the FAF). 
The two CROSS clearances issued to aircraft arriving from the same sector correctly used the 
merge waypoint as the ABP (FFFAT for the ANCHR2 and KOHOE2 arrivals, and LONGS for 
the CREDE3 and PEEKK3 arrival), and correctly used the FAF as the PTP (FRONZ and LEETS). 
The other two CROSS clearances were issued to aircraft coming from different sectors (the IM 
aircraft on the PEEKK3, and the Targets on the KAILE2 and TSCHNR2) but they incorrectly used 
an ABP that was only on the IM aircraft’s route; therefore, the change from the TBO to the CTD 
speed control law did not happen until both aircraft were established on final. 
Only two valid IM operations with the ABP at the merge did not provide statistically meaningful 
data. However, it was noticed on three of the four operations that the transition of the IM software 
from the TBO to the CTD speed control law (which occurs once the aircraft are on the same route 
and past the ABP) created a spike in the calculated spacing error, in turn leading to a change in the 
commanded IM speed. Of note, the RTCA MOPS (ref. 4) has been updated since this software 
was written, and the discrete discontinuity between the two algorithms should no longer exist.  
Table 37. IM Clearances with ABP Dissimilar to the PTP 
Group - 
Scenario Simulator IM Call sign IM Route 
Target 
Call sign 
Target 
Route ABP PTP Valid
1 - I ASTOR1 AAL491 ANCHR2 CHQ3655 KOHOE2 FFFAT FRONZ Y 
3 - J ASTOR3 FFT933 PEEKK3 DAL1605 KAILE2 LONGS LEETS N 
3 - J ASTOR4 ASQ7044 PEEKK3 UPS702 TSHNR2 LONGS LEETS N 
3 - J IFD SWA3036 CREDE3 FFT933 PEEKK3 LONGS LEETS Y 
 
5.9.4.2 Issuing MAINTAIN Clearances in the TRACON 
During the MIXED scenarios, the TRACON controllers had the option to issue an IM clearance if 
their workload permitted. Since the TRACON workstations do not contain any IM information 
(i.e., IM equipped aircraft, the corresponding Target aircraft, and the assigned spacing goal), the 
expectation was some controllers may issue a MAINTAIN clearance if the aircraft were properly 
spaced on the same arrival procedure. Although this did not occur, several of the TRACON 
controllers stated that, given more practice and proficiency, they understood the utility of the 
procedure and believed it could be useful in arrival operations. This should be examined in future 
research once the concept of operations for this procedure is fully developed. 
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5.9.5 Impact to ASTAR When Target Aircraft not at Published Airspeed 
5.9.5.1 ASTAR Ground Speed Term and Phase-Out Logic 
During the design of the trajectory based control law in ASTAR13, the decision was made to 
inhibit the ground speed term when the IM aircraft is close to the achieve-by point. The rationale 
for this design decision was the expectation that the Target aircraft would finish absorbing delay 
prior to the ABP and would fly speeds that were close to the published speeds. However, there 
were route designs and TSAS adaptation designs in the IMAC simulation experiment that allow 
the Target aircraft to absorb delay much closer to the ABP than originally anticipated.  
If the Target aircraft is absorbing delay close to the ABP (i.e., not flying speeds close to the 
published speeds), the trajectory-based speed control law will provide commanded speeds that 
cause the spacing error to diverge from zero to a steady state error value. This problem occurs 
because ASTAR only uses proportional control when the ground speed term is turned off. 
Therefore, there must be a certain amount of spacing error present for the IM aircraft to match the 
traffic aircraft’s speed deviation. 
This section begins with analytic descriptions of the steady state error of the ASTAR13 trajectory-
based control law with the ground speed term either active or inactive. A case study from this 
experiment is used to show how this problem could impact real-world operations. The case study 
is followed by a discussion on potential methods that could be used to minimize the steady state 
error. 
The ground speed term in the ASTAR13 trajectory-based speed control law is inhibited when the 
IM aircraft is close to the achieve-by point. An analysis of the steady state error was conducted for 
the case where the ground speed term in ASTAR13 is active and the case where the ground speed 
term is inactive. As is often the case with analytical analyses, several simplifying assumptions are 
made within this analysis: 
• the conversion from airspeed to ground speed is not modeled; 
• various filters and heuristics used by ASTAR are not modeled; 
• the IM aircraft’s nominal speed is assumed to be constant; 
• the Target aircraft’s speed and nominal speed are assumed to be constant; and 
• the IM aircraft’s speed (ݒூெ) is equal to the IM commanded speed (ݒ௖௠ௗ) (i.e., the IM 
aircraft flies its commanded speed exactly) 
The ASTAR13 trajectory-based speed control law calculates the spacing error using the time-to-
go of the IM and Target aircraft along their predicted 4D trajectories. The time-to-go for each 
aircraft is simply the difference between their ETAs at the achieve-by point and the current time. 
The spacing error is then defined as the difference between the IM aircraft’s time-to-go to the ABP 
(ܶܶܩூெ), and the Target aircraft’s time-to-go to the ABP (ܶܶܩ்ீ்), minus the ASG issued by 
ATC (Δ). 
 
݁(ݐ) = ܶܶܩூெ(ݐ) − ܶܶܩ்ீ்(ݐ) − Δ (1)
 
 
 99 
The amount of speed control required to null the spacing error is computed using a proportional 
control law with a ground speed term added to compensate for differences between the Target 
aircraft’s predicted ground speed and actual ground speed. The speed control is added to the IM 
aircraft’s nominal speed to generate an IM commanded speed (ݒ௖௠ௗ). 
 
ݒ௖௠ௗ(ݐ) = ݒ௡௢௠಺ಾ + ݇௣݁(ݐ) + ݇ீௌ(ݒ்ீ் − ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்) (2)
 
Here, ݒ௡௢௠ூெ is the nominal 4D trajectory ground speed of the IM aircraft, ݇௣ is the proportional 
gain, ݁(ݐ) is the spacing error, ݇ீௌ is the gain for the ground speed term, ݒ்ீ் is the ground speed 
of the Target aircraft, and ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் is the nominal 4D trajectory ground speed of the Target aircraft. 
The ground speed term is fully active until the IM aircraft is 40 nmi from the achieve-by point, 
and linearly decreases to zero when the IM aircraft is 20 nmi from the achieve-by point.  
Using the assumptions described above, the estimated time-to-go of the IM aircraft and the Target 
aircraft is simply their respective distance-to-go divided by the nominal speed. The spacing error 
and time derivative of the spacing error are described in equations 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
݁(ݐ) = ܦܶܩூெ(ݐ)ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
− ܦܶܩ்ீ்(ݐ)ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
− Δ (3)
 
ሶ݁ (ݐ) = ݒ௖௠ௗ(ݐ)ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
− ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
 (4)
 
Two cases are examined in the following sub-sections: a case where the ground speed term is fully 
active (݇ீௌ = 1) and a case where the ground speed term is not active (݇ீௌ = 0). For both cases, 
a differential equation for the spacing error is determined, a Laplace transformation is used to 
convert the spacing error to the frequency domain, and the final value theorem is used to determine 
the steady state error that will occur as time approaches infinity. 
 
5.9.5.1.1 Ground Speed Term Fully Active (࢑ࡳࡿ = ૚) 
The ground speed term in ASTAR13 is fully active when the ground speed gain, ݇ீௌ, is equal to 
one. A differential equation for the spacing error is obtained by combining equations 2 and 4. 
 
ሶ݁ (ݐ) = ݒ௡௢௠಺ಾ + ݇௣݁(ݐ) + (ݒ்ீ் − ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்)ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
− ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
 (5)
 
ሶ݁ (ݐ) − ݇௣ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
݁(ݐ) = ݒ்ீ் − ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
+ ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் − ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
 (6)
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Next, equation 6 is converted to the frequency domain using a Laplace transformation, and the 
resulting expression is rearranged. 
 
ݏܧ(ݏ) − ݇௣ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
ܧ(ݏ) = ቆݒ்ீ் − ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
+ ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் − ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
ቇ 1ݏ (7)
 
 
ܧ(ݏ) =
൬ݒ்ீ் − ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ூெ +
ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் − ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் ൰
ݏଶ − ݇௣ݒ௡௢௠ூெ ݏ
 (8)
  
The steady state error is the error that will occur as time approaches infinity, and can be calculated 
using the Final Value Theorem, which states that the steady state error is the lim௦→଴ ݏܧ(ݏ). Equation 
9 is the result of applying the Final Value Theorem to equation 8, and equation 10 is a rearranged 
expression of the steady state error. 
 
݁௦௦ =
൬ݒ்ீ் − ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ூெ +
ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் − ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் ൰
− ݇௣ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
 (9)
  
݁௦௦ =
1
݇௣ ቆ
ݒ்ீ்
ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
− 1ቇ ቆ ݒ௡௢௠ூெݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
− 1ቇ (10)
  
Equation 10 can be used to attain intuition on the factors that influence the steady state error when 
the ground speed term is fully active. First, the steady-state error will be equal to zero whenever 
the Target aircraft’s speed is equal to its nominal speed and whenever the nominal speed of the IM 
aircraft is equal to the nominal speed of the Target aircraft. Since the proportional gains in ASTAR 
range from 0.375 to 1.5, the steady state error will be small for all operationally relevant speed 
deviations. As an example, consider the extreme case where the Target aircraft’s speed is twice as 
large as the Target aircraft’s nominal speed and the IM aircraft’s nominal speed is twice as high 
as the Target aircraft’s nominal speed; a case that is not expected to occur in an operational 
environment. In this case, the steady state error will be equal to1/݇௣, indicating that steady state 
error is not problematic when the ground speed term is fully active. 
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5.9.5.1.2 Ground Speed Term Not Active (࢑ࡳࡿ = ૙) 
When the IM aircraft is 40 nmi from the achieve-by point, ݇ீௌ linearly decreases from a value of 
one to a value of zero when the IM aircraft is 20 nmi from the achieve-by point. This section 
examines the steady state error for the case where the ground speed term is equal to zero, causing 
ASTAR13 to revert to proportional control. A differential equation for the spacing error is 
calculated by combining equations 2 and 4, and simplifying. 
 
ሶ݁ (ݐ) = ݒ௡௢௠಺ಾ + ݇௣݁(ݐ)ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
− ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
 (11)
 
ሶ݁ (ݐ) − ݇௣ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
݁(ݐ) = ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் − ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
 (12)
 
Next, equation 12 is converted to the frequency domain using a Laplace transformation, and the 
resulting expression is rearranged.  
 
ݏܧ(ݏ) − ݇௣ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
ܧ(ݏ) = ቆݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் − ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
ቇ 1ݏ (13)
 
ܧ(ݏ) =
൬ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் − ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் ൰
ݏଶ − ݇௣ݒ௡௢௠ூெ ݏ
 (14)
 
Similarly to the case where the ground speed term was active, the steady state error is calculated 
using the Final Value Theorem, which states that the steady state error is the lim௦→଴ ݏܧ(ݏ). Equation 
15 shows the steady state error calculated using the Final Value Theorem, and equation 16 is a 
rearranged expression of the steady state error. 
 
݁௦௦ =
൬ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் − ݒ்ீ்ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ் ൰
− ݇௣ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
 (15)
 
݁௦௦ = ቆ
ݒ்ீ் − ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
݇௣ ቇ
ݒ௡௢௠ூெ
ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்
 (16)
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Equation 16 can be examined to gain intuition on the factors that influence the steady state error. 
First, the steady state error will be lower when ݇௣ is large and larger when ݇௣ is small. Within 
ASTAR, ݇௣ ranges from a value of 0.375 when the aircraft is far from the achieve-by point to 1.5 
when the aircraft is close to the achieve-by point. When the Target aircraft’s nominal speed is 
equal to the IM aircraft’s nominal speed, ݁௦௦ = ൫ݒ்ீ் − ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்൯/݇௣. Therefore, the steady state 
error will be large when the Target aircraft has a large ground speed deviation and when ݇௣ is 
large.  
 
5.9.5.2 Example of Ground Speed Phase-Out Causing Negative Impact 
Figure 46 and Figure 47 show a case study from this experiment where large Target aircraft speed 
deviations close to the achieve-by point caused the spacing error to trend toward a large steady 
state error value. The middle plot in Figure 46 shows the Target aircraft’s airspeed (blue line) 
relative to the Target aircraft’s nominal airspeed profile expected by ASTAR (green line). Within 
the last 30 nmi of the IM operation, the Target aircraft flew speeds substantially lower than the 
nominal speed profile. Figure 47 shows that the ground speed compensation (red line) was phased 
out between a distance-to-go of 40 nmi and 20 nmi from the achieve-by point. During this period 
of time, the spacing error increased from a value of zero when the IM aircraft was 36 nmi from the 
runway threshold to -35 seconds when the IM aircraft was 11 nmi from the runway threshold. 
When the IM aircraft had a distance-to-go of 20 nmi to the runway threshold, the IM speed limited 
flag was set, indicating that the speed control was limited because the spacing error was large 
enough to generate speed control greater than 15% of the nominal speed. By this time, the spacing 
error had grown to -29 seconds, and continued to grow until it reached a value of -35 seconds. At 
the very end, the spacing error decreased to -15.7 seconds because the Target aircraft started flying 
a speed that was closer to its nominal speed. 
The values in this case study can be input into equation 16 to determine if the spacing error was 
close to the theoretical steady-state error value when the IM aircraft was 20 nmi from the runway 
threshold. It should be noted that the values are unlikely to match exactly, since ASTAR contains 
several features that were not modeled in the analysis. These features include speed limiting, 
filters, and heuristics to prevent ASTAR from commanding unnecessary speed commands to 
pilots. Furthermore, the dynamic system may not reach its steady-state value, since the inputs are 
constantly changing. 
When the IM aircraft was 20 nmi from the achieve-by point, the proportional gain (݇௣) was 
approximately equal to one, the Target aircraft’s ground speed (ݒ்ீ்) was equal to 209 knots, the 
Target aircraft’s nominal ground speed (ݒ௡௢௠ ்ீ்) was equal to 248 knots, and the IM aircraft’s 
nominal ground speed (ݒ௡௢௠ூெ) was equal to 250 knots. Plugging these number into equation 16 
gives a steady-state error value of -39 seconds. The IM aircraft had a spacing error as large as-29 
seconds when it was 20 nmi from the runway threshold and had a maximum spacing error of -35 
seconds, suggesting that the data matches the analytic model reasonably closely. 
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Figure 46: Case study of spacing error when Target has a large ground speed deviation. 
 
Figure 47: Target aircraft ground speed compensation term. 
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5.9.5.3 Possible Alternatives to Current Ground Speed Phase-Out Approach 
During the design of the trajectory based control law in ASTAR13, the decision was made to 
inhibit the ground speed term when the IM aircraft is close to the achieve-by point. When the 
Target aircraft is absorbing delay close to the achieve-by point (i.e., not flying speeds close to the 
published speeds), the trajectory based control law will provide commanded speeds that cause the 
spacing error to diverge from zero to a steady state error value. An analytic analysis was conducted 
to characterize that steady state error when ASTAR’s ground speed term was fully active and when 
it was inhibited. The results of the analytic analysis showed that the steady state error was not 
problematic when the ground speed term was fully active; however, it can be problematic when 
the ground speed term is inhibited. A case study from this human-in-the-loop simulation was used 
to show the impact that the steady state error can have. The remainder of this section discusses 
potential solutions to this problem. 
One potential solution to this problem is to keep the ground speed term fully active until the Target 
aircraft crosses the achieve-by point. However, there are challenges with this approach. First, it is 
unclear what to do with the ground speed term after the Target aircraft crosses the achieve-by 
point. When the Target aircraft crosses the achieve-by point, its crossing time is recorded. The IM 
aircraft will then attempt to cross the achieve-by point Δ seconds after the Target aircraft, where Δ 
is the value of the assigned spacing goal. When this occurs, the Target aircraft’s ground speed is 
no longer relevant; however, removing the ground speed term could cause the IM commanded 
speed to increase when the IM aircraft is close to the achieve-by point. Increasing the commanded 
speeds close to the achieve-by point could be detrimental to pilot acceptability, particularly when 
the achieve-by point is the final approach fix. A second problem is that the Target aircraft often 
matches the nominal speed during the deceleration to the final approach fix. As a result, the ground 
speed term could go from a large value to a much smaller value, causing ASTAR to command a 
speed increase just prior to the final approach fix. 
Another possible solution is to derive the Target aircraft’s current airspeed from its altitude, ground 
speed, and the wind forecast, and use that derived airspeed to update the Target aircraft’s nominal 
speed profile. For instance, if the Target aircraft slows early, it could be assumed that the Target 
aircraft will stay at its current speed until its speed intersects the nominal speed profile. Using this 
method, the Target aircraft’s time-to-go calculations would be based off of the now modified 
nominal speed profile, causing the spacing error to change. There are, however, challenges with 
this approach as well. First, the current ASTAR13 trajectory-based control law is continually 
adjusting the commanded speed to null the spacing error. Therefore, assuming that the Target 
aircraft will continue to fly a particular speed may not be a good assumption when the Target 
aircraft is also conducting an IM operation. Additionally, small Target aircraft speed changes could 
cause the spacing error to change significantly if the speed segment that the Target aircraft is on is 
very long. 
Further research and development is needed to determine the best way of eliminating the steady 
state error problem. 
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6 Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
This section contains: (1) a high-level summary of the experiment results; (2) a table of results for 
the Performance Goals and Hypotheses; (3) conclusions related to the ATD-1 ConOps, 
Procedures, and Phraseology; (4) conclusions about the IM Cockpit Displays; (5) conclusions 
about the IM Spacing Software; (6) and Lessons Learned through practice, observation, or 
discussions with the subject and confederate participants (or due to lack of sufficient data for 
statistical analysis).  
6.1 General 
In general, the ATD-1 concept and IM procedures demonstrated substantial promise in this 
experiment and met many important performance criteria, but the current instantiation of IM in a 
busy voice environment has several critical issues that must be resolved prior to being 
implemented in real-world operations (described in subsequent sections).  
6.2 Meeting Performance Goals and Hypotheses 
The ATD-1 ConOps, particularly the IM procedure as tested during the IMAC experiment, was 
successful when evaluated against the performance goals and hypotheses described in Table 38. 
Table 38. Summary of Performance Goals and Hypotheses 
# Performance Goals Results 
1 The percentage of IM spacing errors at the ABP within 10 seconds will be ≥ 95% NO 
2a The inter-arrival spacing error of 68% of IM operations following either a TSAS or IM operation will be ≤ 8 seconds
YES (capture, cross) 
NO (maintain, mixed) 
2b The inter-arrival spacing error of 68% of TSAS operations following another TSAS or IM operation will be ≤ 12 seconds
YES (capture, mixed) 
NO (TSAS, maintain) 
3 The mean controller acceptability rating of ATD-1 operations will be ≥ ‘8’ on a scale of 1 – 10 YES 
4 
The mean controller (workload) rating for Mental Demand, 
Physical Demand, Time Pressure, and Effort will be ≤ ‘5’, and 
for Success and Frustration will be ≤ ‘3’ on a scale of 1 – 7 
YES 
# Hypotheses Results
1 The percentage of uninterrupted PBN operations within the TRACON and using ATD-1 tools will be > 70% YES 
2 The rate of IM operations terminated by ATC prior to the Planned Termination Point will be < 30% YES 
3 The rate of IM operations terminated by the flight crew prior to the Planned Termination Point will be < 30% YES 
4 The mean flight crew acceptability rating of IM operations will be ≥ ‘5’ on a scale of 1 – 7 YES 
5 The mean flight crew workload ratings of IM operations will be ≤ ‘3’ on a scale of 1 – 10 YES 
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6.3 ATD-1 ConOps, Procedures, and Phraseology 
The IM procedures achieved the ATD-1 ConOps goal of greater aircraft delivery precision at the 
FAF compared to TSAS operations (Table 12). 
For ARTCC controllers, aircraft behavior during IM operations was comparable to non-IM 
operations, and they rated the ATD-1 operations, workload, and phraseology as acceptable. For 
TRACON controllers, non-IM and IM operations exhibited similar performance in terms of 
schedule deviation at the Meter Fix, and they rated the ATD-1 operations, workload, and 
phraseology as acceptable; however, a concern was identified that the MAINTAIN operation as 
conducted in this experiment was generally not suitable and frequently had to be canceled. 
(Sections 5.7.1, 5.7.2, and 5.7.3). 
Those controllers’ qualitative responses are corroborated by the use of speed control alone in the 
TRACON (Section 5.4.2), and the low percentage of IM operations interrupted by controllers (4% 
for CROSS and CAPTURE, Section 5.5.1). Although the arrival scenarios were designed to be at 
the airport’s maximum throughput rate, it is recognized that other wind conditions or aircraft 
distributions would most likely have required the use of vectors and increased the frequency of IM 
operation cancellation. 
For the pilots of IM capable aircraft, the acceptability, workload, and head down time required to 
conduct IM operations was rated as acceptable and comparable to non-IM operations, although the 
higher frequency of speed changes and speed reversals during IM operations was identified as was 
not desirable (Section 5.8).  
A list of issues and conclusions about the ATD-1 ConOps, procedures, and phraseology, and if 
appropriate possible methods to address them, are described below. 
• The interaction of the different operations (TSAS and IM), within the same arrival stream, 
appears to be generally compatible and acceptable. This conclusion is based on the two 
operations having similar schedule deviation at the TRACON Meter Fix (Section 5.5.2.2) 
and the FAF (Section 5.5.2.1), similar values for variation from the CMS slot marker 
(Section 5.4.3), and the low rate of controller canceled IM operations (Section 5.5.1) and 
pilot canceled IM operations (Section 5.6.1). There were no qualitative controller 
comments (Section 5.7.3) or pilot comments (Section 5.8) about this particular finding. 
• The use of voice communication to issue all IM clearance types was rated as acceptable by 
controllers and pilots (Sections 5.6.3, 5.8.4.5, and 5.8.4.6). However, it became very 
challenging when controllers had to quickly issue multiple IM clearances in a voice 
environment during high-density arrival operations. 
o The use of data link is seen as the most viable method to address this issue. The 
ground software should automatically present to the controller on their screen a 
viable IM clearance, which the controller reviews and then can elect to send or not 
send via uplink using a single button push. The flight crew acknowledges the IM 
clearance via a down link message using a button push, loads the clearance via 
button push (reducing probability of error), and notifies ATC the IM operation has 
commenced via a down link with a single button push. 
• Issuing the Target aircraft’s identification using its call sign within the IM clearance 
generally did not cause confusion for the pilots (Sections 5.8.4.7, 5.8.4.8, and 5.8.4.9). In 
the post-experiment survey, controllers and pilots agreed with the philosophy given in 
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training that issuing the Target’s aircraft identification using the phonetic alphabet instead 
of the call sign (for example, Delta Alpha Lima 324 instead of Delta 324) potentially 
provides two benefits: it clearly differentiates the Target aircraft from the aircraft the 
clearance is addressed to, and it gives an unambiguous and precise description of the 
aircraft identifier shown in the cockpit when the call sign is unfamiliar or the call sign is 
not similar to the identifier (for example, BAW is the identifier seen by controllers and 
pilots on their displays, but the call sign for British Airways is Speed Bird). For these two 
reasons, slightly more than half of the flight crew reported that they preferred the phonetic 
identifier be used for the Target aircraft (Section 5.8.4.4). Despite the simulation 
environment intentionally having unusual call signs and similar sounding numbers, none 
of the controllers and only four of the pilots reported any issues with the Target call sign 
being used in the IM clearance, and overwhelmingly the Target call sign was used since 
there was so little confusion. When the pilots did query the controllers, they generally 
responded by using the phonetic spelling of the Target.  
o Controllers should typically use the phonetic identifier of the Target aircraft in the 
IM clearance, while having the discretion to use the Target call sign if appropriate. 
• Issuing the MAINTAIN clearance was relatively easy since it had the least amount of data 
to convey (Section 5.6.3); however, both controllers (Section 5.6.1) and pilots (5.8.1.3) 
rated the acceptability of the operation itself the lowest of any operation since the spacing 
interval calculated by the IM software when the aircraft was at altitude was frequently not 
desirable when the aircraft entered the TRACON or was on final.  
o If the next sector has a very different operational characteristic (such as in this 
experiment where the ARTCC sector did not involve many altitude changes but the 
TRACON Feeder had aircraft descending), one option could be to issue the 
MAINTAIN clearance with the PTP as the last waypoint within that controller’s 
sector.  
• Using VNAV speed (manually dialing the IM speed into the MCP) to fly an IM operations 
results in a somewhat higher workload (Section 5.8.2) and removes some of the altitude 
protection offered in VNAV Path (Section 5.7.4). Anecdotally this contributed to the IM 
operation’s significantly higher percentage of missed altitude constraints as compared to 
non-IM operations (the single mouse-driven computer interface to the ASTOR simulators 
was the primary cause). Furthermore, some of the pilots reported that the additional task of 
maintaining vertical path required additional head-down time. 
o At least two options are available. First, the avionics manufacturer could make 
VNAV speed perform more like VNAV path in terms of deviation from the original 
calculated trajectory. And second, for a longer-term solution the spacing software 
could be integrated into the FMS to eliminate the need for manual entry. 
6.4 IM Cockpit Displays 
In general, the pilots found their cockpit interfaces and displays useful, in particular the IM speed 
on the EFB and especially on the CGD. Although they also reported the amount of head down 
time required to conduct IM was acceptable (Section 5.8.1.9), it was noted that the IM operation 
did frequently require more head down time during critical phases of flight (on final and 
configuring the aircraft for landing). Other cockpit display issues identified by pilots, and potential 
methods to address them, are listed below. 
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• To many pilots, the FAST/SLOW indicator could be confusing and received the lowest 
usefulness rating of all display elements (Section 5.8.5). For example, if the flight crew 
decelerated faster than the spacing algorithm expected and slowed below the IM 
commanded end speed, the FAST/SLOW indicator will display ‘Too Slow’ (aircraft slower 
than the IM instantaneous speed), yet the aircraft’s airspeed may be at or below the IM 
commanded end speed. Consequently, if pilots compared the IM commanded end speed to 
the aircraft’s speed (which many did), they could not understand why the IM equipment 
was telling them they were slow. However, by the end of the experiment, many of the 
subject pilots found the display useful, and their ability to decelerate the aircraft in a manner 
expected by the spacing algorithm substantially improved. For the pilots that were not able 
to incorporate the FAST/SLOW indicator into their decision making process, they had a 
greater challenge decelerating the aircraft (frequently due to overuse of speed brake or 
configuring the aircraft too early), which in turn caused subsequent IM speed increases. 
o The FAST/SLOW indicator should be redesigned to be more intuitive, and one 
method of accomplishing this could be to change the location from the CGD to the 
speed tape on the primary flight display. 
• The EARLY/LATE indicator was problematic for many flight crews and received the 
lowest usefulness rating of any display on the EFB (Table 73). Many considered it useless 
and essentially ignored it through most of the experiment (Sections 5.8.5.2 and 5.9.1.3). 
Unlike the FAST/SLOW indicator (once correctly understood), the EARLY/LATE 
indicator does not provide unambiguous information that enables the flight crew to take 
action. It was difficult to determine when the circle reached the scale limit, and even when 
it was clear that it had reached the limit, no action was required since the limit was not 
related to the infeasibility of successfully completing the IM operation. 
o The EARLY/LATE indicator should include values on the scale, and consideration 
should be given to displaying on that indicator the fore and aft locations of where 
the IM operation is no longer considered feasible, and have accompanying pilot 
procedures to notify ATC that the IM operation is no longer feasible. 
• An issue reported by some pilots was the need to devote attention to watching for a change 
to the IM commanded end speed, which detracted from their overall situation awareness 
(Sections 5.8.3, 5.8.4.3, and 5.8.5.3). If the aircraft decelerated at a slower rate than 
anticipated by the spacing algorithm, then the IM software could command additional 
speed decreases to compensate. 
o Aural alerts could be added as a back-up to the visual cues that the IM speed 
changed, thereby allowing flight crew to devote more attention to duties other than 
watching for a change to the IM commanded end speed. For example, retain the IM 
commanded end speed in steady reverse video when the speed change occurs and 
in flashing video if no action occurs within 10 seconds, but then also trigger a chime 
to sound after 15 seconds of no pilot response. 
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6.5 IM Spacing Software 
In general, the spacing algorithm met the performance metrics defined in the performance goals 
and hypotheses, in particular the primary metric of delivery precision of the CROSS and 
CAPTURE operations. 
• In both the CROSS and CAPTURE scenarios, aircraft conducting IM operations were very 
precise in achieving the ASG (mean of 1 second or less, and standard deviation of 6.2 
seconds or less), (Section 5.3.1).  
• In both the CROSS and CAPTURE scenarios, aircraft conducting IM operations had a 
mean schedule spacing error and standard deviation less than half that of aircraft not 
conducting IM operations (Section 5.4.1). 
In general, the behavior of the IM spacing algorithm rated as acceptable by both controllers and 
pilots. However, listed below are four key IM spacing software issues that need to be resolved 
prior to real-world implementation. 
• Quantitative data and survey data indicated that the IM spacing algorithm commanded a 
higher frequency of speed changes (Section 5.3.2) and more speed reversals (Section 5.3.3) 
as compared to non-IM (TSAS) operations. The highest frequency of IM speed command 
changes (Figure 24) occurred 1) while the aircraft was on final (within twenty nmi of the 
FAF), and 2) when that aircraft used the TBO speed control law to conduct a CROSS 
operation (Section 5.3.2). It was further noted that the ‘capture’ phase of the CTD speed 
control law also appears to have a higher frequency of speed change than the ‘maintain’ 
phase. Pilot comments also indicated that the frequency, magnitude, and reversal of speed 
commands was problematic, and should be improved prior to IM being deployed into real-
world operations (Sections 5.8.1.1, 5.8.1.3., 5.8.1.4, 5.8.1.6, 5.8.1.7, and 5.8.1.8). 
Furthermore, commanding a second IM speed prior the first speed being set in the MCP 
speed window is not ideal, particularly when configuring the aircraft for landing (Section 
5.6.2; 1% of IM speed changes above 11,000’ MSL, but 10% below 11,000’ MSL). The 
high frequency of speed changes, especially when close to the FAF when configuring the 
aircraft for landing, was also cited as an issue by the pilots in their survey responses 
(Section 5.8.4.3) 
o The consequences of these issues were slightly increased pilot workload, reduced 
fuel efficiency, a concern for passenger comfort, and the pilot’s trust in IM. 
o Causes included: lack of shared aircraft intent data, controllers issue speed change 
instructions when needed and not at published waypoints (as the trajectory 
generator used by ASTAR expects), the phase out of the ground speed term prior 
to the ABP (see next bullet), the methodology used to calculate the Target aircraft’s 
trajectory (the Target’s expected published speed versus its actual speed) was 
problematic, the methodology used by the IM software to resolve the spacing error 
is different than the ground software, and some flight crews had difficulty 
decelerating the aircraft in a fashion expected by the spacing algorithm (triggering 
further speed changes to compensate for the increase in spacing error). 
• During CROSS operations and when the IM aircraft was within 40 nmi of the ABP, the 
ground speed term in the TBO speed control law was phased out. As a result, ASTAR 
controlled the aircraft to a large steady state error value (Section 5.9.5). This behavior 
resulted in less than ideal speed commands that included very slow speed commands on 
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final approach and speed reversals close to the ABP. Phasing out the ground speed term 
was also a contributing factor to one of the loss of separation events (Section 5.9.1). 
• During CAPTURE operations when air traffic controllers instructed the Target aircraft to 
descend to an altitude lower than the published procedure (to absorb required delay), the 
resulting lower Target ground speed caused the IM software to command a speed decrease 
for the IM aircraft. When the Target aircraft later rejoined the altitude profile defined by 
the published procedure, the Target ground speed differential no longer exists, causing a 
large reversal of the IM commanded end speed (Section A.3.2).  
o The consequences of using the CTD speed control law (where the Target aircraft’s 
estimated airspeed is the base speed, and the speed control is added to the base 
speed) was that large speed reversals propagate through the arrival stream. 
• Flight crews conducting IM operations using the VNAV speed mode (manually setting the 
controller issued or IM commanded speed in the MCP) had a more difficult time meeting 
the high end of an altitude constrained waypoint when a slower speed was issued to the 
flight crew within 8 nmi of that waypoint (Section 5.7.4 and 5.8.1.4). 
o The consequences was a higher frequency of missed altitude constraints for IM 
operations when compared to non-IM operations (4.4% versus 0.5%). 
o Causes include: the challenges ASTOR pilots had time sharing a mouse-driven 
interface to manipulate the desktop simulator; the VNAV speed mode on many 
aircraft uses pitch to control airspeed, in turn causing the aircraft to not meet the 
high side of an altitude constrained waypoint when decelerating; the IM operation 
requires the flight crew to use the VNAV speed mode for a longer duration 
compared to current day operations; and the IM operation has a higher speed change 
frequency compared to current day operations. 
6.6 Lessons Learned 
The following items are derived from lessons learned and best practices the IM research team 
developed over the course of this experiment and from discussions with the controllers and pilots. 
Although there is only anecdotal evidence for these issues, the information in this sub-section does 
provide additional information about this research experiment. 
 
ATD-1 ConOps, Procedures, and Phraseology 
• Some pilots became confused when a long delay occurred between entering the IM 
clearance and the IM operation commencing (Section 5.8.1.3). This occurred when one of 
the criteria to commence the IM operation had not been met, for example, being outside of 
the Target aircraft’s ADS-B range, being in the Mach segment of the arrival procedure, etc.  
o The consequence of this delay between data entry and IM operation start was that 
some pilots expressed low confidence in the IM concept and software. 
o Recommendations for future research to remove the delay include: 
 The flight crew enters Ownship Mach speed (as in previous IM research), 
and the software estimates the Target’s Mach speed. 
 Controllers issue the IM clearance after all criteria has been met (previously 
considered but not implemented based on the FAA’s modernization plan). 
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 If the IM aircraft is not within ADS-B range of the Target aircraft, the 
clearance should include the Target aircraft’s scheduled time of arrival. 
• The design of the arrival procedure should support the use of speed as a method of timing 
control (speed constraints in the middle of the aerodynamic range of the stream class for 
that altitude to allow speed increases and decreases), and the magnitude of the speed 
decrease should be no larger than approximately 30 knots (to preclude the flight crew from 
assuming there is a need to aggressively slow the aircraft). 
• A few controllers stated that future research should explore the ramifications of issuing a 
clearance for an operation that continues into another controller’s sector, in particular, the 
CROSS operation whether the IM aircraft is in the PAIRED mode or not.  
• A few controllers made the following verbal statements about the IM phraseology: 
o The CAPTURE and MAINTAIN clearances may be short enough not to require a 
preparatory instruction. 
o The “REPORT PAIRED” should be included in the controller’s acknowledgement 
of the flight crew’s read back, and not as part of the initial clearance. 
 
 Pilot and Controller Displays 
• The pilots flying the IFD simulator did not report any issues with entering the Ownship 
and IM clearance information into the EFB while in conditions of light to moderate 
turbulence. 
• The ARTCC workstation should display only the specific IM operation deemed to be most 
suitable at one time, and only those elements needed for that clearance should be displayed. 
• The TRACON workstation should indicate which aircraft are IM capable in its data tag 
and whether or not an IM clearance has been issued to that aircraft or not. 
 
IM Spacing Software 
• When flight crews decelerated the aircraft at a rate faster than expected by the IM software, 
it was frequently in response to large changes to the IM commanded speed (>30 knots on 
arrival and >20 knots on approach). In these situations the pilots extended the speed brake 
more than required, or lowered the gear early to facilitate rapidly achieving the new speed. 
o Mitigating this issue was the genesis of the FAST/SLOW indicator in previous IM 
research. 
o The consequence of decelerating the aircraft faster than the algorithm’s prediction 
is an increase in spacing error, in turn causing an IM speed increase (reversal). 
o A possible cause is hypothesized to be the subject pilots’ instinctual assumption 
that a large speed change is indicative that something is not going as planned, 
therefore an immediate and substantial reaction is required. 
• When flight crews decelerated the aircraft at a rate slower than expected by the IM 
software, it was typically inattention by the flight crew (long response time to set the new 
IM commanded speed in the MCP) or insufficient use of speed brake (not achieving the 
new IM commanded speed in a timely fashion).  
o Mitigating this issue was the genesis of the FAST/SLOW indicator in previous IM 
research. 
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o The consequence of decelerating the aircraft slower than the algorithm’s prediction 
is that it requires subsequent changes of even slower IM commanded speeds. 
• The FAST/SLOW indicator behaved differently for speed changes at a published waypoint 
with a speed constraint versus a deceleration commanded by the IM software. This 
difference in methodology to calculate the FAST/SLOW value was covered in training. 
o The consequence was that the pilots became confused, and believed either the 
display or the calculations by the software were incorrect. 
o The cause is due to the spacing algorithm not having a look-ahead function enabling 
it to predict the next speed change. 
• The “IM Speed Limited” message was not well understood by many pilots. 
o The consequence was that most pilots typically ignored the message since there 
was no action to take, and it did not seem to add to the pilots overall situation 
awareness. 
 
Simulators 
• The ASTOR simulator provides great capability and utility, but there are a few challenges 
that need to be addressed in future hardware and software upgrades. In particular, the single 
mouse interface to operate the aircraft and communicate with the controller causes a slight 
delay in response to IM commanded speeds (Section 5.7.2), and a significant increase in 
missed altitude constraints (Section 5.7.4) and unstable approaches (Section 5.7.5). 
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7 Recommendations for Future Research 
This section contains areas of research and development that should occur prior to real-world 
implementation of the ATD-1 ConOps, or that would benefit the IM procedures and operations. 
Concept of Operations and Procedures 
• Develop an alternative concept where the controller issues a two-part clearance to the IM 
aircraft that includes a STA to the waypoint that the IM and Target merge at, then 
CAPTURE the ASG behind the Target aircraft. This would require an advanced FMS if 
the merge point occurs while the aircraft are descending.  
• Explore the impact of setting the ABP as the waypoint where the Target and Ownship 
routes merge, in particular, if this approach is more robust to ensuring desired separation 
between aircraft when on the same route. 
• Safe separation between the IM and Target aircraft should be considered by the spacing 
algorithm. Furthermore, preserving safe separation with the aircraft behind the aircraft 
conducting the IM operation should also be considered. 
• Issuing a MAINTAIN clearance (the shortest clearance and most intuitive operation) in the 
TRACON should be explored. This would also require development of the IM cockpit 
interface to minimize the number of button presses to display only those aircraft that meet 
the in-trail criteria for the operation (to minimize head down time). 
• Develop an integrated avionics solution (locating the spacing software within the FMS) to 
enable the use of VNAV Path and auto-throttles. An issue previously identified with this 
approach that must also be resolved is how to keep the flight crew in the decision making 
cycle. 
• The use of data link to issue the IM clearance should reduce workload, reduce the 
probability of data entry error, and allow for more complex operations. 
Controller and Cockpit Displays 
• The controller decision support tools should identify when the ASG is not valid throughout 
the entire arrival operation, and either adjust that value appropriately or preclude issuing 
an IM clearance altogether in those situations. 
• Provide more IM information on ARTCC and TRACON controller workstations to reduce 
the voice communication required and increase the opportunity for conducting IM 
operations. Areas to explore include: 
o For ARTCC workstations: 
 Only display the one IM clearance most suitable for that aircraft geometry  
 Only display the clearance when it is feasible (within ADS-B range, etc.) 
 Only display the data elements relevant to that particular IM clearance 
o For TRACON workstations: 
 Display element in the aircraft data tag indicating which aircraft are IM 
capable and what the IM status is 
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IM Spacing Software 
• Explore the benefit of providing the IM aircraft with improved wind information and more 
accurate route information (i.e., a trajectory that includes the delay calculated by TBFM). 
Problems that currently degrade the accuracy of the calculation by the airborne spacing 
software include: 
o Not knowing TBFM’s calculated delay for the IM aircraft and Target aircraft means 
there can be a large difference between what the spacing algorithm expects (the 
speeds on the published procedure) and what the aircraft actually flies.  
o Lack of knowledge about the wind field of the Target aircraft, especially when the 
Ownship aircraft is not in-trail with the Target aircraft. 
• How the spacing algorithm resolves the spacing error should be explored. Options include: 
o Align the methodology closer to the technique used by the ground system scheduler 
(apportion as much delay to the Final sector, any remaining delay to the Feeder 
sector, then any remaining delay to the ARTCC) 
o Resolve the spacing error more strategically than the proportional algorithms that 
have been investigated to date. For example, a spacing algorithm could be 
developed that uses optimal control techniques to create plan a new speed profile 
to the ABP that resolves the spacing error.  
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Appendix A: IM Software 
A.1 IM Software Components 
The IM system consists of the following IM software and IM hardware components shown in 
Figure 48. All the components shown, except for the 4D trajectory and the dynamically updated 
data, are discussed in Appendix A, and the IM displays and how the flight crew enter the IM 
information into the IM system are discussed in Appendix B. 
 
 
Figure 48. Relationship of IM software, ASTAR algorithm, and speed control laws. 
 
A.2 ASTAR Algorithm 
A.2.1 ASTAR Overview and History 
The basic goal of an airborne spacing algorithm is to provide an airspeed to the flight crew, which 
if flown, nulls the spacing error. Research in the mid-1980s explored constant time delay (or time-
history) techniques, where the spacing error is calculated by determining the time elapsed between 
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when the Target aircraft crossed a specific point and when the IM aircraft crossed that same point. 
The spacing error at any given point is simply the difference between the elapsed time and the 
assigned spacing goal. The IM speed is a summation of the Target aircraft’s current speed and the 
speed needed to null the current spacing error, and can only be calculated when both aircraft are 
on the same route (in-trail with each other). 
In the early 2000’s, trajectory-based techniques were developed, where the spacing algorithms 
calculate the ETA for each aircraft at the achieve-by point (ABP) and then compare the difference 
in ETAs to the assigned spacing goal to determine the current spacing error. The IM speed is then 
defined as the IM aircraft’s expected speed on that segment plus the speed compensation used to 
null the current spacing error. This type of algorithm relaxes the requirement of the aircraft being 
in-trail, but requires additional Target and IM aircraft route information to calculate the trajectory 
for both aircraft from their current positions to a common ABP. 
The NASA-developed Airborne Spacing for Terminal Arrival Routes (ASTAR) uses detailed route 
information for both aircraft to allow spacing to begin at any time the Target aircraft’s route can 
be communicated to the IM aircraft. This allows for multiple turns, planned altitude changes, and 
planned speed changes prior to the common point, and for a much larger range between aircraft at 
the start of the operation. In a mature Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) 
environment, the Target aircraft’s route information would be delivered by a data link message 
from air traffic control. In the interim, however, published RNAV arrival routes and instrument 
approaches can provide sufficiently accurate information for airborne spacing. Since the spacing 
algorithm is continually running and providing up-to-date speed guidance, any trajectory 
prediction errors will eventually appear as spacing errors and are corrected. Previous human-in-
the-loop simulations have demonstrated that the ASTAR algorithm is able to precisely deliver 
aircraft to the ABP and that the speeds produced by the algorithm are generally acceptable to pilots 
(ref. 11). Each of these human-in-the-loop simulations assumed an advanced airspace environment 
with controller-pilot data link communications used to transmit IM clearances to the flight deck, 
and that the IM aircraft will have access to detailed information of the Target aircraft’s intended 
trajectory. 
When the ATD-1 project began, the focus of IM research at NASA switched from a future 
environment that included controller-pilot data link communications to the use of IM in the 
midterm airspace environment. Since controller-pilot data link communications are not expected 
to be available in the midterm National Airspace System, IM clearances are provided using voice 
communications and the intended trajectories of the IM and Target aircraft are assumed to be 
published Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STARs). In preparation for the ATD-1 flight 
demonstration, several simulations were conducted to examine the integration of IM with TMA-
TM and CMS.  
An earlier version of the ASTAR algorithm, ASTAR11, did not perform well when used with 
TMA-TM and the CMS tools. TMA-TM uses the predicted trajectory of each aircraft along their 
projected OPDs to compute their ETAs to a series of scheduling waypoints. If there is a conflict at 
one of the scheduling waypoints, TMA-TM often delays aircraft to resolve the conflict. With the 
advent of flex scheduling, aircraft can also be advanced in certain circumstances. Since ASTAR 
uses the published STARs as the estimate of the Target aircraft’s intended trajectory, the speeds 
expected by ASTAR and TMA-TM do not always match. The ASTAR11 algorithm was not 
designed to compensate for large speed differences between the Target aircraft’s actual speed and 
the published speeds that were used by ASTAR11 to predict the Target aircraft’s ETA. The result 
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was that the ASTAR11 algorithm exhibited a large steady state error and undesirable closure rates 
with the Target aircraft when it was absorbing delay (an example of this type of behavior is 
described in Section 5.9.5).  
In 2013, NASA’s ASTAR algorithm was updated to mitigate the previously described problems 
and improve compatibility with TMA-TM and CMS; this version of ASTAR was called 
ASTAR12. The main modification was a ground speed term that was added to the ASTAR 
algorithm to compensate for discrepancies between the Target aircraft’s actual speeds and 
published speeds. The ground speed term essentially enables the IM aircraft to match the Target 
aircraft’s speed deviation and then correct for the spacing error using the proportional control term. 
The ground speed term also prevents steady-state errors from occurring when the Target aircraft 
is not flying its expected speed, reducing undesirable closure rates between the IM and Target 
aircraft. Several batch simulations were conducted to investigate the performance of the ASTAR12 
algorithm with this new ground speed term functionality (ref. 24 and 25). 
A.2.2 ASTAR13 in the IMAC Experiment 
In 2015, NASA’s ASTAR algorithm was updated to support new IM operations that are described 
in the IM industry standards (ref. 3 and ref. 4). These standards define five different IM operation 
types: Capture then Maintain (CAPTURE), Achieve-by then Maintain (CROSS), Maintain Current 
Spacing (MAINTAIN), Final Approach Spacing (SPACE), and IM Turn (TURN). Prior versions 
of ASTAR only supported the Achieve-by portion of the CROSS operation and did not support 
the other IM operations, whereas ASTAR13 supports all of these operation types except for IM 
Turn. In order to support the additional operation types, a new state-based Constant Time Delay 
(CTD) speed control law was added to ASTAR. The trajectory-based speed control law used in 
ASTAR12 is also used in ASTAR13. 
An algorithmic description of each of the three IM operations used in this experiment is as follows: 
• Achieve-by then Maintain (CROSS): 
o The Ownship and Target aircraft can be on the same or different routes. 
o ATC assigns a specific spacing interval in either time or distance. 
o The TBO control law is used until the Ownship aircraft crosses the ABP, after 
which the CTD control law is used until the PTP. 
• Capture then Maintain Spacing (CAPTURE): 
o The Ownship and Target aircraft must be on the same route. 
o ATC assigns a specific spacing interval in either time or distance. 
o The CTD control law is used to achieve the ATC assigned spacing interval. 
• Maintain Current Spacing (MAINTAIN):  
o The Ownship and Target aircraft must be on the same route. 
o When the flight crew initiates the operation, the IM avionics measures the current 
spacing interval and uses that value as the ASG.  
o The CTD control law is used to maintain the avionics measured spacing interval. 
 
 
Appendix A: IM Software 120 
A.3 Speed Control Laws 
A.3.1 TBO Speed Control Law 
The TBO speed control law in ASTAR13 is designed to support IM operations both when the IM 
and Target aircraft are in-trail and when they are on merging routes. The spacing error is calculated 
using the time-to-go of the IM and Target aircraft along their predicted 4D trajectories. The time-
to-go of each aircraft is simply the difference between their respective ETAs at the ABP and the 
current time. For time-based operations4, the spacing error is defined as the difference between the 
IM aircraft’s time-to-go (ܶܶܩூெ) to the ABP and the Target aircraft’s time-to-go to the ABP 
(ܶܶܩ்ீ்) minus the spacing goal assigned by air traffic control (Δ). 
݁(ݐ) = ܶܶܩூெ(ݐ) − ܶܶܩ்ீ்(ݐ) − Δ 
The amount of speed control required to null the spacing error is computed using a proportional 
controller with a ground speed term added to compensate for differences between the Target 
aircraft’s predicted ground speed and actual ground speed. The speed control is added to the IM 
aircraft’s nominal speed to generate the IM commanded speed (ݒ௖௠ௗ(ݐ)). 
ݒ௖௠ௗ(ݐ) = ݒ௡௢௠ூெ(ݐ) + ݇௣݁(ݐ) + ݇ீௌ ቀݒௗ௘௥೅ಸ೅(ݐ) − ݒ௡௢௠೅ಸ೅(ݐ)ቁ 
Here, ݒ௡௢௠ூெ(ݐ) is the nominal 4D-trajectory airspeed of the IM aircraft; ݇௣ is the proportional 
gain, ݁(ݐ) is the spacing error; ݇ீௌ is the gain for the ground speed term; ݒௗ௘௥೅ಸ೅(ݐ) is the airspeed 
derived from the Target aircraft’s ground speed, wind forecast, and altitude; and ݒ௡௢௠೅ಸ೅(ݐ) is the 
nominal 4D-trajectory airspeed of the Target aircraft. A graphical depiction of the ASTAR13 TBO 
speed control law is shown in Figure 49. 
The IM avionics used in the ATD-1 flight demonstration will likely be a retrofit implementation 
that is not connected with the aircraft’s flight management system, requiring the flight crew to 
monitor for IM speed changes and manually enter them into the aircraft’s mode control panel speed 
window in order to close the control loop. To reduce the number of speed changes that the flight 
crew is required to respond to, speed commands are discretized into either five or ten knot 
increments prior to being displayed to the flight crew.  
Gain scheduling is implemented to ensure that the appropriate amount of speed control is used 
throughout the arrival. The proportional gain ranges from a value of 0.375 when the IM aircraft is 
far from the ABP to 1.5 when the IM aircraft is within 5 nmi of the ABP. The ground speed gain 
is set to one until the IM aircraft is 40 nmi from the ABP. Between 40 nmi and 20 nmi from the 
ABP, the ground speed gain is linearly decreased to zero, and remains at zero until the ABP. 
Additionally, the ground speed gain is set to zero whenever the Target aircraft’s ground speed is 
faster than expected. This is done to reduce the number of instances where the TBO speed control 
law commands a speed increase during an arrival and to increase conformance with the controller 
tools, which primarily resolve conflicts at meter points by delaying aircraft. 
                                                 
4 Since all of the IM clearances evaluated in the IMAC human-in-the-loop simulation were time-based, the discussion 
of the TBO and CTD speed control laws is limited to time-based operations. 
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Additional filtering is applied to the Target aircraft’s ground speed differential to prevent 
undesirable speed changes from occurring. The Target aircraft’s ground speed is filtered using a 
first order low pass filter to remove high frequency variability. The time constant of the filter 
changes from 60 seconds when the IM aircraft is more than 30 nmi from the ABP to 30 seconds 
when the IM aircraft is at the ABP. 
To prevent the TBO speed control law from commanding unacceptable speeds, the commanded 
speed is limited to be within ±15% of the TBO nominal profile speed, which is derived from the 
STAR that the IM aircraft is on. Furthermore, the commanded speed is limited to conform to any 
airspace speed restrictions. 
 
 
Figure 49. Diagram of the TBO speed control law. 
 
A.3.2 CTD Speed Control Law 
The state-based CTD speed control law was added to ASTAR to support the maintain phase of the 
CROSS operation, the CAPTURE operation, and the MAINTAIN operation. Unlike the TBO 
speed control law, the CTD speed control law can only be used when the IM and Target aircraft 
are on the same route.  
For time-based operations, the Measured Spacing Interval (ܯܵܫ) is calculated by determining the 
difference between the IM and Target aircrafts’ actual times of arrival at a particular point along 
their common path. The spacing error at any given point is simply the difference between the MSI 
and the ASG. 
݁(ݐ) = ܯܵܫ − Δ 
The amount of speed control required to null the spacing error is computed using a proportional 
controller, and the Target aircraft’s estimated time-history airspeed. The Target aircraft’s time-
history airspeed is estimated using the IM aircraft‘s sensed winds, the ground speed, and the 
altitude of the Target aircraft when it was at the IM aircraft’s current along path position. The 
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speed control is added to the Target aircraft’s derived time-history airspeed to generate the IM 
commanded speed. 
ݒ௖௠ௗ = ݒௗ௘௥೅ಸ೅(ݐ − ܯܵܫ) + ݇௣݁(ݐ) 
Here, ݒௗ௘௥೅ಸ೅(ݐ − ܯܵܫ) is the Target aircraft’s estimated time-history airspeed, ݇௣ is the 
proportional gain, and ݁(ݐ) is the spacing error. Similarly to the TBO speed control law, the pilots 
are required to manually enter the commanded speeds into their aircraft’s mode control panel to 
close the control loop. Additionally, the speed commands are discretized into either five or ten 
knot increments, limited to be within ±15% of the TBO nominal profile speed, and limited to 
conform to any airspace speed restrictions. A graphical depiction of the ASTAR13 CTD speed 
control law is shown in Figure 50. 
Gain scheduling is implemented to ensure that the appropriate amount of speed control is used 
throughout the arrival. The gains used in the CTD speed control law range from 0.5 to 1.5, and 
depend on the IM aircraft along-path distance to the PTP and the magnitude of the spacing error. 
When the IM aircraft is within 7.5 nmi of the PTP, the gains are increased to obtain a more precise 
spacing interval at the PTP. The gains are decreased as the magnitude of the spacing error increases 
because fast-time simulations prior to this simulation showed that decreasing the gain resulted in 
improved string stability and speed behavior. 
The IM standards specify that the IM CAPTURE rate should be a minimum of three seconds per 
minute, which is equivalent to speed control equal to 5% of the Target aircraft’s time-history 
ground speed. There were some cases where the gains were not high enough to meet the capture 
rate specified in the IM standards; therefore, an override function was implemented5. Whenever 
the speed control (݇௣݁(ݐ)) is less than 5% of the IM aircraft’s nominal TBO airspeed and the 
spacing error is greater than 20 seconds, the magnitude of the speed control is increased so that it 
is equal to 5% of the IM aircraft’s nominal TBO airspeed6. 
Additional heuristics are used to minimize the number of speed commands provided to the flight 
crew. One of these heuristics is a function that uses the Target aircraft’s time-history information 
to estimate the speed that the Target aircraft had at the end of a long deceleration. This results in 
fewer speed commands when the Target aircraft has a large speed change. For example, the 
algorithm can command a single thirty knot deceleration instead of three consecutive ten knot 
decelerations. 
                                                 
5 The decision to add the override function was made because there was not enough time before the IMAC human-in-
the-loop experiment to complete another design revision of the CTD algorithm. Future design iterations should 
examine modifying the proportional gains so that the override function is not needed. 
6 In order to meet the capture rate in the IM standards, the speed control magnitude must be equal or greater than 5% 
of the Target aircraft’s time-history ground speed. The IM aircraft’s nominal TBO airspeed was used in the override 
function because it is a more stable value than the Target aircraft’s time-history ground speed and was found to result 
in improved speed behavior. However, it should be noted that the use of the IM aircraft’s nominal TBO airspeed 
results in cases where the IM aircraft will not meet the desired capture rate (i.e., when there is a large tailwind). 
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Figure 50. Diagram of the CTD speed control law. 
 
 
 
A.4 ASTAR Logic Wrapper 
This part of Appendix A contains four sections that provide greater detail on the IM states, the 
criteria to transition between states, the IM alert levels, and the IM messages. 
A.4.1 IM States 
The IM state logic used in this experiment consisted of seven states. These states were: 
1. OFF/TERMINATE: IM not active, or prior to all information being entered into the EFB;  
2. ARMED: information entered, but not all requirements have been met to conduct IM;  
3. AVAILABLE: all requirements met, but the flight crew has not initiated the IM operation; 
4. PAIRED: the IM operation is in effect, and the flight crew flies the IM commanded speed; 
5. SUSPENDED-ARMED: the IM operation was previously in effect, but all requirements 
are no longer met to conduct the operation;  
6. SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE: the IM operation was previously in effect, and all 
requirements are met to resume the operation; and  
7. UNABLE: an unrecoverable error has occurred.  
 
Figure 51 illustrates the IM states used in the IM application, the manual actions taken by the flight 
crew (pressing the ARM, EXECUTE, SUSPEND, RESUME, and CANCEL buttons), and 
transitions done automatically by the IM application software (to the AVAILABLE, 
SUSPENDED-ARMED, UNABLE, and TERMINATE states). This IM state logic was designed 
so that the OFF and TERMINATE states as defined in reference 4 are the same. 
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Figure 51. IM state logic flow diagram.  
 
 
 
A.4.2 Transition between IM States 
The following sections describe how the IM software transitions between states. If a transition is 
not listed, for example from AVAILABLE to SUSPSENDED-AVAILABLE, then that transition 
did not exist for this experiment. 
 
 OFF/TERMINATE State 
• Transition from OFF/TERMINATE to ARMED State 
o The transition from OFF/TERMINATE to ARMED occurs when the flight crew 
presses the ARM IM HOME bezel button or soft-key (R1) on the IM clearance home 
page. For this button to be visible, all the Ownship and IM clearance information must 
be entered. 
o The transition from OFF/TERMINATE to ARMED is shown by a solid blue up arrow 
labeled “ARM” in Figure 51. 
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 ARMED State 
• Transition from ARMED to OFF/TERMINATE State 
o The transition from ARMED to OFF/TERMINATE occurs one of two possible ways: 
 The flight crew manually presses the CANCEL IM button on the EFB (shown by a 
solid red line labeled “CANCEL” in Figure 51), or 
 The Ownship crosses the Planned Termination Point, causing the software to 
automatically terminate the IM operation (the dotted black line labeled “software 
auto-transition”). 
When the IM software transitions to the OFF/TERMINATE state, all IM clearance information is 
cleared, but the Ownship information is retained. 
The transition from any other state to the OFF/TERMINATE state is always for the two reasons 
listed above, therefore all subsequent sections will state “Previously described.” 
 
• Transition from ARMED to AVAILABLE State 
o The transition from ARMED to AVAILABLE occurs automatically when all of the 
criteria for the AVAILABLE state are met (listed below). 
o The transition from ARMED to AVAILABLE is shown by a black line in Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from ARMED to UNABLE State 
o The transition from ARMED to UNABLE occurs automatically when any of the 
following criteria are met: 
 The IM software or system fails, 
 The IM navigation database is not current (not implemented in IMAC), 
 The IM software cannot calculate the route for the Ownship, or 
 The IM software cannot calculate the route for the Target aircraft. 
o The transition from ARMED to UNABLE is shown by the dashed orange line in Figure 
51. 
The transition to the UNABLE state is the exactly the same from any other state, therefore all 
subsequent sections will state “Previously described.” 
 
 AVAILABLE State 
• The criteria to transition to the AVAILABLE state is all of the following criteria are met: 
o A valid ADS-B track file exists for the Target aircraft, 
o The Ownship aircraft is on its route, 
o The Target aircraft is on its route, 
o The Ownship has passed a speed constrained waypoint (CROSS clearance only), 
o The Target aircraft has passed a speed constrained waypoint (CROSS clearance only), 
o The assigned spacing goal is feasible, and 
o Both aircraft are in the airspeed segment of the route (approximated as below FL290). 
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• Transition from AVAILABLE to OFF/TERMINATE State 
o Previously described. 
 
• Transition from AVAILABLE to ARMED State 
o The transition from AVAILABLE to ARMED occurs one of two possible ways: 
 The flight crew manually amends the Ownship information or the IM clearance 
(shown by a solid turquoise line in Figure 51), or  
 When any of the criteria required for the AVAILABLE state (defined above) is no 
longer met (shown by a black down arrow in Figure 51). 
 
• Transition from AVAILABLE to PAIRED State 
o The transition from AVAILABLE to PAIRED occurs when the flight crew presses the 
EXECUTE button, and is shown by the solid blue up arrow labeled “EXECUTE” in 
Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from AVAILABLE to UNABLE State 
o Previously described. 
 
 
 PAIRED State 
• Transition from PAIRED to OFF/TERMINATE State 
o Previously described. 
 
• Transition from PAIRED to ARMED State 
o The transition from PAIRED to ARMED occurs when the flight crew modifies any 
Ownship information or IM clearance information. (Note: the Target ID cannot be 
modified, rather it requires the IM operation to be canceled and then the new clearance 
be entered.) 
o The transition from PAIRED to ARMED is shown by a solid turquoise line Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from PAIRED to SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE State 
o The transition from PAIRED to SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE occurs when the flight 
crew manually suspends the IM operation by pressing the SUSPEND button on the 
EFB. 
o The transition from PAIRED to SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE is shown by a solid lime-
green line in Figure 51. 
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• Transition from PAIRED to SUSPENDED-ARMED State 
o The transition from PAIRED to SUSPENDED-ARMED occurs automatically when 
any of the criteria required for the AVAILABLE state (Section B.2.3) is no longer met. 
o The transition from PAIRED to SUSPENDED-ARMED is shown by the thin solid 
black line in Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from PAIRED to UNABLE State 
o Previously described. 
 
 SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE State 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to OFF/TERMINATE State 
o Previously described. 
 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to ARMED State 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to ARMED occurs when the flight 
crew modifies any Ownship information or IM clearance information. (Note: the Target 
ID cannot be modified, rather it requires the IM operation to be canceled and then the 
new clearance be entered.) 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to ARMED is shown by a solid 
turquoise line in Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to SUSPEND-ARMED State 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to SUSPENDED-ARMED occurs 
automatically when any of the criteria required for the AVAILABLE state (Section 
B.2.3) is no longer met. 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to SUSPENDED-ARMED is shown 
by a thin solid black line in Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to PAIRED State 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to PAIRED occurs when the flight 
crew presses the RESUME button. 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to PAIRED is shown by a solid lime-
green line in Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE to UNABLE State 
o Previously described. 
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 SUSPENDED-ARMED State 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-ARMED to OFF/TERMINATE State 
o Previously described. 
 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-ARMED to ARMED State 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-ARMED to ARMED occurs when the flight crew 
modifies any Ownship information or IM clearance information. (Note: the Target ID 
cannot be modified, rather it requires the IM operation to be canceled and then the new 
clearance be entered.) 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-ARMED to ARMED is shown by a solid turquoise 
line in Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-ARMED to SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE State 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-ARMED to SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE occurs 
automatically when all of the criteria required for the AVAILABLE state (Section 
B.2.3) is met. 
o The transition from SUSPENDED-ARMED to SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE is shown 
by a thin solid black line in Figure 51. 
 
• Transition from SUSPENDED-ARMED to UNABLE State 
o Previously described. 
 
 UNABLE State 
• Transition from UNABLE to the OFF/TERMINATE State 
o Previously described. 
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A.4.3 Alert Levels 
A structured alert hierarchy that aligns with other cockpit display philosophies was used for the 
IM displays. IM displays and messages are assigned the lowest possible alert level and do not 
change levels if the pilot does not take action. No audio tones are used to alert the pilot of a message 
during the IM operation since none of the IM messages meet the criteria for a warning level alert 
as described in Table 39.  
Table 39. Alert Levels and Characteristics  
  Alert Characteristics 
Alert 
Level Criteria Aural Visual Tactile 
   Display Color  
3 
Warning 
Emergency 
operational or aircraft 
systems conditions 
which require 
immediate corrective 
or compensatory 
action by the crew. 
ATTENTION or 
DISCRETE aural 
alert. 
Time critical alerts 
and annunciations 
may be 
supplemented by 
voice message. 
• Alpha-numeric alert 
messages. Red 
Stick 
shaker 
2 
Caution 
Abnormal operational 
or aircraft systems 
conditions which 
require immediate 
crew awareness and 
subsequent corrective 
or compensatory 
crew action. 
None 
• Alpha-numeric alert 
messages. 
• Flashing reverse video for 
IM speed (indicates a 
change in the IM speed 
greater than 10 seconds ago; 
returns to normal video 
when speed set in MCP). 
White None 
1 
Advisory 
Operational or 
aircraft systems 
conditions which 
require crew 
awareness and may 
require crew action. 
None 
• Alpha-numeric alert 
messages. 
• Reverse video for IM speed 
(indicates a change in the 
IM speed less than 10 
seconds ago; returns to 
normal video when speed set 
in MCP). 
White None 
0 
Info 
Operational or 
aircraft systems 
conditions which 
require flight deck 
indication. 
None • Discrete lights, alpha-numeric readout, or icon. White None 
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A.4.4 IM Alerting Messages 
The IM alerting messages are categorized from highest to lowest alert level outlined in Table 39 
(caution, advisory, information), with no IM messages reaching the criticality of a warning level. 
A maximum of three messages are shown on either the EFB or CGD. 
Only messages that enabled the pilot to take direct action based on the information in that message 
were shown in the pilot’s primary field of view on the CGD. All other messages provide an 
explanation for the current IM software state, and are only shown on the EFB outside of the 
primary field of view. 
Table 40. IM Message Criteria and the Pilot Response 
Message Criteria Pilot Response Alert Level Location 
AIRCRAFT 
TOO FAST 
The aircraft is faster than 0.02 Mach or 10 
kt above the IM instantaneous speed for 
more than 10 seconds. 
Reduce throttle and/or 
deploy speed brake Caution 
EFB 
and 
CGD 
AIRCRAFT 
TOO SLOW 
The aircraft is slower than 0.02 Mach or 10 
kt below the IM instantaneous speed for 
more than 10 seconds.  
Increase throttle and/or 
retract speed brake Caution 
EFB 
and 
CGD 
IM SYS FAIL 
A failure of the IM software or hardware 
has occurred, or the Ownship data is not 
valid. 
Notify ATC unable to 
initiate the IM 
operation 
Caution EFB only 
IM DB NOT 
CURRENT 
Navigation database (DB) used by IM 
system is not current, therefore IM speed 
will not be calculated. This check occurs 
when the IM application is initially selected 
(prior to entry of either Ownship data or IM 
clearance data). 
Notify ATC unable to 
initiate the IM 
operation 
Caution EFB only 
OWNSHIP 
BAD ROUTE 
A valid Ownship traffic record and an 
Ownship route definition exists, but the 
calculated trajectory cannot be calculated, 
or it does not meet speed or altitude 
constraints. 
Either notify ATC 
unable to initiate the 
IM operation, or notify 
ATC must terminate 
the IM operation 
Caution EFB only 
TGT BAD 
ROUTE 
A valid Target traffic record and a Target 
route definition exists, but the calculated 
trajectory cannot be calculated, or it does 
not meet speed or altitude constraints. 
Either notify ATC 
unable to initiate the 
IM operation, or notify 
ATC must terminate 
the IM operation 
Caution EFB only 
OWNSHIP 
OFF ROUTE 
A valid Ownship traffic record exists and 
the Ownship’s calculated trajectory is valid, 
but the Ownship is greater than 2 nautical 
miles laterally or greater than 8000 feet 
vertically from the intended flight path. 
Either update route in 
IM application if 
required (any state 
except PAIRED), or 
notify ATC must 
suspend IM operation 
(if in PAIRED state) 
Advisory EFB only 
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Message Criteria Pilot Response Alert Level Location 
TGT OFF 
ROUTE 
A valid Target traffic record exists and the 
Target’s calculated trajectory is valid, but 
the Target is greater than 2 nautical miles 
laterally or greater than 8000 feet vertically 
from the intended flight path. 
No action (any state 
except PAIRED), or 
notify ATC must 
suspend IM operation 
(if in PAIRED state) 
Advisory EFB only 
TGT DATA 
LOST 
The ADS-B track file for the Target aircraft 
has been lost or removed (data invalid or no 
longer received for a longer time period 
than the Air Traffic Computer allows). 
No action (any state 
except PAIRED), or 
notify ATC must 
suspend IM operation 
(if in PAIRED state) 
Advisory EFB only 
SPC GOAL 
TOO LARGE 
The assigned spacing goal cannot be 
attained, even with the Ownship flying its 
slowest possible speed profile.  
Notify ATC unable to 
initiate or must 
terminate the IM 
operation 
Advisory EFB only 
SPC GOAL 
TOO SMALL 
The assigned spacing goal cannot be 
attained, even with the Ownship flying its 
fastest possible speed profile.  
Notify ATC unable to 
initiate or must 
terminate the IM 
operation 
Advisory EFB only 
IM SPEED 
LIMITED 
The software calculated speed is being 
limited by one of:  
• regulatory (i.e., 250 knots or less < 
10,000’) 
• airframe (Mmo, Vmo, etc.) 
• more than 15% difference from the 
published speed  
No action Info EFB only 
NO 
DESCENT 
WIND 
No forecast descent wind is entered, either 
via data comm or manually. Enter wind if available Info 
EFB 
only 
NO 
SURFACE 
WIND 
No forecast surface wind is entered. Enter wind if available Info EFB only 
WAITING 
OWN WPT 
Ownship on the specified route, however 
has not yet passed a speed constrained 
waypoint. 
No action Info EFB only 
WAITING 
TGT WPT 
Target on its specified route, however the 
aircraft has not yet passed a speed-
constrained waypoint. 
No action Info EFB only 
WAITING 
TGT DATA 
ADS-B data has never been received from 
the Target aircraft. No action Info 
EFB 
only 
MANUALLY 
SUSPENDED 
IM operation was manually suspended by 
the pilot.  No action Info 
EFB 
only 
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Appendix B: IM Displays and Data Entry 
The entirety of Appendix B is derived from reference 6, Cockpit Interfaces, Displays, and Alerting 
Messages for the Interval Management Clearances (IMAC) Experiment. For more detailed 
information, please refer to this document. 
 
B.1 EFB Overview 
Each pilot could manually interface with and configure their respective EFB (shown in Figure 52) 
to: 1) enter Ownship information, 2) enter the IM clearance, 3) select when to commence, suspend, 
resume, and terminate the IM operation, 4) filter the traffic data shown on the display, and 5) 
display additional information about aircraft and routes. Although the displays were independently 
operated and controlled by the respective pilot, the data entered by one pilot would be reflected in 
the other EFB (caveat: the filter options only applied to the EFB being manipulated). 
The EFBs present information and may have selectable data fields based on what page has been 
selected. The “Ownship and Wind” entry page allowed pilots to enter the IM equipped aircraft’s 
destination, route of flight, and forecast descent winds. The “IM Clearance” entry page allowed 
pilots to specify the IM clearance type, and enter the data unique to that clearance. The “IM Home” 
page presented the following information to the flight crew: 1) mode status of the IM software, 2) 
the IM commanded speed, 3) the Ownship and IM clearance information if previously entered, 4) 
an icon uniquely identifying the Target aircraft, 5) an indication of the aircraft’s current airspeed 
relative to the spacing algorithm’s expected speed, and 6) an indication of the aircraft’s along-
track position relative to the desired location.  
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Figure 52. Legend for the IM Home page on an EFB. 
 
A) Title of IM page (changes to state function of the page) 
B) Soft-key and bezel button to enter Ownship and forecast wind information 
C) Text box that displays Ownship information 
D) FAST/SLOW indicator 
• PAIRED state: displayed 
• all other states: not displayed 
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E) IM commanded speed 
• OFF and TERMINATE states: nothing displayed 
• ARMED, SUSPENDED-ARMED, and UNABLE states: white dashes 
• AVAILABLE and SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE: value shown in grey 
• PAIRED state: value shown in green 
F) IM state 
• OFF and TERMINATE states: nothing displayed 
• ARMED, SUSPENDED-ARMED, and UNABLE states: white text 
• AVAILABLE and SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE: white text 
• PAIRED state: green text 
G) IM alert message box (applicable messages shown in white) 
H) EARLY/LATE indicator (shown when within 30 nautical miles of ABP or during a 
maintain phase of the IM operation) 
I) Soft-key and bezel button to enter or modify the IM clearance information 
J) Non-selectable text box that displays the IM clearance information 
K) Area where Ownship aircraft filter annunciations are displayed 
L) Area where Target aircraft filter annunciations are displayed 
M) Soft-key and bezel button to cancel IM (present in all states except OFF/TERMINATE) 
N) Soft-key and bezel button to display FILTERS page 
O) Soft-key and bezel button to suspend the IM 
P) Ownship location 
• ASTOR, DTS, and IFD: single solid white triangle 
Q) Traffic and Target location 
• Traffic: 
o ASTOR: single-white hollow chevron 
o DTS and IFD: single-cyan hollow chevron 
• Target in the ARMED, AVAILABLE, or SUSPENDED state: 
o ASTOR: single-white hollow chevron surrounded by white chevron 
o DTS and IFD: single-cyan hollow chevron surrounded by a white chevron 
• Target in the PAIRED state: 
o ASTOR, DTS, IFD: single-white hollow chevron surrounded by a green 
chevron 
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B.2 CGD Overview 
The CGD (Figure 53) cannot be manually interfaced with, rather it is a repeater display in the 
pilot’s optimal primary field of view that automatically provides the subset of the critical 
information from the EFB needed to conduct the IM operation. Unlike the EFBs that could be 
individually manipulated and tailored by the respective pilot, the two CGDs always showed 
identical information. 
 
 
Figure 53. Legend for the IM displays on a CGD. 
 
A) FAST/SLOW indicator 
• PAIRED state: displayed 
• all other states: not displayed 
B) IM commanded speed 
• OFF and TERMINATE states: nothing displayed 
• ARMED, SUSPENDED-ARMED, and UNABLE states: white dashes 
• AVAILABLE and SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE: value shown in grey 
• PAIRED state: value shown in green 
C) Text box that displays the IM clearance information once entered by the crew 
D) IM state 
• OFF and TERMINATE states: nothing displayed 
• ARMED, SUSPENDED-ARMED, and UNABLE states: white text 
• AVAILABLE and SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE: white text 
• PAIRED state: green text 
E) IM alert message box (applicable messages shown in white) 
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B.3 IM Displays by State 
B.3.1 OFF/TERMINATE State 
No data is shown on the EFB or CGD in the OFF/TERMINATE state prior to the flight crew 
entering any data into the IM application (Figure 54). If the Ownship information has been entered 
into the IM application, it will be visible when the display is in the OFF/TERMINATE state 
(Figure 55). 
 
 
Figure 54. EFB and CGD in the OFF state with no Ownship information. 
 
Appendix B: IM States and Transitions 137 
 
Figure 55. EFB and CGD in the OFF state with Ownship information. 
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B.3.2 ARMED State 
In the ARMED state, all IM information is shown on the EFB except for the FAST/SLOW 
indicator, the EARLY/LATE indicator, and the IM commanded speed (Figure 56). Up to three IM 
alerting messages (prioritized by alert level) are displayed on the EFB, and any traffic for which a 
valid ADS-B data file exists are shown as single white chevrons. The IM state, the IM clearance 
type, and the IM clearance information are shown on the CGD, but the IM commanded speed and 
the FAST/SLOW indicator are not shown. No alerting messages are shown on the CGD in the 
ARMED state. 
 
 
Figure 56. EFB and CGD in the ARMED state. 
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B.3.3 AVAILABLE State 
In the AVAILABLE state, the IM information is shown in white on the EFB, the IM commanded 
speed is shown in grey, and the FAST/SLOW and EARLY/LATE indicators are not displayed 
(Figure 57). The white Target aircraft chevron is outlined with a second white chevron.  The IM 
state and IM clearance information are shown in white on the CGD, while the IM commanded 
speed is shown in grey and the IM clearance type in green. The FAST/SLOW indicator is not 
displayed. 
 
 
 
Figure 57. EFB and CGD in the AVAILABLE state. 
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B.3.4 PAIRED State 
In the PAIRED state, the IM state and commanded speed are shown in green. The IM clearance 
type and information are shown cyan on the EFB, and in green and white on the CGD (Figure 58). 
The FAST/SLOW indicator is shown on the EFB and CGD anytime the IM algorithm is in the 
PAIRED state. 
 
 
Figure 58. EFB and CGD in the PAIRED state. 
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B.3.5 SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE State 
In the SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE state, the IM state is shown in white and the commanded speed 
in grey on the EFB and CGD, while the FAST/SLOW and EARLY/LATE indicators are removed 
(Figure 59). The Target aircraft chevron is outlined with a second white chevron (instead of 
outlined in green in the PAIRED state). 
 
Pressing the RESUME bezel button or soft-key (R8) causes the software to transition to the 
PAIRED state. This is the only time the RESUME button is visible and the function available. 
 
 
Figure 59. EFB and CGD in the SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE state. 
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B.3.6 SUSPENDED-ARMED State 
In the SUSPENDED-ARMED state, the IM information is visible but the IM speed, the 
FAST/SLOW indicator, and the EARLY/LATE indicators are removed. Up to three IM alerting 
messages (prioritized by alert level) are displayed on the EFB. All traffic on the EFB is shown as 
a single white chevron. The IM state and the IM clearance information are shown in white on the 
CGD, the IM clearance type in green, and the IM commanded speed and the FAST/SLOW 
indicator are removed. 
 
 
 
Figure 60. EFB and CGD in the SUSPENDED-ARMED state. 
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B.3.7 UNABLE State 
In the UNABLE state, the Ownship information and IM state remain visible, however the 
FAST/SLOW indicator, the EARLY/LATE indicator, and the IM commanded speed are removed 
from the EFB and CGD displays (Figure 61). All traffic on the EFB is shown as a single white 
chevron (traffic not depicted). 
 
 
 
Figure 61. EFB and CGD in the UNABLE state. 
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B.4 IM Display Sub-Elements 
B.4.1 Change to IM Command Speed 
When a change occurs to the IM commanded speed, the colors of the green text and black 
background are reversed to provide a salient cue to the flight crew (Figure 62). The reverse video 
is maintained until the flight crew sets the IM commanded speed in the MCP speed window. If the 
correct speed is not set within 10 seconds, the normal and reverse video configuration are 
alternated at approximately 1 Hz until the speed is set in the MCP. 
 
 
Figure 62. EFB and CGD with IM speed in reverse video. 
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B.4.2 FAST/SLOW Indicator 
The FAST/SLOW indicator displays the aircraft’s current airspeed and the IM instantaneous 
speed. It is intended to allow pilots to quickly compare the relationship between the two speeds 
and then take appropriate action. The solid white triangle is the aircraft’s current airspeed, and the 
hollow green triangle is the IM instantaneous speed which is displayed as the reference speed (i.e., 
it remains fixed in the middle of the vertical FAST/SLOW display). The IM instantaneous speed 
takes the discrete IM commanded speed, adds compensation for the delay due to pilot recognition 
and reaction time, then estimates the deceleration rate of the aircraft to produce a smooth and 
continuous value. When the aircraft’s airspeed does not match the IM instantaneous airspeed the 
pilots are expected to move the throttle in the direction towards the green reference speed in the 
center of the display. 
In the example shown in Figure 63, the IM commanded speed changes from 270 to 240 knots. 
From left to right, the first panel shows the IM commanded speed of 270 knots (the green 
numbers), and the aircraft’s current airspeed matches the IM instantaneous speed (solid white 
triangle aligns with the hollow green triangle). The second panel shows the IM commanded speed 
just changed to 240 knots, and the IM instantaneous speed has not changed yet (triangles still 
aligned). In the third panel, the spacing algorithm has calculated that the aircraft should have begun 
to decelerate, however since the aircraft itself is still at 270 knots, the aircraft is faster than expected 
(shown by the solid white triangle moving towards the FAST end of the scale). This display is 
intended to graphically present a cue to the pilots that they should pull the throttles aft, which 
would slow the aircraft and resolve the error calculated by the ASTAR algorithm. The final panel 
shows that when the difference between the aircraft’s current airspeed and the IM instantaneous 
speed is greater than 10 knots, the number of that difference and a message (AIRCRAFT TOO 
FAST) is added to the display to increase the saliency of the information being presented to the 
flight crew. 
 
 
Figure 63. FAST/SLOW indicator sequence during IM speed change. 
 
B.4.3 EARLY/LATE Indicator 
The EARLY/LATE indicator provides the flight crew an awareness of their ability to meet the 
assigned spacing goal within the expected tolerance and is not used to actively control the aircraft. 
The EARLY/LATE indicator is only presented on the side-mounted EFB and only shown when 
the aircraft is within 30 nautical miles of the ABP (CROSS operation only) or during the 
MAINTAIN phase of any IM operation (between the ABP and PTP in a CROSS operation, or 
anytime during a CAPTURE and a MAINTAIN operation). 
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From 30 nautical miles prior to the ABP until the aircraft is within 210 seconds of the ABP, the 
scale of the display is ± 2 minutes, with tick marks at zero, +60, and -60 seconds. The “bug” is 
located at the current spacing error value and is a circle with a diameter equal to 20 seconds (left 
panel of Figure 64).  
From 210 seconds prior to the ABP until the Termination Point, the scale is ±45 seconds with tick 
marks at +30, +15, 0, -15, and -30 seconds. The “bug” is located at the current spacing error value 
and is a circle with a diameter equal to 20 seconds (right panel of Figure 64). The 20 second 
diameter of the circle is the same as the IM error tolerance for a maintain operation described in 
the IM MOPS. Thus, if the center mark is not within the circle, the spacing error is greater than 
the ±10 second tolerance. 
 
           
Figure 64. Progress Indicator with 2 minute (left) and 45 second (right) scales. 
 
B.4.4 Canceling the IM Operation 
When the pilot presses the CANCEL IM bezel button or soft-key (L8 in Figure 62), a page is 
displayed on the EFB that requires the flight crew to confirm their intention to cancel the IM 
operation (left panel of Figure 65). The YES bezel button and soft-key (R8) is on the opposite side 
of the EFB from the previous CANCEL IM button to prevent accidental termination of the IM 
operation. 
Pressing the YES bezel button or soft-key (R8) terminates the IM operation and returns the IM 
equipment to the OFF/TERMINATE state (right panel of Figure 62). Pressing the NO bezel button 
or soft-key (L8) returns the IM display to the previous IM state and page. 
The right panel of Table 69 illustrates the EFB after an IM operation has been manually canceled 
by the flight crew or automatically canceled by the software (at the Planned Termination Point). 
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Figure 65. EFB display to confirm cancellation of IM operation. 
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B.5 Flight Crew Data Entry into IM Interface 
B.5.1 Navigation to the IM Home Page 
When the EFB is first powered on or the MENU bezel button is pressed, the MAIN MENU page 
is displayed (left panel of Figure 66). Pressing the APPLICATIONS MENU (L2) bezel button or 
touch screen soft-key causes the list of cockpit-based procedures to be displayed to the flight crew 
(right panel of Figure 66). Pressing the INTERVAL MANAGEMENT (L1) bezel button or soft-
key causes the IM Home page to be displayed (Figure 67). 
 
          
Figure 66. Main Menu and Applications Menu pages. 
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B.5.2 Ownship and Wind Data 
Pressing the OWNSHIP AND WINDS bezel button or soft-key (L1) on the IM Home page (left 
panel of Figure 67) causes the OWNSHIP AND WIND ENTRY page to be displayed (right panel 
of Figure 67). The flight crew enter the Ownship information as soon as feasible (typically prior 
to receiving an IM clearance from ATC). 
Mandatory entries are indicated by boxes (e.g., four characters must be entered for the destination 
airfield), and non-mandatory entries are indicated by dashes (e.g., descent forecast wind) in the 
right panel of Figure 67. If the optional descent forecast wind information is not entered, a message 
to the pilots is triggered. 
Pressing the DESTINATION AIRPORT bezel button or soft-key (L1) causes that data field to be 
highlighted in green and causes the keypad to be displayed as well (left panel of Figure 68). 
 
          
Figure 67. IM Home and Ownship Entry pages.  
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When a data field is active (indicated by the green hue and underscore cursor), any value touched 
on the keypad is entered into that field up to the maximum available characters limit. In this 
example, the flight crew will select the four-letter identifier of their destination airport, causing the 
display to change to the right panel of Figure 68. 
Once the four letters have been typed into the data field, the flight crew may either press the 
ENTER soft-key adjacent to (L5), in which case no data field is active (i.e. green), or else press 
the bezel button or soft-key to activate the next field of intended data entry. 
The flight crew must enter the destination airport prior to entering either the Ownship arrival route 
or Target route information. To minimize the likelihood of data entry error by the flight crew, the 
Ownship and Target route information is entered by the crew using a selectable list of options (not 
feasible for airport and forecast winds). 
 
          
Figure 68. Airport data field selected and airport entered. 
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Once the descent forecast wind is received via ACARS, the bezel button and soft-key (R6) to auto-
load the wind direction and speed at four different altitudes is shown (left panel of Figure 69). The 
time stamp of the message is shown on the second line of the data field. 
Pressing the LOAD DEC FCST WIND bezel button or soft-key causes 1) the data from the 
ACARS message to be auto-loaded into the appropriate data fields, 2) the time of the message to 
be displayed in the page title, 3) activates the next data field (surface wind direction), and 4) causes 
the keypad to appear for manual data entry (right panel of Figure 69). 
 
           
Figure 69. Descent Forecast page prior to and after data entry. 
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Figure 70 illustrates the IM Home page with the Ownship information entered. The three Ownship 
data elements shown on the upper left blue box are 1) the next waypoint, 2) the arrival procedure, 
and 3) the instrument procedure. 
Any Ownship data may be modified by pressing the OWNSHIP & WINDS bezel button or soft-
key (R1) on the IM Home page to return to the OWNSHIP AND WIND ENTRY page. All three 
data fields (airport, route, and winds) can be changed using the same procedure that was used for 
the initial data entry. 
Pressing the IM CLEARANCE bezel button or touch screen soft-key (R1) brings up the initial IM 
CLEARANCE ENTRY page (Figure 71). 
 
 
Figure 70. IM Home page with Ownship data entered.  
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B.5.3 IM Clearance Entry Page 
This section uses the CROSS clearance type as the example since it has the most data elements, is 
the most complex of the clearances implemented for this experiment, and is the clearance type 
used in all previous IM research at NASA Langley and Ames Research Centers. 
To minimize the probability of data entry error by the flight crew, whenever feasible, the IM 
clearance information is entered by the crew using a selectable list of options. Exceptions include 
the assigned spacing goal and time periods when the Target aircraft is outside ADS-B range of the 
IM aircraft. 
The left panel of Figure 71 illustrates the initial IM CLEARANCE ENTRY page, displayed when 
the flight crew presses the IM clearance bezel button or soft-key in Figure 70, but no clearance 
data has been entered yet. 
Pressing the CLEARANCE TYPE bezel button or soft-key (L1 on left panel of Figure 71) causes 
the clearance type sub-page to be displayed (right panel of Figure 71). The clearance types are 
listed in alphabetical order from top to bottom, and any type that has been implemented is shown 
in grey, while those not implemented are shown in cyan (non-selectable). Pressing the appropriate 
bezel button or soft-key (L2 for CROSS clearance in this example) causes a page to appear that 
displays only those data elements relative to that clearance type (Figure 72). 
 
          
Figure 71. Initial IM clearance entry page and IM clearance type sub-page. 
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The left panel of Figure 72 illustrates the required data elements for the IM CROSS clearance type, 
shown top to bottom in the order that the controller is expected to issue the clearance. The 
Achieve-By and Terminate At soft-keys auto-populate with the Ownship’s final approach fix 
waypoint. 
Pressing the ARM IM HOME bezel button or soft-key (R1 in the right panel of Figure 72) returns 
the display to the IM Home page. If the clearance is fully input, then the IM software will also 
transition to the ARMED state (Figure 73). 
 
          
Figure 72. IM CROSS clearance page with and without data entered. 
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Figure 73 illustrates the IM Home page with both Ownship and IM clearance information 
displayed, and the software has transitioned from the OFF to the ARMED state. A CANCEL IM 
function at (L8) in gray is now visible and selectable, while an EXECUTE function is visible at 
(R8) in cyan, but not selectable (turns white in the AVAILABLE state). Up to three status 
messages, listed by priority, may appear immediately below the IM state. 
 
 
Figure 73. IM Home page with all data entered. 
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B.6 IM Displays in DTS and IFD 
The previous sub-section of this Appendix used pictures of the software-based EFB and CGD 
generated by the ASTOR simulator. This sub-section of the Appendix provides graphics generated 
by the DTS and IFD simulators which use hardware-based EFBs. The bezel buttons, while not 
depicted, function and are located identically to the ASTOR EFB. 
Two Astronautics EFBs for both the DTS and IFD were positioned on three-axis rotating mounts 
next to each pilot and co-pilot station, allowing rotation from portrait to landscape mode. The DTS 
used a software emulated CGD located next to the navigation display, while the IFD used a 
hardware-based CGD. 
Shown in Figure 74 is an example of an IM CROSS clearance display in the DTS and IFD, similar 
to Figure 72 for the ASTOR. 
 
 
Figure 74. IM CROSS clearance page in DTS and IFD. 
  
Appendix B: IM States and Transitions 157 
Shown in Figure 75 is an example of an IM CAPTURE and an IM MAINTAIN clearance display 
in the DTS and IFD. 
 
          
Figure 75. IM CAPTURE and MAINTAIN clearance pages in DTS and IFD. 
 
 
 
Figure 76 illustrates the ARMED and AVAILABLE states in the DTS and IFD, and Figure 77 
illustrates the PAIRED and the SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE states in the DTS and IFD. 
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Figure 76. ARMED and AVAILABLE states in the DTS and IFD. 
 
          
Figure 77. PAIRED and SUSPENDED-AVAILABLE states in the DTS and IFD.
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Figure 78 illustrates the confirm cancellation page in the DTS and IFD, similar to Figure 65 for 
the ASTORs. 
 
 
Figure 78. The confirm cancel message in the DTS and IFD. 
 
Figure 79 illustrates the CGD as displayed in the DTS and IFD in the AVAILABLE state (Figure 
57 for the ASTORs) and PAIRED state (Figure 62 for the ASTORs). 
 
       
Figure 79. The CGD showing AVAILABLE and PAIRED in the DTS and IFD.
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Appendix C: Procedures and Phraseology for IM Operations 
C.1 Pilot Procedures for IM Operations 
C.1.1 Nominal IM Procedures 
During nominal current-day and IM operations, the flight crews were instructed to 1) achieve and 
maintain the assigned lateral and vertical path, 2) achieve and maintain the appropriate airspeed, 
and 3) achieve and maintain the proper spacing. 
1) The procedures to achieve and maintain the proper vertical path were: 
• Verify VNAV speed is the active mode; 
• Ensure aircraft starts a descent at Top of Descent (TOD) Point; 
• Use drag and thrust as necessary to maintain vertical path within ±400 feet; and 
• Monitor the aircraft to ensure it stays on path and all restrictions are met. 
 
2) The procedures to achieve and maintain the proper airspeed were: 
• Observe and announce IM Speed changes and mode changes on CGD/EFB; 
• Determine if airspeed is safe and acceptable for current conditions 
o If not, see “Other IM Flight Crew Procedures” section below for action 
• Set IM commanded speed in speed window on MCP;  
o Note: speed changes are highlighted for 10 seconds, then flash if not set in MCP 
• Maintain ±10 knots of IM instantaneous speed during speed changes; 
• Configure aircraft as necessary to maintain IM commanded speed. 
NOTE: The IM spacing algorithm is designed to comply with all procedural constraints (e.g., 250 
knots or less when at or below 10,000’ MSL), and the flight crew is responsible for determining 
that the IM speed is operationally acceptable for the current flight conditions. If those two criteria 
are met, the priority of what speed the crew should fly is: 
1. Controller-assigned airspeed 
2. IM assigned airspeed 
3. Published procedure airspeed 
4. Airline standard operating procedure airspeed 
Note: The FAST/SLOW indicator can be used as a secondary display for deceleration or 
acceleration rate guidance. This display is particularly important when close to the ABP. 
 
3) The procedures to achieve or maintain the proper spacing were: 
• Ensure no alert messages on EFB or CGD (See Appendix A.4.4 for messages); 
• Notify ATC when initially spacing behind Target aircraft; 
• Notify each new ATC check in with “Paired with”; and 
• Notify ATC if no longer IM spacing. 
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C.1.2 Off-Nominal IM Procedures 
1) The controller amends the ASG:  
• Press IM GOAL and enter the new value into the system; 
• The other pilot confirms the new value has been correctly entered;  
• Assess the new IM commanded speed for acceptability; and 
• If acceptable, notify ATC of PAIRED status and IM speed; or 
• If unacceptable or infeasible, notify ATC unable to conduct IM operation. 
 
2) The controller suspends, resumes, or cancels the IM operation: 
• Press the SUSPEND, RESUME or CANCEL button (Figure 52) as appropriate; and  
• Notify ATC of new status (for example, RESUME with IM speed). 
Note: If the controller suspends or cancels the IM operation, that instruction should also include 
either clearance to resume the arrival procedure as published, or a specific heading and speed for 
the flight crew to fly. 
 
3) The flight crew must suspend or cancel the IM operation: 
• Continue to fly current airspeed and notify ATC; and 
• Comply with ATC instructions. 
Note: The ATC response can range from “advise when able to resume spacing” to “cancel IM and 
resume the published approach.” 
NOTE: When an IM operation is canceled or suspended, the IM commanded speed is removed 
from the cockpit displays. In this situation, the priority of what speed the crew should fly is: 
1. Controller-assigned airspeed 
2. Last valid IM airspeed 
3. Published procedure airspeed 
4. Airline standard operating procedure airspeed 
 
C.2 Controller – Pilot Phraseology for IM Operations 
This Appendix contains examples of the phraseology used during IMAC to conduct IM operations. 
The controllers and pilots in this experiment were trained and instructed to use their judgment 
whether to use the Target’s call sign, i.e., Southwest3033, or to use the phonetic pronunciation, 
i.e., Sierra Whiskey Alpha three zero three three. The alpha-numeric format, i.e., S-W-A-3-0-3-3, 
was not part of the training for IM phraseology, however some controllers and pilots did 
occasionally use it. 
Whenever an aircraft call sign (for example SWA3033) is shown in this document, it should be 
understood that the controllers and pilots verbally said Southwest3033 or Sierra Whiskey Alpha 
three zero three three. 
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C.2.1 Preparatory Call 
Controllers were instructed to issue a preparatory call to the flight crew prior to issuing the IM 
clearance to ensure the crew was prepared and could write down the IM instruction. 
ATC: (Call sign), CLEARANCE AVAILABLE, ADVISE WHEN READY TO COPY. 
Crew: (Call sign) READY TO COPY. 
C.2.2 IM Clearance Instruction 
An example of a controller-issued IM CROSS clearance in which the PTP is not specified, 
therefore the IM software sets the PTP to a default of the FAF (in this example FRONZ is both the 
ABP and PTP). 
ATC: (Call sign), FOR INTERVAL SPACING, CROSS FRONZ 120 SECONDS BEHIND 
SWA3033 ON THE ANCHR2 ARRIVAL. 
 
An example of a controller-issued IM CROSS clearance in which the ABP and PTP are not the 
same, and therefore the controller does need to issue them both. 
ATC: (Call sign), FOR INTERVAL SPACING, CROSS CTFSH 120 SECONDS BEHIND 
November Alpha Sierra Alpha zero niner ON THE ANCHR2 ARRIVAL, TERMIANTE 
AT DOGGG. REPORT PAIRED. 
 
An example of a controller-issued IM CAPTURE clearance. 
ATC: (Call sign), FOR INTERVAL SPACING, CAPTURE 120 SECONDS BEHIND 
SWA3033. REPORT PAIRED. 
 
An example of a controller-issued IM maintain clearance is: 
ATC: (Call sign), FOR INTERVAL SPACING, MAINTAIN CURRENT TIME BEHIND 
SWA3033. REPORT PAIRED. 
C.2.3 IM Operation Commencing 
The flight crew will notify the controller when commencing the IM operation and will include the 
initial IM speed. The controller will update the aircraft data tag as described in Section 2. 
Crew: (Call sign), NASA06 PAIRED BEHIND United254. AIRSPEED IS 290 KNOTS.  
ATC: (Call sign) ROGER. 
C.2.4 Amendment to IM Clearance 
Any field of the IM clearance can be modified except for the Target call sign. Shown here is a 
change to the ASG from 120 seconds in the previous sub-section to 115 seconds. 
ATC: (Call sign), AMENDMENT TO YOUR CLEARANCE. ADVISE WHEN READY TO 
COPY.  
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Crew: (Call sign) READY TO COPY. 
ATC: (Call sign), SPACE 115 SECONDS BEHIND Sierra Whiskey Alpha three zero three 
three. 
Crew: (Call sign), SPACE 115 SECONDS BEHIND Sierra Whiskey Alpha three zero three 
three. 
C.2.5 Suspending the IM Operation 
ATC: (Call sign), SUSPEND INTERVAL SPACING, SLOW TO two-three-zero KNOTS. 
Crew: (Call sign), SUSPEND INTERVAL SPACING, SLOW TO two-three-zero KNOTS. 
C.2.6 Resuming the IM Operation 
ATC: (Call sign), RESUME INTERVAL SPACING BEHIND Delta six-two-two. REPORT 
PAIRED. 
Crew: (Call sign), RESUME INTERVAL SPACING BEHIND Delta six-two-two. REPORT 
PAIRED. 
C.2.7 Cancelling the IM Operation 
The IM operation can be canceled by the controller or the flight crew. In this example, the flight 
crew notifies the controller the IM operation has been suspended due to the Target aircraft no 
longer being on the expected trajectory, and the controller elects to terminate the IM operation. 
Once the controller determines that the IM operation will be canceled without the expectation of 
allowing the aircraft to pair at a later time, the keyboard command “FI” is entered. This removes 
all IM indicators from the data-tag, and the flight is now controlled as a non-IM operation. 
Crew: (Call sign), INTERVAL SPACING SUSPENDED, TARGET OFF PATH. 
ATC: (Call sign), CANCEL INTERVAL SPACING, MAINTAIN two-one-zero KNOTS. 
Crew: (Call sign), CANCEL INTERVAL SPACING, MAINTAIN two-one-zero KNOTS. 
 
C.2.8 Check-in with subsequent controllers 
Not all controllers have IM information available on their workstations, and therefore until it is 
available, the ATD-1 ConOps instructs the flight crew to append the IM information to the initial 
check-in with each subsequent controller. 
Crew: (Call sign) LEAVING one-niner thousand, DESCENDING VIA THE TELLR2 
ARRIVAL, PAIRED BEHIND Delta Alpha Lima one-two-eight. 
ATC: (Call sign), ROGER. 
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Appendix D: Airlines Operating into Denver International Airport 
Based on the KDEN site visit, Table 41 is a list of some of the airlines that operate into KDEN and 
their corresponding ID (or data tag) and voice call sign. 
Table 41. Airline IDs and Call Signs Used in IMAC 
ID Call sign Airline 
AAL American American Airlines 
ACA Air Canada Air Canada 
ANZ New Zealand Air New Zealand 
ASA Alaska Alaska Airlines 
ASQ Acey Express Jet 
ASH Air Shuttle Mesa 
BAW Speed Bird British Airways 
CHQ Chautauqua Chautauqua 
DAL Delta Delta 
DLH Lufthansa Lufthansa 
EJM Jet Speed Executive Jet Management 
FDX FedEx FedEx 
FFT Frontier Frontier 
GJS Lindbergh GoJet Airlines 
GLA Lakes Air Great Lakes 
JBU JetBlue JetBlue 
LOF Water Ski Trans States Airlines 
LYM Key Lime Key Lime Air 
NKS Spirit Wings Spirit Airlines 
RPA Brickyard Republic 
SKW Skywest SkyWest 
SWA Southwest Southwest 
TCF Mercury Shuttle America 
UAL United United 
UPS UPS United Parcel 
VIR Virgin Virgin Atlantic 
WJA West Jet West Jet 
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Appendix E: Questionnaires 
E.1 Controller Background Questionnaire 
1. Controller ID:      
 
2. What is your current age? 
 
3. Did you work en route ATC? 
 
4. [If answered ‘Yes’ to en route] Please list the facilities where you worked en route and 
the number of years at each. 
 
5. Did you work TRACON? 
 
6. [If answered ‘Yes’ to TRACON] Please list the facilities where you worked TRACON, 
the number of years at each, and the position(s) held. 
 
7. Did you work Tower? 
 
8. [If answered ‘Yes’ to Tower] Please list the facilities where you worked Tower and 
the number of years at each. 
 
9. On what date (MM/YYYY) did you retire? 
 
10. What qualifications have you held? 
Please choose all that apply: 
  Certified Professional Controller (CPC) 
  Front Line Manager (FLM) 
  Staff Specialist 
  Traffic Management Coordinator (TMC) 
  Other:      
 
11. Describe your experience and currency with RNAV arrivals. 
 
12. Describe your experience and currency with RNP approaches. 
 
13. Describe your experience with any previous IM experiments and please provide the 
dates and locations. 
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E.2 Pilot Background Questionnaire 
1. Pilot ID:      
 
2. What is your current age? 
 
3. With which airline do you have the most experience? 
 
4. How many years of military/commercial flight experience do you have? 
 
5. How many hours of commercial, multi-engine flight experience do you have? 
 
6. What type(s) of aircraft have you flown? 
 
7. On what date (MM/YYYY) did you most recently fly a commercial aircraft? 
 
8. What qualifications have you held (instructor, standards captain, etc.)? 
 
9. Describe your experience and currency with RNAV arrivals. 
 
10. Describe your experience and currency with RNP approaches. 
 
11. Describe your experience with any previous IM experiments and please provide the 
dates and locations. 
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E.3 Controller Post-Run Questionnaire 
 
1. Controller ID:    
 
2. Please select the scenario you just completed from the list below: 
M6 
Scenario A 
Scenario B 
Scenario C 
Scenario D 
Scenario E 
Scenario F 
Scenario G 
Scenario H 
Scenario I 
Scenario J 
 
3. Which position did you work in this scenario? 
Center North 
Center South 
Feeder 
Final 
 
4. [TLX 1] How mentally demanding was the scenario? 
 
Very 
Low      
Very 
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. [TLX 2] How physically demanding was the scenario? 
 
Very 
Low      
Very 
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
6. [TLX 3] How hurried or rushed was the pace of the scenario? 
 
Very 
Low      
Very 
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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7. [TLX 4] How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance? 
 
Very 
Low      
Very 
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. [TLX 5] How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you? 
 
Very 
Low      
Very 
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. [TLX 6] How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do? 
 
Good      Poor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
** For controller post-run questions #11 through #16, the italicized number in square brackets (not 
shown on survey to controllers) is the number associated with the rating shown in Figure 31. ** 
 
10. [CARS 1] Was the system safe in this last run? 
Yes 
No   
 
11. [CARS 2] [If controller responded ‘Yes’ to CARS 1] Did the system function 
adequately, so that you had a tolerable workload? 
Yes 
No          [1] 
 
12. [CARS 3] [If controller responded ‘No’ to CARS 2] Given that you think the 
system’s performance was not adequate, were the operations controllable? 
Barely controllable, needs extreme amounts of controller compensation [2] 
Marginally controllable, needs considerable controller compensation [3] 
Controllable, needs some controller compensation    [4] 
 
13. [CARS 4] [If controller responded ‘Yes’ to CARS 2] Is the system here satisfactory 
without improvement? 
Yes 
No 
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14. [CARS 5] [If controller responded ‘No’ to CARS 4] How much did you have to 
compensate for the system to make the operations work? (In these situations “compensate” 
means how much did you have to work to counterbalance or offset less desirable actions 
from the system?) 
Extensive compensation required to maintain adequate performance [5] 
Considerable compensation required to achieve adequate performance [6] 
Moderate compensation required to maintain adequate performance [7] 
 
15. [CARS 6] [If controller responded ‘Yes’ to CARS 4] How close to a desired level of 
performance was the system in this scenario? 
Moderate controller compensation needed to reach desired performance [8] 
Minimal controller compensation required to reach desired performance [9] 
Desired ATC system performance with no controller correction  [10] 
 
16. [CARS 7] [If controller responded ‘No’ to CARS 1] Please describe any events you 
saw in the last run that were unsafe. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. To what degree did you modify your technique in order to use the CMS tools? 
 
Not at all   Moderately   Completely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on how and why you modified your technique: [mandatory if rated 4-7] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. To what degree did you modify your technique in order to use the IM tools? 
 
Not 
at all   Moderately   Completely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on how and why you modified your technique: [mandatory if rated 4-7] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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19. Did you have to change the way you worked to manage the IM aircraft? 
 
Please choose all that apply: 
 
  Changed my general scan of the IM aircraft (compared with non-IM aircraft) 
  Changed the way I monitored separation of the IM aircraft (compared with non-IM 
aircraft) 
  Changed the way I monitored the IM aircraft spacing (compared with non-IM aircraft) 
  Issued different types of clearances to the IM aircraft (compared with non-IM aircraft) 
  Issued more clearances to the IM aircraft (compared with non-IM aircraft) 
  Less voice communication with the IM aircraft, including speed instructions or vectors 
(compared with non-IM aircraft) 
  More voice communication with the IM aircraft, including speed instructions or vectors 
(compared with non-IM aircraft) 
  Changed the way I coordinated with other controllers (compared with non-IM aircraft) 
  Considered different types of solutions to IM aircraft problems (compared with non-IM 
aircraft) 
  Other (If none, comment “None”):       
 
Please comment on your choice here: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Please rate the acceptability of the speeds flown by the IM aircraft. 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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21. Did you issue any of the clearance types listed below? Please note the aircraft call 
sign (if able) as well as where and why you took this action in the box on the right. 
 
Please choose all that apply and provide a comment: [mandatory comment for each chosen] 
 
  Suspended IM spacing       
  Resumed IM spacing       
  Canceled IM spacing       
  Decided not to issue a IM clearance       
  Aircraft never paired ______________________________ 
  Other (If none, comment “None”)        
 
22. [If Center] Were there any issues with the IM clearance phraseology? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if “Yes”] 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
23. [If Center] What type of third party ID was used to issue the IM clearance? Please 
note the aircraft call sign (if able) and describe any issue(s) in the box on the right. 
 
Please choose all that apply and provide a comment: [mandatory comment for each chosen] 
 
  Call sign (e.g., Brickyard 123)        
  Alpha-numeric (e.g., R P A 123)        
  Phonetic (e.g., Romeo Papa Alpha 123)       
  Other:            
 
Please describe any issues with the IM clearance phraseology here: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Describe any unusual or unexpected event(s). Please include time, location, and 
aircraft call signs if able. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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E.4 Pilot Post-Run Questionnaire 
1. Pilot ID:      
 
2. Please select the scenario you just completed: 
M6 
Scenario A 
Scenario B 
Scenario C 
Scenario D 
Scenario E 
Scenario F 
Scenario G 
Scenario H 
Scenario I 
Scenario J 
 
3. Please select your position during the scenario: 
Captain 
First Officer 
 
4. Please select your role during the scenario: 
Pilot Flying 
Pilot Monitoring 
 
5. [MCH 1] Even though errors may be large or frequent, can instructed task be 
accomplished most of the time? 
Yes 
No 
 
6. [MCH 2] [If pilot responded ‘Yes’ to MCH 1] Are errors small and inconsequential? 
Yes 
No 
 
7. [MCH 3] [If pilot responded ‘No’ to MCH 2] Given that major deficiencies exist and 
system redesign is strongly recommended, please choose one of the following ratings: 
Major difficulty / maximum operator mental effort is required to bring errors to moderate 
level 
 
Major difficulty / maximum operator mental effort is required to avoid large or numerous 
errors 
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Major difficulty / intense operator mental effort is required to accomplish task, but 
frequent or numerous errors persist 
 
 
8. [MCH 4] [If pilot responded ‘Yes’ to MCH 2] Is mental workload level acceptable? 
Yes 
No 
 
9. [MCH 5] [If pilot responded ‘No’ to MCH 4] Given that mental workload is high 
and should be reduced, please choose one of the following ratings: 
Minor but annoying difficulty / moderately high operator mental effort is required to 
attain adequate system performance 
 
Moderately objectionable difficulty / high operator mental effort is required to attain 
adequate system performance 
 
Very objectionable but tolerable difficulty / maximum operator mental effort is required 
to attain adequate system performance 
 
10. [MCH 6] [If pilot responded ‘Yes’ to MCH 4] Given that mental workload level was 
acceptable, please choose from one of the following: 
Very easy / highly desirable / operator mental effort is minimal and desired performance 
is easily attainable 
 
Easy, desirable / operator mental effort is low and desired performance is attainable 
 
Fair, mild difficulty / acceptable operator mental effort is required to attain adequate 
system performance 
 
11. [Acceptability] Please rate the overall acceptability of IM during the scenario you 
just completed. 
 
 Completely Completely 
 Unacceptable Acceptable 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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12. Please rate the acceptability of IM during each segment of flight during the scenario 
you just completed. 
 
 Completely 
Unacceptable    
Completely 
Acceptable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
> 18,000 ft. (cruise, initial descent) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
18,000-11,000 (descent, approach 
check) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
11,000-6,000 (TRACON, low 
altitude merge) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Please rate the acceptability of the use of voice communications to provide the IM 
clearance(s) during the scenario you just completed. 
 
 Completely Completely 
 Unacceptable Acceptable 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Please rate the overall effectiveness with which relevant information, including 
operational plans, decisions, and changes in aircraft state were communicated between 
yourself and your crew member. 
 
 Completely Completely 
 Ineffective Effective 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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15. Please rate the operational acceptability of the IM commanded speeds. 
 
 Completely Completely 
 Unacceptable Acceptable 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Please rate the acceptability of the frequency of IM speed changes. 
 
 Completely Completely 
 Unacceptable Acceptable 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Please rate the acceptability of the amount of head down time required of the Pilot 
Monitoring to input information from the IM clearance(s) into the EFB. 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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18. Please rate the acceptability of the IM procedures for the events in this scenario. 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Please rate the completeness of the IM procedures for the events in this scenario. 
 
Not at all 
complete   
Somewhat 
complete   
Very 
complete 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Were there any missing steps in the IM procedures? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if Yes] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Did the IM procedures contain extra steps that were unnecessary? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if Yes] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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22. Were the IM procedural steps logical and easy to follow? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if No] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Did you take any of the actions listed below? Please note where and when (if able), 
as well as why you took this action in the box on the right. 
 
Please choose all that apply and provide a comment: [mandatory comment for each chosen] 
 
  Suspended IM spacing       
  Resumed IM spacing       
  Canceled IM spacing       
  Aircraft never paired ______________________________ 
  Other (If none, comment “None”)        
 
24. Were there any issues with the IM phraseology? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if Yes] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. What type of third party ID was used to issue the IM clearance? Please note the 
aircraft call sign (if able) and describe any issues in the box on the right. 
 
  Call sign (e.g., Brickyard 123)       
  Alpha-numeric (e.g., R P A 123)       
  Phonetic (e.g., Romeo Papa Alpha 123)       
  Other           
 
Please describe any issues with the IM clearance phraseology here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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26. Were there any issues with using a touch-screen device during this scenario? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if Yes] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. Describe any unusual or unexpected events. Please include time, location, and 
aircraft call signs if able. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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E.5 Controller Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
1. Controller ID:    
 
2. Which position did you work during the simulation? 
Center North 
Center South 
Feeder 
Final 
 
3. Describe any anomalies or inconsistencies in the simulation that affected your 
performance. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Please rate how well the training prepared you to use the following: 
 
 
Not At 
All 
Prepared 
  
Moderately 
Prepared 
 
 Very 
Prepared
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
simulator ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
airspace ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
metering concept ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
CMS tools ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM operation ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
phraseology ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
5. Please describe how the academic and hands-on training can be improved. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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6. Please rate the operational acceptability of the procedures for using the CMS tools. 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Please rate the operational acceptability of the procedures for IM operations. 
 
 Completely Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CAPTURE clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
CROSS clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
MAINTAIN clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Please rate the impact of the addition of IM operations on expediting the traffic flow 
during this simulation. 
 
Much Less 
Expeditious   
No 
Impact   
Much More 
Expeditious
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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9. When IM aircraft were in your sector, how acceptable was it for you to be 
responsible for maintaining safe / standard separation between these aircraft, while the 
flight crew was managing the spacing on a CAPTURE clearance. 
 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable
  
Moderately 
Acceptable 
 
 Completely 
Acceptable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind IM aircraft on the 
same route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a IM aircraft on a 
different route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a CMS aircraft on 
the same route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a CMS aircraft on 
a different route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choices here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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When IM aircraft were in your sector, how acceptable was it for you to be responsible for 
maintaining safe / standard separation between these aircraft, while the flight crew was 
managing the spacing on a CROSS clearance. 
 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable
  
Moderately 
Acceptable 
 
 Completely 
Acceptable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind IM aircraft on the 
same route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a IM aircraft on a 
different route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a CMS aircraft on 
the same route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a CMS aircraft on 
a different route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choices here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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When IM aircraft were in your sector, how acceptable was it for you to be responsible 
for maintaining safe / standard separation between these aircraft, while the flight crew 
was managing the spacing on a MAINTAIN clearance. 
 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable
  
Moderately 
Acceptable 
 
 Completely 
Acceptable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind IM aircraft on the 
same route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a IM aircraft on a 
different route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a CMS aircraft on 
the same route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM aircraft spacing 
behind a CMS aircraft on 
a different route 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choices here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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10. [If Center] How useful were the controller tools for managing the aircraft?  
 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Not useful 
at all 
(ignored) 
 Somewhat useful  
Very useful 
(essential) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Delay in the meter list ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Delay countdown timer ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM designators ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Runway identifier ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM-specific meter list information ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
All-aircraft meter list information ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choices here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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11. [If Feeder or Final] How useful were the CMS tools for managing the aircraft?  
 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Not useful 
at all 
(ignored) 
 Somewhat useful  
Very useful 
(essential) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Speed advisories ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Slot markers ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Early/late indicators ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Delay countdown timer ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Timelines ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM designators ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Spacing cones (bats) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choices here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Describe any changes you would make to the IM operation. If appropriate, please 
comment on the IM and Target aircraft being in-trail vs. on merging routes, the delay 
between the issuance of the IM clearance and the initiation of the IM operation, etc. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. What changes would you make to the displays for the IM aircraft? What additional 
information (if any) would you like with respect to the IM aircraft and how would you like 
it displayed? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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14. What information (if any) would you like available with respect to the Target 
aircraft and how would you like it displayed? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
15. Please rate the operational acceptability of the IM phraseology used during the 
simulation. 
 
 
Not at all 
clear 
 
Moderately 
clear 
 
Very 
clear 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
CAPTURE clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
CROSS clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
MAINTAIN clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Reporting “IM paired” ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Check in with TRACON ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Amendments to IM 
clearance 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM clearance suspension ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM clearance resumption ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM engagement status 
reporting “Unable” 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choices here: [mandatory comment if any ratings of 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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16. Did you experience any confusion due to the use of the Target aircraft’s call sign in 
the IM clearance? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please comment on your choice here and indicate what type of third party ID was used: 
[mandatory comment if Yes] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Please rate the operational acceptability of using the Target aircraft’s call sign in 
the IM clearance. 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rating 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Describe any suggestions to improve the clarity and/or completeness of the IM 
clearance phraseology. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Describe the challenges (if any) you perceive to the operational implementation of 
IM operations. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
20.  In order to issue an IM clearance in the TRACON, what information would you 
need and how would you like it displayed? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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21. Of the IM clearances and operations you experienced in this experiment 
(CAPTURE, CROSS, MAINTAIN), which one do you believe is the most useful, and when 
would you use it? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
22. Of the IM clearances and operations you experienced in this experiment 
(CAPTURE, CROSS, MAINTAIN), which one do you believe is the least useful, and why?  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
23. Do you have any additional comments about the experiment? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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E.6 Pilot Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
1. Pilot ID:     
 
2. Describe any anomalies or inconsistencies in the simulation that affected your 
performance. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Was the workload required to operate the simulator much less than, the same as, or 
greater than the workload required to fly an actual aircraft? 
 
 Much More 
Moderately 
More 
Slightly 
More 
The 
Same 
Slightly 
Less 
Moderately 
Less 
Much 
Less 
Workload 
Required 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Please rate how well the training prepared you to fly the simulator. 
 
Not At 
All 
Prepared 
  
Moderately 
Prepared 
 
 Very 
Prepared 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please describe how simulator training can be improved: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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5. Please rate how well the training prepared you to enter information into and 
interpret the information presented on the EFB. 
 
Not At 
All 
Prepared 
  
Moderately 
Prepared 
 
 Very 
Prepared 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please describe how EFB training can be improved: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
6. Please rate how well the training prepared you to interpret the information 
presented on the CGD in the forward field of view. 
 
Not At 
All 
Prepared 
  
Moderately 
Prepared 
 
 Very 
Prepared 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please describe how CGD training can be improved: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Please rate how well the training prepared you to conduct an IM operation. 
 
Not At 
All 
Prepared 
  
Moderately 
Prepared 
 
 Very 
Prepared 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please describe how IM operations training can be improved: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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8. Please rate the operational acceptability of the procedures for IM operations. 
 
 Completely Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CAPTURE clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
CROSS clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
MAINTAIN clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9. Please rate the overall acceptability of the IM procedures. 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Please rate the impact of conducting an IM operation on your overall situational 
awareness during the arrival operations. 
 
Severely 
Degraded 
Situational 
Awareness 
  No Impact   
Greatly 
Improved 
Situational 
Awareness
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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11. How acceptable was it for you to be responsible for achieving the assigned spacing 
interval while the controller retained responsibility for the separation of aircraft? 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Did following the IM commanded speed ever cause unexpected or undesired 
behavior? 
Yes 
No 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if Yes] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Describe any changes you would make to the IM operation. If appropriate, please 
comment on the IM and Target aircraft being in-trail vs. on merging routes, the delay 
between the issuance of the IM clearance and the initiation of the IM operation, etc. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Please rate the intuitiveness of entering IM clearance information into the EFB. 
  
Completely 
Unintuitive      
Completely 
Intuitive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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15. Please rate the usefulness of the following elements on the EFB display. 
 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Not useful 
at all 
(ignored) 
 Somewhat useful  
Very useful 
(essential) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IM commanded speed ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM status (i.e., ARMED, 
SUSPENDED, PAIRED) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM messages ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
FAST/SLOW indicator ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
EARLY/LATE indicator ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
What changes would you make to the above display elements? [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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16. Please rate the usefulness of the following elements on the EFB display. 
 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Not useful 
at all (ignored)  
Somewhat 
useful  
Very useful 
(essential)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
Altitude filter ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Bearing and Range ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Target Route ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Merge Point / Way Point ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Target Ground Speed and Track  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Terminate Point  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ownship Route  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
What changes would you make to the above display elements? [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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17. Please rate the usefulness of the following elements on the CGD display (forward 
field of view). 
 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Not useful 
at all 
(ignored) 
 Somewhat useful  
Very useful 
(essential) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Target aircraft call sign ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM commanded speed ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM status (i.e., ARMED, 
SUSPENDED, PAIRED) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
IM messages ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
FAST/SLOW indicator ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
What changes would you make to the above display elements? [mandatory comment] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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18. Please rate the effectiveness of the CGD in providing adequate information to 
conduct an IM operation. 
Completely 
Ineffective      
Completely 
Effective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Please rate the operational acceptability of the IM phraseology used during the 
simulation. 
 
 
 Not at 
all clear 
 
Moderately 
clear 
 
Very 
clear  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
 CAPTURE clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 CROSS clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 MAINTAIN clearance ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 Reporting “IM paired” ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 Check in with TRACON ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 Amendments to IM 
clearance 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 IM clearance suspension ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 IM clearance resumption ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 IM engagement status 
reporting unable 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if any ratings of 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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20. Did you experience any confusion when hearing your aircraft call sign used as the 
Target aircraft in an IM clearance issued to another aircraft? 
Yes 
No 
Did not hear this occur 
 
What was the impact (if any) and how quickly was it resolved? [mandatory comment if Yes] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Please rate the operational acceptability of using the Target aircraft’s call sign in 
the IM clearance. 
 
Completely 
Unacceptable      
Completely 
Acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please comment on your choice here: [mandatory comment if rated 1-3] 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
22. Describe any suggestions to improve the clarity and/or completeness of the IM 
clearance phraseology. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. How difficult do you think it would be for a typical crew to learn and integrate the 
IM spacing procedures into their current daily operational flight procedures? 
 
Very 
Difficult 
Moderately 
Difficult 
Slightly 
Difficult Neutral 
Slightly 
Easy 
Moderately 
Easy 
Very 
Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
24. Describe the challenges (if any) you perceive to the operational implementation of 
IM operations. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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25. Of the IM clearances and operations you experienced in this experiment 
(CAPTURE, CROSS, MAINTAIN), which one do you believe is the most useful, and when 
would you use it?  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Of the IM clearances and operations you experienced in this experiment 
(CAPTURE, CROSS, MAINTAIN), which one do you believe is the least useful, and why?  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
27. Do you have any additional comments about the experiment? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix F: Questionnaire Results 
F.1 Controller Background Questionnaire Results 
Participating controllers had a mean age of 57.4 years, standard deviation = 1.9. Groups 1 and 3 
had similar mean ages (group 1: mean = 57.3, standard deviation = 2.5; group 3: mean = 57.5, 
standard deviation = 1.3). 
Fifty percent of the participating controllers had worked en route ATC, and they had an average 
of 24 years (standard deviation = 6.2) of experience at en route facilities. Five of the eight (62.5%) 
participating controllers had worked TRACON with a mean experience of 23.8 years (standard 
deviation = 9.4) at TRACON facilities. Five of the eight (62.5%) participating controllers had 
worked in a Tower facility for an average of 7.4 years (standard deviation = 6.1). 
All controller subjects were retired with an average of 67.3 months (5 years, 7.3 months) (standard 
deviation = 30.3 months, or 2 years, 6.3 months) since retirement. Mean retirement times of group 
1 and group 3 differed by 31.5 months (group 1: mean = 51.5, standard deviation = 35.4; group 3: 
mean = 83, standard deviation =14.7). 
All controllers were Certified Professional Controllers (CPC). Additionally, 25% of the controllers 
were Front Line Managers (FLM), and 25% of the controllers were Traffic Management 
Coordinators (TMC). One controller was a Staff Specialist, and one controller was a Controller-
in-Charge (CIC) and an on-the-job instructor. 
Seventy-five percent of controller subjects stated they used RNAV arrivals during their operational 
career. The remaining 25% had not used them operationally but had knowledge of RNAV arrivals 
and used them in instruction. Five of the eight (62.5%) controller subjects had little or no 
operational experience with RNP approaches. The remaining three controllers had operational and 
instructional experience with RNP approaches. Only one controller had participated in a previous 
IM experiment. 
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F.2 Pilot Background Questionnaire Results 
The 24 participating pilots had a mean age of 57.5 years (standard deviation = 7.1). Groups 1 and 
3 had similar mean ages (group 1: mean = 58.4, standard deviation = 8.3; group 3: mean = 56.5, 
standard deviation = 6.0). 
Fifty percent of pilots reported they had the most experience with United Airlines. The other 50% 
reported a variety of other air carriers. The mean military and commercial flight experience of both 
groups in years was 34.4, standard deviation = 9.0. Groups 1 and 3 had similar mean years of 
experience (group 1: mean = 33.6, standard deviation = 9.0; group 3: mean = 35.2, standard 
deviation = 9.4). The mean commercial, multi-engine flight experience was 17382.3 hours 
(standard deviation = 6346.42). The difference between groups 1 and 3 was not operationally 
significant (group 1: mean = 18575, standard deviation = 7315.9; group 3: mean = 16189.58, 
standard deviation = 5252.61). Participating pilots listed experience in a wide variety of aircraft, 
reporting between 3 and 21 different aircraft (median = 8). 
Ninety-two percent of participating pilots had flown a commercial aircraft within the previous 4 
years, and 75% had flown a commercial aircraft in the last two months. 66.7% of participating 
pilots reported experience as an instructor, and 50% reported experience as a standards captain or 
line check airman. 
All pilots reported high levels of experience and currency with RNAV arrivals. Multiple pilots 
described their experience with RNAV arrivals as “extensive” and many comments describe daily 
use. All pilots report training or experience with RNP approaches, but 41.6% reported infrequent 
use, as little or less than one real-world RNP approach per year. Fifty percent of pilots had 
participated in a previous IM experiment. 
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F.3 Controller Post-Run Questionnaire 
The controller post-run questionnaire was issued after each data collection run. Questions 1-3 were 
administrative and are not reported in this document. 
 
F.3.1 TLX Questions 
Questions 4-9 were adapted from the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) to assess controller workload 
using a 7 point Likert scale from “Very Low” to “Very High” for the Mental Demand, Physical 
Demand, Time Pressure, Effort, and Frustration subscales, and from “Good” to “Poor” for the 
Success subscale. These questions and the rating are defined in the ATD-1 Measures of 
Performance Specification (ref. 19). Response summaries, plots, and descriptive statistics can be 
found in the following pages, which provide additional detail for Section 5.6.2. 
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4.  [TLX 1] How mentally demanding was the scenario?  
Mean Mental Demand responses were all less than or equal to 2.5 (standard deviation ≤ 1.6). There 
were no responses above ‘5’ on the Mental Demand subscale. All but one response above ‘3’ were 
given by the same Center controller. The additional ‘5’ response was due to an aircraft slowing 
excessively in the BASELINE operation, which forced the Final controller to instruct the following 
aircraft to go around. 
Mi
xe
d
Ma
int
ain
Cr
os
s
Ca
pt
ur
e
Ba
se
lin
e
Fin
al
Fe
ed
er
Ce
nte
r
Fin
al
Fe
ed
er
Ce
nte
r
Fin
al
Fe
ed
er
Ce
nte
r
Fin
al
Fe
ed
er
Ce
nte
r
Fin
al
Fe
ed
er
Ce
nte
r
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
TL
X
 R
at
in
gs
 
Figure 80. Controller perception of mental demand by station by IM operation type. 
Table 42. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Perception of Mental Demand. 
Operation Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 
Center 8 1.9 1.4 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 2.3 0.5 2 2 3 
Final 4 2.3 1.9 1 1.5 5 
Total 16 2.1 1.3 1 2 5 
CAPTURE 
Center 8 2.6 1.6 1 2 5 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Total 16 2.3 1.3 1 2 5 
CROSS 
Center 8 2.1 1.4 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Total 16 2.1 1.1 1 2 4 
MAINTAIN 
Center 8 1.9 1.1 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 1.8 0.5 1 2 2 
Final 4 2.5 0.6 2 2.5 3 
Total 16 2.0 0.9 1 2 4 
MIXED 
Center 8 2.1 1.5 1 1.5 5 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Total 16 2.0 1.2 1 2 5 
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5.  [TLX 2] How physically demanding was the scenario? 
Physical Demand response means for all operations and positions were less than or equal to 2.0 
(standard deviation ≤ 1.2). All Physical Demand responses above ‘2’ were given by the same 
Center controller identified in question 4. Three ‘4’ responses were given. 
 
Figure 81. Controller perception of physical demand by station by IM operation type. 
Table 43. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Perception of Physical Demand. 
Operation Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 
Center 8 1.5 0.9 1 1 3 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.4 .7 1 1 3 
CAPTURE 
Center 8 2.0 1.1 1 2 4 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.6 0.9 1 1 3 
CROSS 
Center 8 2.0 1.1 1 2 4 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.6 0.9 1 1 4 
MAINTAIN 
Center 8 1.6 0.9 1 1 3 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Total 16 1.5 0.7 1 1 3 
MIXED 
Center 8 1.8 1.2 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.4 0.9 1 1 4 
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6.  [TLX 3] How hurried/rushed was the pace of the scenario? 
All means were less than or equal to 2.3 (standard deviation ≤ 1.3). All but 6 responses provided 
were less than or equal to ‘3’; those higher responses were again provided by the controller 
identified in questions 4 and 5. Nine ‘3’ responses were provided. 
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Figure 82. Controller perception of time pressure by station by IM operation type. 
Table 44. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Perception of Time Pressure. 
Operation Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 
Center 8 1.6 1.2 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Final 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Total 16 1.8 1.0 1 1 4 
CAPTURE 
Center 8 2.3 1.3 1 2 4 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Total 16 1.9 1.1 1 1.5 4 
CROSS 
Center 8 1.9 0.8 1 2 3 
Feeder 4 1.8 0.5 1 2 2 
Final 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Total 16 1.8 0.7 1 2 3 
MAINTAIN 
Center 8 1.8 1.2 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Total 16 1.6 0.9 1 1 4 
MIXED 
Center 8 2.0 1.3 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.7 1.1 1 1 4 
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7.  [TLX 4] How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance? 
The mean Effort response was 2.1, standard deviation = 1.1. All means were less than or equal to 
2.3 (standard deviation ≤ 1.4). One of the two ‘5’ responses and seven of the nine ‘4’ responses 
were from the same Center controller identified in questions 4-6. The other ‘5’ response was again 
due to the unexpected go around mentioned in question 4. 
 
Figure 83. Controller perception of effort by station by IM operation type. 
Table 45. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Perception of Effort. 
Operation Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 
Center 8 1.9 1.4 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 3.0 1.2 2 3 4 
Final 4 2.3 1.9 1 1.5 5 
Total 16 2.3 1.4 1 2 5 
CAPTURE 
Center 8 2.5 1.4 1 2 5 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Total 16 2.1 1.2 1 2 5 
CROSS 
Center 8 2.1 1.1 1 2 4 
Feeder 4 2.3 1.0 1 2.5 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Total 16 2.1 1.0 1 2 4 
MAINTAIN 
Center 8 1.9 1.1 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 2.8 0.5 2 3 3 
Final 4 2.0 0.8 1 2 3 
Total 16 2.1 1.0 1 1 4 
MIXED 
Center 8 2.0 1.3 1 1.5 4 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Total 16 1.9 1.1 1 1.5 4 
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8.  [TLX 5] How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you? 
All means were less than or equal to 2.0 (standard deviation ≤ 1.5). Two ‘4’ responses were given, 
one by the controller identified in previous questions in the CAPTURE operation, one by another 
controller in the MAINTAIN operation. 
 
 
Figure 84. Controller perception of frustration by station by IM operation type. 
Table 46. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Perception of Frustration. 
Operation Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 
Center 8 1.1 0.4 1 1 2 
Feeder 4 2.0 0.0 2 2 2 
Final 4 1.5 1.0 1 1 3 
Total 16 1.4 0.6 1 1 3 
CAPTURE 
Center 8 1.6 1.1 1 1 4 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.4 0.8 1 1 4 
CROSS 
Center 8 1.1 0.4 1 1 2 
Feeder 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.1 0.3 1 1 2 
MAINTAIN 
Center 8 1.1 0.4 1 1 2 
Feeder 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Final 4 1.8 1.5 1 1 4 
Total 16 1.3 0.8 1 1 4 
MIXED 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
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9.  [TLX 6] How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do? 
The mean Success response was 1.2, standard deviation = 0.6. All means were less than or equal 
to 2.3 (standard deviation ≤ 1.9). There was one ‘5’ response in the BASELINE condition, by the 
same Final controller mentioned in question 4, in response to the event where one aircraft slowed 
excessively on final forcing the following aircraft to go around. All other responses were less than 
or equal to ‘3’. 
 
 
Figure 85. Controller perception of success by station by IM operation type. 
Table 47. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Perception of Success. 
Operation Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.8 1.0 1 1.5 3 
Final 4 2.3 1.9 1 1.5 5 
Total 16 1.5 1.1 1 1 5 
CAPTURE 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.1 0.3 1 1 2 
CROSS 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.1 0.3 1 1 2 
MAINTAIN 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.5 0.6 1 1.5 2 
Final 4 1.5 1.0 1 1 3 
Total 16 1.3 0.6 1 1 3 
MIXED 
Center 8 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Feeder 4 1.3 0.5 1 1 2 
Final 4 1.0 0.0 1 1 1 
Total 16 1.1 0.3 1 1 2 
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F.3.2 CARS Questions 
Questions 10-16 used the Controller Acceptance Rating Scale (CARS) (ref. 21). A box plot of the 
CARS ratings is shown in Figure 86, and a summary of the controller post-run workload CARS 
ratings is shown in Table 48. 
   
Figure 86. Controller post-run acceptability (CARS) ratings by operation type. 
Table 48. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Acceptability Ratings. 
Operation Position N Mean SD Min Median Max 
BASELINE 
Center 8 9.1 0.6 8 9 10 
Feeder 4 8.5 0.6 8 8.5 9 
Final 4 8.5 0.6 8 8.5 9 
CAPTURE 
Center 8 9.1 0.6 8 9 10 
Feeder 4 8.8 0.5 8 9 9 
Final 4 9.0 0.0 9 9 9 
CROSS 
Center 8 9.1 0.6 8 9 10 
Feeder 4 8.5 0.6 8 8.5 9 
Final 4 8.8 0.5 8 9 9 
MAINTAIN 
Center 8 9.3 0.5 9 9 10 
Feeder 4 8.0 0.8 7 8 9 
Final 4 8.8 0.5 8 9 9 
MIXED 
Center 8 9.5 0.5 9 9.5 10 
Feeder 4 8.5 0.6 8 8.5 9 
Final 4 8.5 1.0 7 9 9 
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F.3.3 Additional Questions 
Questions 17 – 19 asked controllers about changes to technique to use the new tools. Question 20 
asked controllers about the acceptability of speeds flown by the IM aircraft.  
 
17. To what degree did you modify your technique in order to use the CMS tools? 
This question asked controllers to rate the degree they modified their technique to use the CMS 
tools on a scale from 1 – 7 where ‘1’ was “Not at all,” ‘4’ was “Moderately,” and ‘7’ was 
“Completely.” The mean rating was 1.5 (standard deviation = 0.7). 
 
 
Figure 87. Modification of controller technique to use CMS tools. 
 
18. To what degree did you modify your technique in order to use the IM tools? 
This question asked controllers to rate the degree they modified their technique to use the IM tools 
on a scale from 1 – 7 where ‘1’ was “Not at all,” ‘4’ was “Moderately,” and ‘7’ was “Completely.” 
The mean rating was 1.5 (standard deviation = 0.7). 
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Figure 88. Modification of controller technique to use IM tools. 
 
19. Did you have to change the way you worked to manage the IM aircraft? 
Table 49 displays the number of controllers of the 80 total respondents who chose each item. Of 
the 35 controllers who responded “Other” to question 19, 32 responded “None” or that no IM 
aircraft were in that scenario. Of the three other responses, two also responded yes to question 19 
item 7: “More voice communication with the IM aircraft, including speed instructions or vectors 
(compared with non-IM aircraft).” 
 
Table 49. Responses to How Controllers Changed Working with IM Aircraft. 
Response (compared with non-IM aircraft) N 
Changed my general scan of the IM aircraft 10 
Changed the way I monitored separation of the IM aircraft 10 
Changed the way I monitored the IM aircraft spacing 12 
Issued different types of clearances to the IM aircraft 10 
Issued more clearances to the IM aircraft 18 
Less voice communication with the IM aircraft, including speed instructions or vectors 8 
More voice communication with the IM aircraft, including speed instructions or vectors 17 
Changed the way I coordinated with other controllers 0 
Considered different types of solutions to IM aircraft problems 5 
Other (If none, comment “None”) 35 
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20. Please rate the acceptability of the speeds flown by the IM aircraft. 
This question asked controllers to rate the acceptability of the speeds flown by the IM aircraft on 
a scale from 1 - 7 where ‘1’ was “Completely Unacceptable” and ‘7’ was “Completely 
Acceptable.” The mean acceptability rating was 6.1 (standard deviation = 1.6). 
 
 
Figure 89. Pilot accept ability ratings of speeds flown by IM aircraft. 
 
21. Did you issue any of the clearance types listed below? 
 
Table 50 includes the number of controllers who used each clearance type.  
Of the five controllers who suspended an IM operation, two commented they did it by mistake and 
it was not needed.  
One of the two Resume clearances was a controller who suspended an aircraft after the pilot “said 
he needed to suspend,” and resumed IM when the pilot “said he could resume IM spacing.”  
Of the five Cancel clearance responses, two commended that the Cancel clearance was in response 
to incorrect application of the Maintain clearance. One controller commented “three aircraft had 
to be canceled,” another controller commented that an aircraft on downwind had to be canceled 
for excessive spacing, and another commented, “it was asking for a slower speed that the [aircraft] 
was unable to maintain.”  
There were no cases where a controller decided not to issue an IM clearance, but four of the 
controllers responded that the IM aircraft did not pair in their airspace. 
One response to the “Other” item was that the controller issued no IM clearances, while all other 
comments were “None.” 
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Table 50. Clearance Types Issued. 
Clearance N 
Suspended IM spacing 5 
Resumed IM spacing 2 
Canceled IM spacing 5 
Decided not to issue an IM clearance 0 
Aircraft never paired 4 
Other (If none, comment “None”) 65 
 
 
22. [If Center] Were there any issues with the IM clearance phraseology? 
Of the 40 Center controller responses, all but one controller responded “No.” The only controller 
who responded “Yes” commented that there were no issues. 
 
 
23. [If Center] What type of third party ID was used to issue the IM clearance? Please 
note the aircraft call sign (if able) and describe any issue(s) in the box on the right. 
Table 51 lists the types of third party call signs used to issue IM clearances. Note: the 25 
“Other” responses all either stated no IM clearance issued or “none.” See Table 33 in 
Section 5.8.4.4 for responses to the same question as reported by pilots. 
Table 51. Type of Third Party ID Used to Issue the IM Clearance. 
Third Party ID N 
Call sign (e.g., Brickyard 123) 18 
Alpha-numeric (e.g., R P A 123) 0 
Phonetic (e.g., Romeo Papa Alpha 123) 0 
Other 22 
 
 
24. Describe any unusual or unexpected event(s). 
Most comments were “none” or a phrase with the same meaning. One controller mentioned a 
situation with an aircraft that had to cancel IM, also mentioned in question 21, and another 
controller mentioned an aircraft out of parameters for a Maintain clearance.  
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F.4 Pilot Post-Run Questionnaire Results 
The controller post-run questionnaire was issued after each data collection run. Questions 1 – 4 
were administrative and are not reported in this document.  
 
F.4.1 Modified Cooper-Harper ratings 
Questions 5 – 10 were used to provide Modified Cooper-Harper (MCH) subjective workload 
ratings. The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.2, where these workload 
ratings are discussed. See Table 31 for a summary of these workload ratings by operation. 
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Figure 90. Flight crew perception of workload during BASELINE operation. 
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Figure 91. Flight crew perception of workload during CAPTURE operation. 
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Figure 92. Flight crew perception of workload during CROSS operation. 
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Figure 93. Flight crew perception of workload during MAINTAIN operation. 
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Figure 94. Flight crew perception of workload during MIXED operation. 
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F.4.2 Acceptability ratings 
Questions #11 - #18 asked the flight crew to respond to a range of acceptability issues. 
 
11. Please rate the overall acceptability of IM during the scenario you just completed. 
The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.1.1, where these acceptability 
ratings are discussed. Ratings were given on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ 
as “Completely Acceptable.” 
Most comments in response to this question included at least one of the following three concerns: 
• Speed commands were too frequent. 
• Speed commands required large control adjustments for compliance with the command 
itself or for altitude restriction compliance. 
• Speed commands were outside the performance capabilities of the aircraft. 
Selected comments: 
• “Was good until the turn to final. Received 4 speed reductions in about 30 seconds from 
180 to 140 - a speed below the aircraft's capability (final approach speed 144kts). The 
number of speed changes in rapid succession caused us to not set our missed approach 
altitude. This caused the aircraft to not leave 7000' at the FAF. The delay in starting down 
caused us to have a high sink rate approach down to 500'. The turn to final is a very bad 
place to have this distraction.” 
• “The IM speed changes above FL180 were a little too excessive. They are manageable 
from a pilot’s perspective, however the passenger comfort would be marginal due to the 
constant application of speed brakes and/or thrust changes.” 
• “Some speed reductions required full spoilers to make altitude restrictions.” 
• “Multiple speed changes in short period of time immediately after IM Pairing: in 1-2 
minutes had IM speed commands of 280-300-290-250.” 
• “IM speed changes were ignored around 9 mile final due to task prioritization in cockpit.” 
• “Approaching the FAF crew task loading gets fairly high. I failed to notice that the speed 
brakes were still deployed.” 
 
Figure 95. Flight crew acceptability of BASELINE operation. 
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Figure 96. Flight crew acceptability of CAPTURE operation. 
 
 
Figure 97. Flight crew acceptability of CROSS operation. 
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Figure 98. Flight crew acceptability of MAINTAIN operation. 
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Figure 99. Flight crew acceptability of MIXED operation. 
 
 
12. Please rate the acceptability of IM during each segment of flight during the scenario 
you just completed. 
The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.1.2, were given on a scale from 
‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ as “Completely Acceptable.” 
In the cruise and initial descent phases of flight (>18,000 feet), three pilots gave IM acceptability 
ratings of ‘1’, echoing concerns from question 11 about excessive speed command frequency and 
size. One pilot gave a rating of ‘2’, commenting on poor setup pre-IM. Two pilots gave ratings of 
‘3’, again echoing concerns from question 11 about excessive speed commands. Five pilots gave 
ratings of ‘4’. 
In the mid-level segment (18,000 – 11,000 feet), one pilot rated acceptability as ‘1’, commenting 
about large speed command changes in a CAPTURE scenario, from 230 to 290 to 240 knots within 
45 seconds. Five pilots gave ratings of ‘2’, all commenting on large speed reductions, which caused 
two pilots to overshoot altitude crossing restrictions. Seven pilots gave ratings of ‘3’, commenting 
about large and frequent changes in the commanded speed which, again, made descending to meet 
altitude restrictions in the mid-level segment difficult or impossible. Twelve pilots (7.3% of all 
mid-level segment responses) gave a rating of ‘4’. 
In the lower-level segment (Surface – 11,000’), overall, pilots reported excessive speed command 
changes which caused many pilots to change their configuration at undesirable points in the 
approach. Two pilots rated acceptability as ‘1’, commenting on “major speed changes” nearing the 
FAF. Five pilots rated acceptability as ‘2’, with most pilots again commenting on the excessive 
speed changes on final. One of those five pilots rated acceptability in the lower segment as a ‘2’ 
for confusion in communication with the feeder approach controller over the suspension of a 
clearance. Seventeen pilots (10.4% of all lower-level segment responses) gave a rating of ‘4’. 
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Table 52. Descriptive Statistics for Flight Crew Acceptability Ratings. 
Operation Altitude N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 
> 18,000’ 46 6.2 1.2 3 7 7 
11,000 – 18,000’ 46 5.9 1.5 1 7 7 
Surface – 11,000’ 46 6.0 1.5 1 6 7 
CROSS 
> 18,000’ 48 6.4 1.2 1 7 1 
11,000 – 18,000’ 48 6.3 1.0 3 7 7 
Surface – 11,000’ 48 5.8 1.3 2 6 7 
MAINTAIN 
> 18,000’ 42 6.1 1.5 1 7 7 
11,000 – 18,000’ 42 5.8 1.5 2 6 7 
Surface – 11,000’ 42 6.3 1.1 1 7 7 
MIXED 
> 18,000’ 48 6.7 0.6 5 7 7 
11,000 – 18,000’ 48 6.2 1.4 2 7 7 
Surface – 11,000’ 48 5.3 1.6 1 6 7 
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Figure 100. Flight crew acceptability of CAPTURE operation by phase of flight. 
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Figure 101. Flight crew acceptability of CROSS operation by phase of flight. 
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Figure 102. Flight crew acceptability of MAINTAIN operation by phase of flight. 
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Figure 103. Flight crew acceptability of MIXED operations by phase of flight. 
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13. Please rate the acceptability of the use of voice communications to provide the IM 
clearance(s) during the scenario you just completed. 
The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.4.5, where these acceptability 
ratings are discussed. Ratings were given on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ 
as “Completely Acceptable.” Eight pilots commented that data link communications would have 
helped avoid confusion and congestion in verbal communication. One pilot also commented, “Not 
all airline IDs are known to flight crews.” 
 
 
7654321
40
30
20
10
0
Pilot Acceptability Ratings
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
 
Figure 104. Flight crew acceptability of voice communication for BASELINE operation. 
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Figure 105. Flight crew acceptability of voice communication for CAPTURE operation. 
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Figure 106. Flight crew acceptability of voice communication for CROSS operation. 
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Figure 107. Flight crew acceptability of voice communication for MAINTAIN operation. 
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Figure 108. Flight crew acceptability of voice communication for MIXED scenario. 
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14. Please rate the overall effectiveness with which relevant information, including 
operational plans, decisions, and changes in aircraft state were communicated between 
yourself and your crew member. 
Figure 109 summarizes responses to question 14, given on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely 
Ineffective” to ‘7’ as “Completely effective.” Responses were consistent across all operations 
and most pilots reported no issues in cockpit communication, though one crew reported entering 
the wrong approach into the FMS and some crews were confused about specific speed 
assignments. 
 
 
Figure 109. Perceived flight crewmember communication effectiveness. 
 
 
15. Please rate the operational acceptability of the IM commanded speeds. 
The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.1.7, where these acceptability 
ratings are discussed. Ratings were given on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ 
as “Completely Acceptable.” Most pilots who gave ratings less than or equal to ‘3’ reported 
excessively large and frequent speed changes, which resulted in missed speed and altitude 
restrictions, undesirable and inefficient configuration changes, and speeds below the capabilities 
of the aircraft. In reference to the large and frequent speed command changes, one comment 
mentions, “We’d be slamming passengers around.” Pilots commented on frequent speed changes 
near the FAF as distracting and slow speeds further from the FAF as inefficient, requiring gear and 
flap extension. 
Selected comments: 
• “IM commanded a large speed reduction from 190 to 130 kts resulting in full configuration 
early. Then IM commanded a faster speed that did not require gear and full flaps. This 
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causes large fuel inefficiencies carrying more drag than necessary. Attempted to decelerate 
as slow as possible to mitigate this.” 
• “IM speeds were logical in hindsight but very little SA in real time.” 
• “I think the typical airline pilot would balk at such large speed changes approaching the 
FAF.” 
• “Received and IM speed reduction of 40 knots 4 miles prior to a hard altitude waypoint. It 
is challenging to meet both speed and altitude constraints in such a short distance.” 
• “Some of these were pretty significant in the initial descent phase, like we were chasing 
speeds.  Commanded speed changes prior to altitude constraints were incompatible with 
VNAV use, had to resort to V/S or FLCH more than once. Speed brake usage was 
frequent.” 
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Figure 110. Flight crew acceptability of IM commanded speeds for CAPTURE operation. 
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Figure 111. Flight crew acceptability of IM commanded speeds for CROSS operation. 
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Figure 112. Flight crew acceptability of IM commanded speeds for MAINTAIN operation. 
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Figure 113. Flight crew acceptability of IM commanded speeds for MIXED operation. 
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16. Please rate the acceptability of the frequency of IM speed changes. 
The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.1.8, where these acceptability 
ratings are discussed. Ratings were given on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ 
as “Completely Acceptable.” Comments associated with low ratings echo previous responses 
describing unacceptable frequencies of speed changes in the low-altitude segment. 
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Figure 114. Flight crew acceptability of IM speed change frequency for CAPTURE ops. 
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Figure 115. Flight crew acceptability of IM speed change frequency for CROSS operation. 
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Figure 116. Flight crew acceptability of IM speed change frequency for MAINTAIN ops. 
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Figure 117. Flight crew acceptability of IM speed change frequency for MIXED operation. 
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17. Please rate the acceptability of the amount of head down time required of the Pilot 
Monitoring to input information from the IM clearance(s) into the EFB. 
The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.1.9, where these acceptability 
ratings are discussed. Ratings were given on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ 
as “Completely Acceptable.” 
Below are comments associated with ratings less than ‘4’: 
• “The more changes to IM speeds the more heads down time needed, not good.” 
• “Heads down time required for canceled and revised clearances below 10,000’ AGL 
are not acceptable and should not be considered a procedure ... aside from the normally 
high amount of heads down associated without aural and visual cues for CGD 
changes.” 
• “More speed adjustments on IM means more heads down time ... AURAL OR VISUAL 
HEADS UP alerting system will be essential.” 
• “Too much heads down after pairing.” 
• “Acceptable but this will have to be fixed in future iterations ... one more time AURAL 
and/or Visual alerting system for CGD changes.” 
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Figure 118. Flight crew acceptability of head down time to enter CAPTURE clearance. 
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Figure 119. Flight crew acceptability of head down time to enter CROSS clearance. 
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Figure 120. Flight crew acceptability of head down time to enter MAINTAIN clearance. 
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Figure 121. Flight crew acceptability of head down time to enter MIXED clearance. 
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18. Please rate the acceptability of the IM procedures for the events in this scenario. 
The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.1.4, where these acceptability 
ratings are discussed. Ratings were given on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ 
as “Completely Acceptable.” One comment provides a good summary of responses to this 
question: “I don’t think the problem is a procedural one but rather a computer issue.” 
 
 
Figure 122. Flight crew acceptability of CAPTURE procedure. 
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Figure 123. Flight crew acceptability of CROSS procedure. 
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Figure 124. Flight crew acceptability of MAINTAIN procedure. 
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Figure 125. Flight crew acceptability of MIXED procedure. 
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F.4.3 Completeness. 
Questions #19 - #23 provide additional detail to the analysis of IM completeness in Section 5.8.1.6 
and any actions taken during the IM operation. 
 
19. Please rate the completeness of the IM procedures for the events in this scenario. 
The figures in this section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.1.6., where these acceptability 
ratings are discussed. Ratings were given on a scale from ‘1’ as “Not at all complete” to ‘4’ as 
“Somewhat complete” to ‘7’ as “Very complete.” 
 
 
7654321
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Completeness Ratings
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
 
Figure 126. Flight crew perception of procedure completeness for CAPTURE operation. 
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Figure 127. Flight crew perception of procedure completeness for CROSS operation. 
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Figure 128. Flight crew perception of procedure completeness for MAINTAIN ops. 
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Figure 129. Flight crew perception of procedure completeness for MIXED operation. 
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20. Were there any missing steps in the IM procedures? 
All comments associated with “Yes” responses: 
• “Suspend command not given when we were given an airspeed assignment.” 
• “Again, the IM system went from ARMED to SUSPENDED without either pilot putting 
into the EFB. Also, the IM commanded airspeed of 140 KIAS was below our minimum 
VRef speed.” 
• “Give a speed command if ATC cancels a clearance.” 
• “Limited information for crew to know ‘TGT BAD ROUTE’ would never pair without 
further intervention.” 
• “Recommend a procedure change to ignore speed changes within 1 mile of the FAF.” 
• “Was given a ‘capture’ clearance before receiving a descend-via clearance.” 
• “Was issued IM clearance then assigned a speed. Then we became paired. Unsure whether 
to fly assigned speed or IM clearance.” 
• “When ATC cancels an IM clearance, it would behoove them to give us an interim airspeed 
target until we get the new clearance issued, read back, entered and armed.” 
• “With no pilot action, CGD went from suspended to Paired”.    
 
21. Did the IM procedures contain extra steps that were unnecessary? 
All comments associated with “Yes” responses: 
• “Again, the IM commanded airspeed change from 270-280-260 noted above.” 
• “I didn't understand why IM commanded speed was slower than the speed that ATC wanted 
to the IF for the RNAV Z 16L.” 
• “Required gear extension too soon.” 
• “Should have just requested a speed change from 210-270 instead of 210-230-240-250-
260-270 in a short time period of about 20 seconds.” 
• “Too much talking. Need data link.” 
• “We put gear and flaps down to accommodate the speed reduction, then we raised flaps for 
the speed increase that was required. 
• “We were assigned 250kts by ATC while we were waiting to be paired. Once pairing was 
available there was some confusion as to whether or not we should execute the pairing 
because we were previously assigned a speed by ATC. We called ATC to confirm that we 
should pair and he said yes, comply with the previous pairing instructions.” 
 
22. Were the IM procedural steps logical and easy to follow? 
All comments associated with “No” responses: 
• “IM logic was tough to follow because of the scope of speed changes.” 
• “Large A/S and too many A/S changes on final in a short period of time. It seemed like it 
should have delayed the speed command in order to minimize the number of close in speed 
changes.” 
• “Limited information for crew to know ‘TGT BAD ROUTE’ would never pair without 
further intervention.” 
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• “Major speed reduction following suspension of IM spacing caused aircraft to be high on 
the path and was unable to meet an altitude restriction. 
• “IM commanded 250 knots then 210 knots before I could set 250 knots.” 
• “No issues here.” 
• “Not easy to follow approaching the FAF, received 3 speed up commands right at FAF we 
still needed to finish configuring the Aircraft. Got a little behind and didn't notice that the 
speed brake was still deployed. The PM caught it.” 
• “Not logical within 1 mile of FAF.” 
• “Not on short final. Spacing was too close and unacceptable.” 
• “Not sure why we got the discontinue spacing direction.” 
• “[Nothing significant to report.]” 
• “There was confusion on my part as to why ATC was commanding a speed faster than IM 
commanded speed.” 
 
23. Did you take any of the actions listed below (suspend, resume, cancel, not pair)?  
Most pilots (75%, 18/24) encountered SUSPEND. All but one response to “Not PAIR” were from 
the BASELINE operation, where no IM clearances were issued. Most “Other” responses were, 
“None” though two pilots reported ignoring IM speed commands after or within one mile of the 
FAF. 
- SUSPEND: 18 (Approximately 85% ATC, 10% software, < 5% by pilots) 
- RESUME: 3 
- CANCEL: 9 (Approximately 75% ATC, 25% flight crew due to IM speed changes) 
- Not PAIR: 7 
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F.4.4 Phraseology, Third-Party ID, and Unusual Occurrences 
Questions #24 - #27 had the flight crew respond to issues about the IM phraseology, the use of 
third-party ID when issuing IM clearances, use of touch-screen devices, and unusual events. 
 
24. Were there any issues with the IM phraseology? 
Table 53. Percent of Pilots Who Reported an Issue with the IM Phraseology 
Operation N % Reporting Phraseology Issue 
CAPTURE 46 4% 
CROSS 48 4% 
MAINTAIN 42 31% 
MIXED 48 10% 
 
- CAPTURE: 
o “Was given a ‘capture’ clearance before receiving a ‘Descend Via’ clearance.” 
o “We were given ATC speed commands after paired, but the controller never used the 
"suspend" word.  We were not expecting to be suspended, nor did we see a reason for 
it.  Once the confusion was cleared up with the next controller, we resumed IM with no 
further IM issues.” 
- CROSS: 
o “They paired us behind Lufthansa 1434. This was not a choice on our EFB so we had 
to ask ATC what the 3 letter code for Lufthansa was.  We would have never guessed 
that it was DLH. A suggestion would be to list the entire airline name as well as the 3 
letter code to help eliminate some of the confusion.” 
o “Communication system clipped clearance, I had to verify with controller. 130 seconds 
sounded like 103 seconds.” 
- MAINTAIN: 
o “The IM Maintain clearance included the Target's route, which should have been 
redundant.” 
o “Initial ATC clearance was to maintain 111 seconds behind, but changed to maintain 
current time.” 
o “I question if we need to check in with the next controller and tell him we are paired as 
he may need a little reminder.” 
o “ATC issued an incorrect IM clearance. We were maintain 96 seconds, this should have 
a capture clearance. You cannot input into the CGD a maintain seconds.” 
o “Given a MAINTAIN clearance to "maintain current spacing" with Target aircraft. Our 
assumption was that this meant ‘time’, not ‘miles’. However, after the fact, we request 
clarification from ATC.” 
o “Controller never used SUSPEND wording but used I believe "discontinue." 
o “Given an airspeed with the "S" word (suspend). We queried the controller if he wanted 
us to suspend and he quickly came back with an affirmative.” 
o On initial contact for an interval spacing clearance ATC should automatically provide 
the phonetic identifier for the Target aircraft ID and not assume we know every airline’s 
three letter identifier.” 
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- MIXED: 
o “The initial IM cross clearance did not have the Target’s route, which turned out to not 
be the same as ours. This was clarified with a radio call.” 
o “Received initial IM crossing clearance from ATC, then received an ATC assigned 
speed before pairing, then paired and flew IM speeds. Later ATC expressed confusion 
whether we were flying IM speeds or ATC assigned speeds. (Pairing radio call was 
made). Confusion could exist when having simultaneous ATC clearances. Is this a 
potential threat/conflict area that needs further clearance verification procedures?” 
o “We had to ask from the get go our aircraft to follow’s proper name for IM input.” 
o “Not with us, but another controller/aircraft stumble over cancel maintain IM. 
Controller did not know what speed to assign to the canceled IM aircraft.” 
 
 
25. What type of third party ID was used to issue the IM clearance? Please note the 
aircraft call sign (if able) and describe any issues in the box on the right. 
The type of third party ID used to issue the IM clearance is shown in Table 54 as reported by the 
pilots. During three flights, pilots reported that both the call sign and alpha-numeric identifier were 
used in the same clearance. In addition, pilots received a clearance with the Target aircraft’s call 
sign and had to query ATC for the three letter identifier during six flights. Of the 24 subject pilots, 
four reported experiencing confusion when their aircraft call sign was used as the Target aircraft 
in an IM clearance issued to another aircraft, 17 did not experience confusion due to this, and three 
did not hear this occur. Five pilots suggested that the phonetic identifier always be used for the 
Target aircraft during IM clearance issuance. In addition, seven pilots mentioned issues with 
obscure call signs not being issued with the phonetic identifier, or suggested modifying the EFB 
to include the full call sign for Target aircraft.  
 
Table 54. Type of Third Party ID Used to Issue the IM Clearance 
Third Party ID N 
Call sign (e.g., Brickyard 123) 158 
Alpha-numeric (e.g., R P A 123) 11 
Phonetic (e.g., Romeo Papa Alpha 123) 4 
Other 14 
 
26. Were there any issues with using a touch-screen device during this scenario? 
Twenty-six of the 290 responses indicated an issue with a touch screen device, however they all 
referred to simulation artifacts and not flight crew interaction with the IM equipment (which was 
the intent of the question). 
 
27. Describe any unusual or unexpected events. Please include time, location, and 
aircraft call signs if able. 
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Approximately 35% of comments were “none” or similar. Below is a selection of other comments 
in response to this question, excluding issues previously noted: 
• “MAINTAIN IM clearance was not executable above FL290, but did not show that it was 
awaiting anything.” 
• “A large speed change 16 mile final with everything showing normal fast/slow meter and 
Early/late showing normal. A compression buffer should be written mileage or time to 
FAF. Aircraft should not have to fully configure on a 16 mile final.” 
• ATC assigned speed 230 w/o clarifying our IM clearance. Everything was resolved, but 
resulted in extra communication and crossing TWNSN +500ft high. 
• “CROSS clearance. Our Target aircraft was -5000 ft. when we went active IM. Immediate 
speed reduction to 230 with gradual increase to 250. Is there any algorithm for IAS versus 
altitude? It would seem we are erroneously slowed and then accelerated as we approached 
the altitude of the Target aircraft.” 
• “Early/Late indicator was blank until well into approach (ARCHY- 13000 ft.). Use of speed 
braked needed to attain desired speed changes, drove us 2300+ below VNAV path (but IM 
seems to do better being low than being high).” 
• “Just before LONGS CGD gave us 210 kts. Noticed EFB had an IM SPEED LIMITED 
note and we were showing a little early. It didn’t make sense that the CGD could not slow 
us a little more at that point to keep from having the later rapid series of speed reductions 
with a final assigned speed below the aircraft capability.” 
• “Speed change algorithm could not hack the ‘slowing in descent’ speed change. Started 
out with arrows balanced, but soon got a ‘too fast’ cue with speed exceeding 20 kts fast on 
indicator. PF reverted to V/S 0 to capture the commanded speed, then reengaged VNAV 
and used speed brakes to make altitude constraints.”  
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F.5 Controller Post-Experiment Questionnaire Results 
Post-experiment questionnaires were completed by all participants after completion of the last 
post-run questionnaire. 
 
3. Describe anomalies or inconsistencies in the simulation that affected your 
performance. 
Comments other than “none”: 
• “When the aircraft were given direct a fix and then took too long to start turning. Some 
planes started down right away and other planes on the same arrival waited to the last 
second to descend.” 
• “The only think I would like to see changed is the leader line position on the west side. 
When you put the leader at 9 o’clock it covers the tag.” 
• “Some of the airspace maps need additional markings to aid the controller. All arrival maps 
need to depict the fix on the RNAV Z approached where there is a 210 speed restriction. 
This allows aircraft that are late to fly faster but gives the reference point where 210 kts is 
needed. The maps for the 16L scenarios do not have the runway threshold markings that 
were updated from my previous week on the other flows.” 
•  “They were consistent, sometimes the mac pilot couldn’t respond fast enough.” 
 
4.  Please rate how well the training prepared you to use the 1) simulator, 2) KDEN 
airspace, 3) metering concept, 4) CMS tools, 5) IM operation, and 6) phraseology: 
This question asked controllers to rate their training on a scale from ‘1’ as “Not at all prepared,” 
to ‘4’ as “Moderately Prepared,” to ‘7’ as “Very Prepared.” The only ‘1’ rating was given for the 
“Simulator” training, and that controller did not clarify in his comment in question 5, only 
commenting on phraseology training, which that controller rated ‘3’. The same controller rated 
CMS Tool training and IM Operation training ‘4’. Table 55 and Figure 130 show summaries of 
responses to this question. 
Table 55. Descriptive Statistics for Post-Experiment Controller Training Ratings 
Training Type N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Simulator 8 6.1 2.1 1 7 7 
Airspace 8 6.3 0.7 5 6 7 
Metering Concept 8 6.1 0.8 5 6 7 
CMS Tools 8 6.0 1.1 4 6 7 
IM Operation 8 6.1 1.1 4 6.5 7 
Phraseology 8 5.8 1.6 3 6.5 7 
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Figure 130. Controller post-experiment ratings of training by type of training. 
 
 
 
5. Please describe how the academic and hands-on training can be improved.  
All comments: 
• “Providing incoming controllers copies of the arrival routes in advance.” 
• “Send all the info in an email to controllers. That way they can get an idea of what is 
coming and prepare better. Also run 1 problem and let an expert show you how it is done. 
They can show you all the things you need to know and how to do it efficiently.” 
• “Knowing more about the altitudes available would be beneficial if and or when you need 
to vector to salvage a sequence.” 
• “Emphasize that speed advisories are just that, advisories, and if something else is required 
to meet the schedule then take action and get the aircraft in the slot markers, then resume 
following the advisories.” 
• “It was comprehensive.” 
• “I would suggest not switching controllers week to week. I would suggest having the same 
controllers so they become more familiar with the operation.” 
• “Have the instructors ask more often if there are any questions. At times you are not sure 
if you are to speak.” 
• “I am not sure; phraseology could maybe be covered better.” 
 
  
Appendix F.5: Controller Post-Exp. Results 240 
6.  Please rate the operational acceptability of the procedures for using the CMS tools. 
On a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ as “Completely Acceptable, all 8 
responses were greater than or equal to ‘5’. The mean response was 6.3 (standard deviation = 0.9). 
 
Figure 131. Controller operational acceptability of CMS tool procedures. 
 
All comments: 
• “Being able to compare ETA vs STA was beneficial to evaluate the controllers’ actions.” 
• “I like the concept. It is a good tool.” 
• “I have a lot of experience using the CMS tools so my opinion is biased. I think they work 
very well. Some little nuances will be learned over time to make them even more effective.” 
• “The tools worked well, but sometimes you could not trust the speeds on final.” 
• “Good with a few normal problems.” 
• “No complaints.” 
• “None.” 
• “Phraseology was different but once you learned it, it was ok.” 
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7.  Please rate the operational acceptability of the procedures for IM operations. 
Controllers were asked to rate operational acceptability of the procedures for each type of IM 
operation, CAPTURE, CROSS, and MAINTAIN. On a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely 
Unacceptable” to ‘7’ as “Completely Acceptable.” 
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Figure 132. Controller acceptability of IM procedures for each clearance type. 
 
Table 56. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Acceptability Ratings of IM Procedures 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 8 6.6 1.1 4 7 7 
CROSS 8 6.4 1.2 4 7 7 
MAINTAIN 8 5.9 2.1 2 7 7 
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8.  Please rate the impact of the addition of IM operations on expediting the traffic flow 
during this simulation. 
Controllers were asked to rate the impact of IM operations on expediting the traffic flow during 
the simulation on a scale from ‘1’ as “Much Less Expeditious,” to ‘4’ as “No Impact” to ‘7’ as 
“Much more Expeditious.” The mean response was 5.6 (standard deviation = 1.2). 
 
 
Figure 133. Impact of IM operations on expediting traffic flow. 
 
All comments: 
• “Allowed for more attention complying with metering duties.” 
• “Adds a little to your workload but spacing is more efficient.” 
• “Only on a maintain clearance do I see a huge benefit. The crossing and capture clearances 
seem to waste space from time to time. Maybe the time needs to be reduced or use 
mileage.” 
• “If you observe the timelines, the IM aircraft were quite often ahead of schedule and well-
spaced.” 
• “Aircraft were run closer and speed adjustments were used for spacing.” 
• “It appears that there is as much pressure on the airport as if you were metering.” 
• “I did not see where it expedited traffic more than the non-IM aircraft on final.” 
• “It was somewhat more expedited.” 
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Questions 9.1 – 9.3. 
Questions 9.1 – 9.3 used a rating scale of ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable,” to ‘4’ as “Moderately 
Acceptable,” to ‘7’ as “Completely Acceptable.” 
Note: for questions 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3, one Final controller consistently rated the clearance types 
significantly lower than all the other controllers, with responses of ‘5’ for 9.1, ‘4’ for 9.2, and ‘3’ 
for 9.3. This controller had TRACON experience, but no experience with RNAV arrivals or RNP 
approaches. The controller had been retired for approximately 5 years, which was typical for this 
controller population. 
 
9.1. When IM aircraft were in your sector, how acceptable was it for you to be responsible 
for maintaining safe / standard separation between these aircraft, while the flight crew was 
managing the spacing on a CAPTURE clearance. 
 
Table 57 summarizes responses to this question. Each “same route” situation had one ‘5’ rating 
and seven ‘7’ ratings. Each “different route” situation had one ‘5’ rating, two ‘6’ ratings, and five 
‘7’ ratings. The ‘5’ ratings were given by a Final controller. 
Table 57. Descriptive Statistics for Acceptability of Controller Responsibility for 
CAPTURE Clearance 
Situation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
IM behind IM on the same route 8 6.8 0.7 5 7 7 
IM behind IM on a different route 8 6.5 0.8 5 7 7 
IM behind CMS on the same route 8 6.8 0.7 5 7 7 
IM behind CMS on a different route 8 6.5 0.8 5 7 7 
 
All comments (not listed are two comments stating, “No problems”): 
• “I utilized information available in data block and matched that with trailing aircraft.” 
• “CAPTURE works well as long as you do not go below the given time.” 
• “Controller increased vigilance scanning of aircraft that were merging from separate routes 
(workload increased).” 
• “Speeds on final were not always acceptable.” 
• “Different routes caused a delay in pairing which increased scanning to come back to the 
Target aircraft to see if they would capture and pair.” 
• “Separation has to be maintained regardless of the types of aircraft equipment.” 
• “Sometimes you have to rely on good old ATC.” 
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9.2. When IM aircraft were in your sector, how acceptable was it for you to be responsible 
for maintaining safe / standard separation between these aircraft, while the flight crew was 
managing the spacing on a CROSS clearance. 
Table 58 summarizes responses to this question. Each “same route” situation had one ‘4’ rating 
and seven ‘7’ ratings. Each “different route” situation had one ‘4’ rating, two ‘6’ ratings, and five 
‘7’ ratings. The ‘4’ ratings were given by the same Final controller identified in question 9.1. 
Table 58. Descriptive Statistics for Acceptability of Controller Responsibility for CROSS 
Clearance 
Situation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
IM behind IM on the same route 8 6.6 1.1 4 7 7 
IM behind IM on a different route 8 6.4 1.1 4 7 7 
IM behind CMS on the same route 8 6.6 1.1 4 7 7 
IM behind CMS on a different route 8 6.4 1.1 4 7 7 
 
Relevant comments are listed below. Two comments were excluded: “Same as in the previous 
question,” and, “No problems.” The same as in previous question was, “I utilized the information 
available in the data block and matched that with trailing aircraft.” 
• “Cross fixes are located in TRACON airspace, so en route controllers did not know when 
pairing took place. Therefore, spacing requirements had to be standard separation 
clearances.” 
• “Crossing clearances always worked well.” 
• “This didn’t adversely impact my operation at all.” 
• “Having sight of the aircraft involved in the clearance is helpful.” 
• “Cross clearances seemed to take longer to get paired.” 
• “Again, without assigning a speed on final they had to be watched a lot.” 
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9.3. When IM aircraft were in your sector, how acceptable was it for you to be responsible 
for maintaining safe / standard separation between these aircraft, while the flight crew was 
managing the spacing on a MAINTAIN clearance. 
Table 59 summarizes responses to this question. Each “same route” situation had one ‘3’ rating 
and seven ‘7’ ratings. Each “different route” situation had one ‘3’ rating, one ‘6’ rating, and five 
‘7’ ratings. The ‘3’ ratings were given by the same Final controller identified in questions 9.1 and 
9.2. 
Table 59. Descriptive Statistics for Acceptability of Controller Responsibility for 
MAINTAIN Clearance 
Situation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
IM behind IM on the same route 8 6.5 1.4 3 7 7 
IM behind IM on a different route 8 6.1 1.5 3 7 7 
IM behind CMS on the same route 8 6.5 1.4 3 7 7 
IM behind CMS on a different route 8 6.1 1.5 3 7 7 
 
All comments (excluded is one comment stating, “no problems”): 
• “MAINTAIN was a beautiful thing on the same routes. Aircraft on different routes took 
too long to occur, until you got the same routing established.” 
• “MAINTAIN clearances worked well, even with aircraft changing speed in descent.” 
• “In most cases, the separation spacing ended up being excessive, so I was never worried 
about losing separation. I was always concerned about too much spacing.” 
• “For aircraft on the same route, the clearance can be issued on a time available basis. 
Aircraft on different routes required me to wait for the aircraft to be on the same route.”  
• “I thought MAINTAIN clearances were the easiest and required less controller input.” 
• “The MAINTAIN clearance was a little less acceptable.” 
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Questions 10 – 11. 
Question 10 and question 11 used a rating scale from ‘1’ as “Not useful at all (ignored)” to ‘4’ as 
“Somewhat useful” to ‘7’ as “Very useful (essential).” 
 
10. [If Center] How useful were the controller tools for managing the aircraft?  
All but one usefulness rating was ‘7’. The one ‘6’ rating was given for the “Delay in the meter list” 
item. Table 60 summarizes the responses to this question. 
Table 60. Descriptive Statistics for Usefulness of Controller Tools for Managing Aircraft 
Controller tool N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Delay in the meter list 4 6.8 0.5 6 7 7 
Delay countdown timer 4 7.0 0.0 7 7 7 
IM designators 4 7.0 0.0 7 7 7 
Runway identifier 4 7.0 0.0 7 7 7 
IM-specific meter list information 4 7.0 0.0 7 7 7 
All-aircraft meter list information 4 7.0 0.0 7 7 7 
 
All comments: 
• “Comparing ETA/STA was useful. Timer absolutely must have. Designators must have. 
Runway ID helpful if there’s difference on the arrival due to flow but TRACON is going 
to tell them what to expect on initial communications.” 
• “I used them all a lot.” 
• “The lists and data block info worked out well.” 
• “The meter list was very helpful especially the all.” 
• “It helped a lot. To me the more info I get to see the better.” 
 
11. [If Feeder or Final] How useful were the CMS tools for managing the aircraft?  
The CMS tool with the poorest mean ratings were the delay countdown timer and spacing cones, 
though both of these items received also received ratings of ‘7’ from different controllers.  
 
Table 61 summarizes the responses to this question. There was one ‘1’ rating, for the spacing 
cones by a controller who did not know they were available. 
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Table 61. Descriptive Statistics for Usefulness of CMS Tools for Managing Aircraft 
CMS tool N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Speed advisories 4 6.0 1.4 4 6.5 7 
Slot markers 4 6.3 1.5 4 7 7 
Early/late indicators 4 5.5 1.7 4 5.5 7 
Delay countdown timer 4 4.3 2.1 2 4 7 
Timelines 4 6.5 1.0 5 7 7 
IM designators 4 6.8 0.5 6 7 7 
Spacing cones (bats) 4 4.0 2.9 1 4 7 
 
All comments: 
• “Did not use the bats or the delay count down timer functions.” 
• “Was not aware that spacing cones were available so my answer indicated is only to fill 
the slot. I do feel they would be useful as a tool especially when there is a wake turbulence 
component in the sequence.” [This controller answered ‘1’ for the usefulness of the spacing 
cones, as indicated above.] 
• “Speed advisories help to provide a reference point.” 
• “I liked the slot markers best, and the speed advisories let me know the trend.” 
• “The speed advisories let me know the trend. Slot markers I liked the best. Spacing cone 
helped on final” 
 
12. Describe any changes you would make to the IM operation. If appropriate, please 
comment on the IM and Target aircraft being in-trail vs. on merging routes, the delay 
between the issuance of the IM clearance and the initiation of the IM operation, etc. 
Relevant comments: 
• “Try and create some way for IM aircraft to pair with aircraft on merging routes prior to a 
common fix. If IM aircraft can see the Target aircraft, then it seems it should be pair-able.” 
• “In trail is easy. On merging routes crossing seems to lead to less possible confusion. The 
delay in IM initiation usually did not cause a problem. But you must be aware of it to figure 
it in.” 
• I think the program tries to “chase” the cone too much. If you follow all the speed 
advisories, you would be issuing speeds constantly. Pick a fix, for example on the 
downwind and project ahead to that point. I did my speed assignments like that and it 
seemed to work well.” 
• “I was very happy from a Final [Controller] perspective of how the IM aircraft operated 
and were displayed. Using the sequence numbers as a reference made it easy to determine 
who the aircraft was paired with. I am not a fan of the MAINTAIN clearance in the terminal 
airspace.  I think once the IM aircraft enters the TRACON airspace, another IM clearance 
type needs to be issued or the MAINTAIN clearance canceled.” 
• “I would put the requirement to say “report paired” with the acknowledgement of the 
original IM clearance. Adding it to the original clearance at the end is just too much 
phraseology.” 
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13. What changes would you make to the displays for the IM aircraft? What additional 
information (if any) would you like with respect to the IM aircraft and how would you like 
it displayed? 
Most controllers found the displays acceptable as currently configured. Included below is the 
only comment which described a change: 
• “Different identifier for maintain clearance. This clearance should hold the spacing 
assigned and the others will deteriorate at some point.” 
 
 
14. What information (if any) would you like available with respect to the Target 
aircraft and how would you like it displayed? 
Most controllers found the current Target information to be acceptable as currently displayed. 
Included below are the only comments which described a change: 
• “If you could click a button and have the altitudes, speeds and all the fixes on the STAR 
that would be good.” 
• “As a TRACON controller I do not care about the Target aircraft. I am not going to the 
trouble of issuing an IM clearance in my airspace.” 
 
15. Please rate the operational acceptability of the IM phraseology used during the 
simulation. 
All ‘4’ ratings (the only ratings less than 5) were provided by one Center controller who did not 
comment about the reasons for those ratings. Not all controllers rated all phraseology. 
Table 62. Descriptive Statistics for Controller Operational Acceptability of IM Phraseology 
Phraseology N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE clearance 5 6.2 1.3 4 7 7 
CROSS clearance 5 7.0 0.0 7 7 7 
MAINTAIN clearance 7 7.0 0.0 7 7 7 
Reporting “IM paired” 8 6.5 1.1 4 7 7 
Check in with TRACON 4 6.8 0.5 6 7 7 
Amendments to IM clearance 7 6.3 1.1 4 7 7 
IM clearance suspension 8 6.4 0.8 4 4 7 
IM clearance resumption 8 6.4 1.1 4 7 7 
IM clearance status reporting “Unable” 6 6.4 0.8 5 6.5 7 
 
Three controllers commented that the phraseology was clear and worked well, or commented on 
their position to explain why they did not issue certain clearances. Other comments: 
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• “Unable should only be used if it cannot be accomplished, not to signal that it is not doable 
from the moment and then later the aircraft pairs up.” 
• “When unable given from an aircraft they need to give a reason. That would avoid some 
possible confusion.” 
 
16. Did you experience any confusion due to the use of the Target aircraft’s call sign in 
the IM clearance? 
Seven of the eight controllers responded “No.” The controller that responded “Yes” commented 
“I had to use phonetics on some aircraft for their call signs.” 
 
17. Please rate the operational acceptability of using the Target aircraft’s call sign in the 
IM clearance. 
All 8 responses gave a rating of ‘7’ on a scale from “1” as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ as 
“Completely Acceptable.” Some controllers commented the use of the Target aircraft’s call sign 
in the IM clearance was not only acceptable but necessary. Selected comments: 
• “I like the verification of who they [the pilots] are paired with.” 
• “As long as the other aircraft can see the other call sign, I thought this was completely 
acceptable.” 
• “Got to have it.” 
 
18. Describe any suggestions to improve the clarity and/or completeness of the IM 
clearance phraseology. 
Two controllers had suggestions to improve the IM clearance phraseology. One controller 
suggested that the relative position of the Target aircraft to the IM aircraft should be called to 
expedite locating that aircraft. Another controller suggested removing the “report paired” 
instruction out of the initial clearance and adding it to a follow-on acknowledgment, giving the 
example, “US1415 read back correct, report paired.” 
 
19. Describe the challenges (if any) you perceive to the operational implementation of IM 
operations. 
Controllers described the challenges of implementing IM operations. Multiple controllers 
mentioned trust of the system as a possible challenge. Selected comments: 
• “Using a data link to transmit IM clearances would improve/increase the delivery of said 
clearances and reduce misunderstandings.” 
• “Controllers might think it will be like time metering that did not work before. But advise 
them this is different and better.” 
• “Training and trusting will be the biggest hurdle. Once the trust is gained that the computer 
is making the correct sequencing decisions and that the IM aircraft really do what is 
necessary, things will go smoothly.” 
• “Adjusting the scanning technique. Currently most scanning is altitude, speed, and then 
time when determining separation. With IM it was time, altitude, and then speed.” 
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20. In order to issue an IM clearance in the TRACON, what information would you need 
and how would you like it displayed? 
Two of four controllers commented that no change was necessary from how information was 
provided. The other two controllers’ comments are as follows: 
• “I would need to know what aircraft are IM capable, and those that are capable need a 
designator in the data block.” 
• “I do not think issuing IM clearances in the TRACON is feasible, too little airspace and 
time.” 
 
21. Of the IM clearances and operations you experienced in this experiment (CAPTURE, 
CROSS, MAINTAIN), which one do you believe is the most useful, and when would you use 
it? 
ARTCC controllers gave the following comments, two of four preferring MAINTAIN: 
• “The MAINTAIN clearance. I would use it to sequence in-trail aircraft.” 
• “CROSS is the easiest to use to increase good spacing. CAPTURE could be the most 
beneficial to close the gaps in spacing. MAINTAIN just keeps it safer than monitoring it 
all the time.” 
• “CAPTURE because spacing can be created.” 
• “MAINTAIN and I would use it for in-trail spacing requirements.” 
 
TRACON controllers gave the following comments, three of four preferring CAPTURE: 
• “CAPTURE. I would use it whenever possible as it frees up my time for other operations 
and reduces transmissions.” 
• MAINTAIN. All the time, due to the fact that the spacing will hold” 
• "CAPTURE from what I saw. As a final controller, if it was not issued already, I doubt I 
would use it.” 
• “Yes CAPTURE.” 
 
 
22. Of the IM clearances and operations you experienced in this experiment (CAPTURE, 
CROSS, MAINTAIN), which one do you believe is the least useful, and why? 
ARTCC controllers gave the following comments, two of four describing the CAPTURE clearance 
as least useful: 
• “CAPTURE, because it is not implemented until both aircraft are on same route.” 
• “The MAINTAIN clearance is the least useful. Only because you already have a spacing 
lineup and speeds done normally.” 
• “CROSS if it includes fixes outside the sector.” 
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TRACON controllers gave the following comments, describing a mix of least-useful clearances. 
• “CROSS and CAPTURE clearances, since they both seem to have a higher percentage of 
deterioration on final.” 
• “MAINTAIN. You really do not know what the spacing is going to end up being, so it is 
not an operation I would use if there was any volume of traffic.” 
• “MAINTAIN. One aircraft off, many others off.” 
• “Cross seemed a little iffy from my limited point of view.” 
 
23. Do you have any additional comments about the experiment? 
• “Possibly have all aircraft in one sector while the other corner just meters.” 
• “It increases accuracy without controller adjustments, and will allow for better spacing. It 
will close the gaps in spacing.” 
• “I think there should be more situations like the pilot error in the last scenario. This gives 
you a better feel for how it would work in the real world. Nothing is fail proof. Controllers 
have to think and adjust on the fly. So put some of those type things in various scenarios.” 
• “When a scenario is being conducted to the west side of the airport i.e. 16L. Most 
controllers will leader the aircraft to the West (the number 4 position). When you do this 
and when you take a handoff the leader extension does not work so the data block ends up 
right on the target.  A change needs to be made to mirror an East (6) direction selection.” 
 
  
Appendix F.6: Pilot Post-Exp. Results 252 
F.6 Pilot Post-Experiment Questionnaire Results 
Post experiment questionnaires were completed by all participants after completion of the last 
post-run questionnaire. 
 
2. Describe any anomalies or inconsistencies in the simulation that affected your 
performance. 
Most of the 24 responses to this question could be grouped into the following four issues: 
• ASTOR: only one crewmember at a time could use the mouse/touch screen, which affected 
timeliness of performance when workload should be shared by both pilots. 
• DTS and IFD: autopilot/VNAV performed inconsistently. 
• ASTOR, DTS, and IFD: communications were sometimes garbled and difficult to 
understand. 
• ASTOR, DTS, and IFD: aircraft performance was not as expected, especially deceleration 
rates. 
 
Selected comments, with simulator used: 
• ASTOR: “The only real simulation issue that affected our performance was the vertical 
path tracking would for no apparent reason, with no commanded speed changes etc., go off 
scale at times from a steady state condition. We would catch it and of course do what was 
needed to get back on profile, but it did not seem natural for a large mass aircraft to zing 
off the profile indications.” 
• ASTOR: “The ASTOR touch screen not being capable of handling two operator inputs at 
the same time. The EFB on a couple occasions failed to mirror the corresponding EFB.” 
• ASTOR: “Deceleration rates at final configuration required a mental adjustment to [reduce 
how quickly drag was added]. It would not likely happen in the real world.” 
 
• DTS: “On one simulation autopilot did not follow flight director commands resulting in 
descent below a minimum altitude.” 
 
• IFD: “Simulator was very difficult to slow - especially at altitude. This was far worse than 
the actual aircraft. The simulator would change speeds unbeknownst to the pilots and not 
commanded by the automation. When resetting Missed approach altitude, the simulator 
would often drop out of Vertical Navigation Mode and go into Vertical Speed Mode. If not 
caught immediately, this caused a high descent profile after the Final Approach Fix.” 
• IFD: “The simulator VNAV performance is not correct. This may influence the results for 
evaluating IM procedures.” 
• IFD: “The FMS does not react well to speed changes during descent on path. There were 
times that I felt it had not adjusted top of descent for winds.” 
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3. Was the workload required to operate the simulator much less than, the same as, or 
greater than the workload required to fly an actual aircraft? 
Pilots were asked to compare the workload required to operate the simulator to the workload 
required to fly an actual aircraft on a scale from ‘1’ as “Much More” to ‘4’ as “The Same” to ‘7’ 
as “Much Less.”  
Table 63. Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Workload of Simulator vs. Actual Aircraft 
Simulator N Mean SD Min Median Max 
ASTOR 16 4.6 1.3 3 5 7 
DTS 4 5 1.2 1 2.5 7 
IFD 4 3 2.2 1 2.5 6 
Total 24 4.4 1.5 1 5 7 
 
The comments discussed characteristics that increased the workload when operating the simulator 
compared to a real aircraft, including the mouse/touch screen issues (ASTOR only), the increased 
monitoring of instruments, and the unfamiliar/unexpected aircraft performance. A characteristic 
that decreased the workload when operating the simulator was the reduced number of distractions 
and tasks in the simulator environment compared to the real world. 
 
Selected comments, grouped by simulator: 
 
• ASTOR: “A number of real-world tasks and distractions are absent from the simulator.” 
• ASTOR: “Slightly more considering the fact that you had to operate through the use of a 
mouse and inputs at the same time, i.e. an ATC frequency change while trying to configure 
the aircraft would knock the other crew member off of the screen, thus delaying the 
operation.” 
 
• DTS: “Looking for sim anomalies will increase workload, but there are real world 
distractions that will make up the difference. I thought workload was as good as a 
simulation can get. ATC simulation was very realistic.” 
 
• IFD: “In VNAV, when slowing down and deploying the speed brakes, the simulator would 
not raise the nose much, if at all to reduce the speed - even though it was going below to 
well below the VNAV profile. In VNAV speed, the aircraft is supposed to pitch up to 
capture the speed and usually causes you to go high on the VNAV descent profile.  But the 
simulator seemed to do the opposite. This would force the PF to come out of VNAV and 
use VS to get the simulator to pitch the nose up and slow. In at least one occasion, this 
caused us to bust an altitude on the approach - since VS has no altitude protection.” 
• IFD: “Simulator was very difficult to slow - especially at altitude. This was far worse than 
the actual aircraft. The simulator would change speeds unbeknownst to the pilots and not 
commanded by the automation. When resetting Missed approach altitude, the simulator 
would often drop out of VNAV and go into VS. If not caught immediately, this caused a 
high descent profile after the FAF.” 
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4. Please rate how well the training prepared you to fly the simulator. 
This question asked pilots to rate how well the training prepared them to fly the simulator on a 
scale from ‘1’ as “Not At All Prepared” to ‘4’ as “Moderately Prepared” to ‘7’ as “Very Prepared.”  
Table 64. Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Preparedness by Training 
Simulator N Mean SD Min Median Max 
ASTOR 16 5.9 1.1 4 6 7 
DTS 4 6.0 1.4 4 6.5 7 
IFD 4 7.0 0.0 7 7 7 
Total 24 6.1 1.1 4 6.5 7 
 
Overall, the comments and ratings indicate the training was well received and worked well, 
especially the reinforcement of information with hands-on training. A few themes emerge from 
the comments, indicating the benefit of verbal debriefs, the benefit of sending training information 
early, and the desire for checklists (which were not provided). 
 
Selected comments, grouped by simulator: 
 
• ASTOR: “The CBT training gave a very good idea of the IM procedures. Flying the 
simulator was just a matter of hands on practice.” 
• ASTOR: “Maybe a bit more should be provided on the Fast/Slow indicator, and how it 
should be used.” 
• ASTOR: “Stress the importance of proper radio calls both for the cockpit and controllers 
with regard to IM. This is especially important for suspend/cancel clearances and 
subsequent follow on commands from ATC.” 
 
• DTS: “Lack of checklists of any kind led to us missing items on set-ups, etc. In one case, 
we did not verify the correct landing runway, and this most likely had a negative effect on 
the experiment data, even though it had nothing to do with IM. I STRONGLY suggest you 
get the checklist card from someone and we use that (I can adjust to another company 
checklist, it is probably good enough).” 
• DTS: “The guide was missing a few diagrams which would have made initial 
understanding of the speed trend display easier to use and interpret. All other issues were 
thoroughly covered in the verbal debrief of the training session.” 
 
• IFD: “Training was good and complete.” 
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5. Please rate how well the training prepared you to enter information into and interpret 
the information presented on the EFB. 
Pilots were asked to rate how well the training prepared them to use the EFB on a scale from ‘1’ 
as “Not At All Prepared” to ‘4’ as “Moderately Prepared” to ‘7’ as “Very Prepared.” 
Table 65. Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Preparedness from EFB Training 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 6.3 0.9 4 7 7 
 
Overall, pilots commented they felt well trained, and there were no ratings below ‘4.’ Pilots felt 
the early distribution of training material allowed them the necessary time to learn the material, 
and the on-site training clarified and reinforced concepts. 
 
Selected comments: 
 
• “Training was good, allowing a week of operation prior to data collection was good. I 
received the manual prior to attending the first week and that was a big help as well.” 
• “Needed some clarification to get totally up to speed. Mostly changes that did not make it 
to the training manual.” 
• “Go over which FILTERS (or other features) might be useful and which ones do not work 
at all. Data input is fairly intuitive, well done on that.” 
• “Training was good. Need to caution users that only the PM should make data entries in 
EFB.” 
• “On line CBT and manuals were good. Best training was the "hands-on" training 
simulations.  Experience working system was the best training.” 
• “Very little hands-on required before I felt completely proficient on using the EFB for IM.” 
• “I learned more as I went along. I found the SA very good using the filters.” 
• “Training was great.” 
 
6. Please rate how well the training prepared you to interpret the information presented 
on the CGD in the forward field of view. 
Pilots were asked to rate how well the training prepared them to use the EFB on a scale from ‘1’ 
as “Not At All Prepared” to ‘4’ as “Moderately Prepared” to ‘7’ as “Very Prepared.” 
Table 66. Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Preparedness from CGD Training 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 6.0 1.1 3 6 7 
 
Multiple pilots expressed difficulty understanding how to interpret the fast/slow trend indicator, 
some expressing the desire for more training. Ratings were more mixed than other training 
questions but only two ratings were below ‘5’. 
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Selected comments: 
 
• “I feel changes need to be made to the CDG: specifically, the fast/slow and early/late scales. 
Fast/slow needs more detail to increase its usefulness and the early/late scale should be 
eliminated. I do not think it serves any purpose.” 
• “Like most procedures, you can only explain so much before you have to see it in practice. 
The training was adequate to allow understanding of the actual presentation.” 
• “Nothing can adequately train to proficiency on that. Even after 6 days of use, it is still not 
a very helpful display.” 
• “The Fast/Slow cue interpretation was still fuzzy... Only during data collection phase were 
we comfortable with what it was saying.” 
• “The fast/slow display was not explained initially but on 2nd day we had additional 
training. At that time, I understood it.” 
 
 
7. Please rate how well the training prepared you to conduct an IM operation. 
Pilots were asked to rate how well the training prepared them to use the EFB on a scale from ‘1’ 
as “Not At All Prepared” to ‘4’ as “Moderately Prepared” to ‘7’ as “Very Prepared.” 
Table 67. Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Preparedness from IM Training 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 6.5 0.8 5 7 7 
 
Overall, participants felt well prepared for IM operations. Simulation provided the best 
understanding of IM. Multiple pilots suggested video of the IM operation be shown prior to 
simulation training. 
 
Selected comments: 
 
• “Concepts were well understood walking in the door. Perhaps some more time spent on 
the limitations of the desktop simulator as compared to the real aircraft, which would 
steepen the learning curve (might also reduce the whining).” 
• “Exceptions to the speed change algorithm (hard constraints, etc.) are still confusing, will 
cause consternation on the line.” 
• “Sequential slides or a video of the acceleration/deceleration, the speed trends (with a large 
deviation), and response technique to correct the delta and then to capture VNAV path 
deviation by proper application of power (below path) or speed brakes (above path).” 
• “Maybe some time compressed videos of actual operation could help pull it together.” 
• “Maybe you could make a short "live" video of someone conducting an experiment?” 
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8. Please rate the operational acceptability of the procedures for IM operations. 
This section provides additional detail for Section 5.8.1.3. Pilots rated operational acceptability of 
the procedures for IM operations on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ as 
“Completely Acceptable.” 
Table 68. Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Operational Acceptability of IM Procedures 
Operation N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE 24 6.4 0.9 4 7 7 
CROSS 24 6.3 0.8 5 6.5 7 
MAINTAIN 24 5.9 1.5 1 6 7 
 
Selected comments are included below. Multiple pilots mentioned data link communications as a 
way to make IM clearances more efficient. Multiple pilots also commented on MAINTAIN as 
ineffective or confusing. 
 
• “All operations are easy to accomplish with the given procedure. And if large 
acceleration/deceleration deviations are corrected and the vertical path is corrected, then 
the commanded speed changes are minimized.” 
• “It is still spooky to have someone turn in front of you when you do not have a lot of 
options to evade a bad turn. Likewise, it seems poor practice to have two airplanes turn 
onto final for parallel runways at the same distance to go and at the same time.” 
• “No issues in simulation, but: 1) Data link is needed for high density operations, and 2) 
software needs to be improved for higher altitude operations and not just below FL290.” 
• “The CAPTURE operation seems to work well. The CROSS operation seems to also work 
well. The MAINTAIN clearance from ATC was confusing. I could see my Target’s ground 
speed was greater than my own and therefore I was unsure how to maintain "current 
spacing" when the IM device would not pair immediately.” 
• “Operationally it has potential in a high density environment. I would expect MAINTAIN 
and CAPTURE clearances to be used the most.” 
• “Overall, some of the cross clearances seemed to result in some excessive decelerations 
which, in turn, put us high on several crossing restrictions.” 
• “Intuitive, however I believe the constraints are too narrow, requiring too many changes 
that are out of line with passenger comfort.” 
• “From an operational standpoint the IM clearances were succinct and to the point.” 
• “The MAINTAIN clearance did not seem to work correctly. A large delay was incurred 
waiting for Pairing. Isn’t logical.” 
• “All three [clearances] are quite acceptable with a good ATC partnership. The set-up at 
high altitude is key to getting a functional IM descent and approach onto the merge.” 
• “CROSS clearances seem to be the most problematic. Every one that we did required a 
speed reduction which could only be obtained in landing configuration and caused gear 
down and full flaps as much as 10 miles from the FAF.” 
• “Must clarify procedures after IM clearance is issued and before pairing if ATC issues a 
speed to fly.” 
Appendix F.6: Pilot Post-Exp. Results 258 
• “MAINTAIN failed due to speed differences between aircraft at different altitudes on 
descent. This caused a jamming up of aircraft and excessively slow speed for trailing 
aircraft. I understand this was caused by initiating the MAINTAIN IM too early.” 
• “MAINTAIN operations seemed to have less speed changes than the others. CROSS would 
have been my next choice. Those two words are also something a pilot is used to hearing.” 
• “As long as we received the clearances early, it was very easy to follow the procedures.” 
• “CROSS seemed to give very aggressive speed changes that required a lot of drag and 
speed changes.” 
• “In the MAINTAIN clearance, there was a bit of difficulty with maintaining the required 
IM speed. The IM commanded speed was asking for a speed near the top limit of our speed 
tape.  In fact, if we flew the speed requested, we would have been past the upper limit speed 
bars.” 
• “Voice is still tedious compared to text (CPDLC or ACARS).” 
 
 
9. Please rate the overall acceptability of the IM procedures. 
This section provides additional detail for Section 5.8.1.5. Pilots rated the overall acceptability of 
IM procedures on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely Unacceptable” to ‘7’ as “Completely 
Acceptable.” 
Table 69. Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Overall Acceptability of IM Procedures 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 6.1 0.8 5 6 7 
 
Selected comments: 
 
• “The instructions were clear. However, we need data link to make this effective.” 
• “Overall the IM procedures seem to work out for spacing aircraft. I do, however, feel that 
the termination point of IM should be about 3 miles prior to the FAF. Several times I was 
in violation of Company procedures when trying to comply with IM commands and a stable 
approach with check list completed. This portion of IM should be revised. Distractions and 
additive conditions should not be induced by IM so near both the airport and the 1000 ft. 
AGL point.” 
• “Procedures were very logical and understandable.” 
• “I think the procedures would work better when the specific aircraft and its’ performance 
are programed into the software.” 
• “The speed changes in certain segments of the arrival at times conflicted with the crossing 
alt. crossing restrictions.” 
• “I do not think the typical airline pilot will blindly follow IM speed commands. They will 
always modify to smooth speed commands or for their personal preferences. Or will simply 
say unable when large speed commands occur near altitude constraints.” 
• “The issues are added workload for the crew, especially right before (2 miles) the FAF. At 
this time the speed is high and usually I receive speed changes at this time. It is easy for 
the crew to become saturated with the additive conditions and mistakes can be made. I 
highly recommend the procedures be changed to ignore all IM instructions 1 mile before 
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the FAF. This will allow the crew to complete configuring and slowing as in normal 
operations.” 
• “IM clearances are easy to understand, load, and fly. The only one that I would rate as 
unacceptable was the CROSS IM.” 
• “Completely acceptable unless it requires a speed change below VRef that requires the 
aircraft to drop the gear.” 
• “Procedurally I like IM. It is pretty straight forward for a pilot.” 
• “Acceptable in a simulation environment, but needs a lot of work for the dynamic real 
world.” 
• “Most of the IM procedures presented no problems. However, there were times when the 
IM speeds were exceeding the normal operating limit speeds of our aircraft.” 
• “Need to train to correct techniques for speed changes (when to use speed brakes vice not) 
and the relationship to speed vs altitude. This will be your biggest challenge to getting 
acceptance on the line.” 
 
 
10. Please rate the impact of conducting an IM operation on your overall situational 
awareness during the arrival operations. 
This section provides additional detail for results discussed in Section 5.8.3. Pilots rated the impact 
of an IM operation on situational awareness using a scale from ‘1’ as “Severely Degraded 
Situational Awareness” to ‘4’ as “No Impact” to ‘7’ as “Greatly Improved Situational Awareness.” 
 
 
Figure 134. Pilot perceived impact of IM operations on overall situational awareness. 
 
Table 70. Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Perceived Impact of IM on Situational Awareness 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 5.8 1.6 2 7 7 
 
 
Selected comments: 
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• “This is probably one of the strongest selling points of IMAC as it gives such a broader 
view of what will happen down the road. Also opens up an operational partnership between 
ATC and pilots.” 
• “You know exactly who you are sequenced behind and know where he is, and frequently 
you knew who he was sequenced behind.” 
• “Improves situational awareness, but increases workload.” 
• “I began looking at Target aircraft and estimating whether our performance would meet 
the desired target times. Having access to other aircraft IDs on the Navigation Display was 
a great boost in situation awareness.” 
• “You can anticipate the changes by better knowing exactly which A/C you are following 
from the onset of the arrival and approach.” 
• “It gives you the big picture as you can track and follow all the other aircraft that are 
arriving at the same airport which allows for much greater situational awareness.” 
• “Using IM allowed me to focus on the aircraft around me and try myself to predict what it 
might do next. I agree that it can cause a little more heads down activity.” 
• “When there were many speed changes or clearances given just before handoffs, or speeds 
assigned that did not make sense or were outside the capability of the aircraft, situational 
awareness was significantly degraded. On the IM approaches where we paired early and 
speed changes were minimal and logical, we maintained a high level of situational 
awareness.” 
• “It is a great thing to know how you fit in with the aircraft around you. I believe it improves 
safety.” 
• “Helped build scan to look at other traffic.” 
• “It really was a great tool for our approaches and remaining in the loop.” 
• “Greatly improved my situational awareness to traffic, but tended to distract from my own 
aircraft state.” 
 
 
11. How acceptable was it for you to be responsible for achieving the assigned spacing 
interval while the controller retained responsibility for the separation of aircraft? 
 
Pilots rated the acceptability of IM responsibilities on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely 
Unacceptable” to ‘7’ as “Completely Acceptable.” One pilot gave a rating of ‘4’ but commented 
“No problem overall.” Two pilots gave ratings of ‘5,’ commenting, “Confusion can arise between 
controller assigned speeds prior to ‘pairing’ and IM speeds after pairing,” and, “Overall acceptable. 
However, with multiple speed changes in a short period of time requires more heads down. It can 
at times cause conflicts with VNAV descent profiles.” All other ratings were greater than or equal 
to ‘6’. 
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Figure 135. Pilot acceptability of IM responsibilities. 
 
Table 71. Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Acceptability of IM Responsibilities 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 6.4 0.8 4 7 7 
 
 
Overall, most pilots found the responsibility delegation very acceptable, which is reflected in most 
comments. Additional selected comments: 
 
• “The pilot controls the airplane, thus it follows that he is in tune with the operational 
capabilities and limitations of his airplane and how to maintain or adjust the spacing in the 
most efficient and operationally feasible manner. There may be MELs, or CDLs that limit 
some types of operation, high gross weights, very low weights, and many other factors that 
impact operational execution that are and should always be under pilot control.” 
• “As long as the controller controls the IM pairing message to keep proper spacing. We 
have to be able to trust that we have enough spacing” 
• “I never felt unsafe, except for a couple of events whereby we were requested to maintain 
a speed which exceeded our aircraft’s operating limit speeds (either too fast or too slow).” 
 
 
 
12. Did following the IM commanded speed cause unexpected or undesired behavior? 
Of 24 responses, 19 pilots (79%) responded “Yes” and 5 pilots (21%) responded “No.” A number 
of common issues emerged from the comments associated with “Yes” responses and are discussed 
in Section 5.8.4.2. All comments from “Yes” respondents are included below, grouped by common 
issue: 
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a) Large speed changes, especially near FAF or crossing restrictions, which reduces 
situational awareness, increases workload, and is unconformable to passengers: 
 
• “Was unable to meet altitude constraints on several occasions when IM made large speed 
changes approaching hard altitude constraints.” 
• "There were times the speed changes were very extreme and this would have caused 
undesired passenger comfort with the constant use of speed brakes.” 
• “Slowing sometimes made it difficult to meet altitude constraints.” 
• “A lot would have given the passengers a very rough ride. A lot of pilots would have not 
accepted the IM due to having to fly using aggressive speed changes.” 
• “Biggest issues were when IM reduced speed while trying to make hard altitude 
constraints. If we are on path and anywhere close to a constraint and IM gives us a slow-
down, it will take a concerted effort to manage all parameters.  Without due diligence (or 
relief), altitude deviations are very likely.” 
• “Yes slowing from 220 to 180 in less than a minute then speeding back up to 220 in less 
than a minute- so in the course of 120 seconds we had multiple speed commands, but at 
the end of all those we were back to the original speed, and the range to the Target was 
unchanged, and the early late indicator was pegged to "on time" throughout all the speed 
command changes.” 
• “Yes when it sometimes made it impossible to make an altitude constraint.” 
• “Too many speed changes close to the FAF would in the real world be rejected.” 
• “Initially some of the IM speeds had huge fluctuations as you approached the FAF.  We 
did not have these on the last 6-7 runs.” 
• “Too many speed changes near the FAF could create a conflict during actual operations. 
Sometimes speed changes caused us to miss our altitudes on the arrival.” 
 
b) Certain FMS modes eliminate altitude protection: 
 
• The aircraft climbed when asked to speed up while in a descent via the arrival. We had to 
use FLCH and then back to VNAV. The altitude protections are lost when out of VNAV 
as well as putting the aircraft in a position to possibly not being able to meet the crossing 
restrictions. 
 
c) Commanded speed below or above safe speed limitations: 
 
• “Speeds requested at times were above ability of aircraft and below.” 
• “IM on several occasions called for me to slow below my aircraft final target airspeed with 
landing flaps. I ignored this command. I would ignore it in the aircraft. Deviations below 
target on final approach should only be momentary and not commanded by an IM device.” 
• “Never expected to see speeds above placarded speed (340kts) or below final approach 
speed (140kts). Those anomalies must be fixed.” 
• “On one occasion the IM speed command was the clacker [over-speed alarm] speed. It 
increased from 280 knots up to 330 knots.  This is not acceptable. On several occasions the 
commanded speed was below target speed, this is also not acceptable.” 
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• “Undesired....yes. In maintaining a high speed on a "Maintain" IM spacing clearance (i.e. 
in trail), we were descending on the arrival and (I believe it was the sim or most likely, my 
error) our aircraft did descend below a crossing restriction altitude, as our aircraft’s descent 
rate was exceeding 4000 fpm. This became sort of like a high speed descent.” 
• “The Maintain clearances caused us to approach minimum safe airspeeds at high altitudes 
- 210 knots at FL230 in one case.” 
 
d) The aircraft had to be configured early to meet speed commands: 
 
• “Required to configure for landing well before it is operationally efficient to do so.” 
• “When it required us to drop the gear to fly the commanded speed.” 
• “Drastic [airspeed] decreases and increases causing us to dirty earlier than normal and then 
raising the flaps to accommodate the [airspeed] increase. 
• “There were times where we had to configure the aircraft much further out than we liked 
to achieve a commanded speed (gear out, so we could slow and extend more flaps). This 
is not fuel efficient.” 
 
 
13. Describe any changes you would make to the IM operation. If appropriate, please 
comment on the IM and Target aircraft being in-trail vs. on merging routes, the delay 
between the issuance of the IM clearance and the initiation of the IM operation, etc. 
All comments are included below. A synopsis of these comments can be found in Section 5.8.4.3. 
• “A data link command would be useful. If the EFB would auto-select Target filters for 
range/bearing, Target ID/tag, Target route and merge point it would increase situational 
awareness, especially for those pilots who do not normally select those filters.” 
• “A CROSS clearance that results in the Target turning onto final in front of you should 
have a fairly large spacing. If it works reliably for a number of years, then it might be 
reduced. IM spacing could begin earlier and use smaller or fewer speed changes if it did 
not wait for both to pass a fix with speed and altitude constraints.” 
• “Need data link communications for instructions–PERIOD. Also need to clean up software 
for operations above FL290. I really have no issues with following someone coming in on 
another STAR or any other in trail or merging procedures. What I saw worked well.” 
• “Need data link! Need data link! Need data link!” 
• “Allow the MAINTAIN clearance to pair immediately otherwise there is confusion with 
"maintain current spacing".” 
• “It seemed to take a long time before pairing occurred. I would like to see IM pairing 
happen sooner after system is armed. I am certain ATC would appreciate that also.” 
• “An initial Target bearing would be helpful, or an anticipated intercept point (ideally 
displayed on the EFB). Sometimes it seemed like 5min, sometimes 30sec until you were 
expected to comply, i.e. pair.” 
• “I think that the IM pairing could happen a little sooner which would allow the aircraft to 
maintain intervals easier and perhaps reduce the speed changes required to maintain the 
spacing. Also, specific aircraft performance and a consideration for passenger comfort 
should be considered in future versions of the IM.” 
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• “The only change that I would suggest is the FAST/SLOW indictor being integrated 
differently by designing it as a speed tape to make it more informatively relevant.” 
• “Again, I would try to find a way to minimize the speed changes as much as possible for 
passenger comfort.” 
• “CROSS clearances seem to take an excessive amount of time to ‘pair’. This often resulted 
in uncertainty by the pilots if the programming had been done correctly. I think the typical 
airline pilot would probably cancel and reprogram trying to speed up the ‘pairing’.” 
• “Recommend changes to the procedures to stop following IM speed one mile outside the 
FAF. The MAINTAIN operation incurred a long delay while waiting for pairing capture.  
I did not experience this with the CROSS or CAPTURE clearance. At least the delay was 
logical.” 
• “1) From the descent point to the proposed point of Pairing it may be valuable to assign 
standard descent speeds across all fleets. 2) This pays dividends for aircraft arriving from 
different sectors on different arrivals. 3) Phonetic identifiers need to be given on initial 
spacing interval clearance. 4) An aural or visual alerting system needs to be incorporated 
to allow for more heads up time. Currently too much time spent head down during the 
ARMED phase and while PAIRED monitoring for speed changes on the CGD.” 
• “If the pairing could occur earlier, possibly the frequent and excessive speed changes could 
be avoided.” 
• “Voice commands that specifically transfer responsibility for IM clearance. If ATC issues 
a speed and then pairing occurs, it is unclear if the pilot can then follow IM commands 
without clearance from ATC.” 
• “MAINTAIN clearances - not sure how they fit into the controller regime. I understand 
that they should be issued below FL290, but that may still cause excessively slow IM 
commands. Routinely, the MAINTAIN times were around 150 seconds, when the desired 
times were around 80-100 seconds.” 
• “If the IM aircraft is off scale there should be an indicator as to where he will appear when 
in range.” 
• “I think the time between issuance of the clearance to the initiation of the IM operation 
should be shorter. In trail aircraft seemed like a much smoother operation than merging 
routes.” 
• “I would limit the amount a speed changes within a predetermined mileage/time of the 
FAF. The system should know the type and operational ability of both the Ownship and 
Target aircraft. ATC should know what IM has been assigned to the Ownship aircraft.” 
• “MAINTAIN seemed to be the smoothest, because you knew the slowdown points, you 
knew what to expect, and the speed changes mostly seemed logical.” 
• “It seems to work well merging aircraft. I am not sure why there were times when we would 
be paired, but the note said IM limited. This seems to throw a wrench into the plan, if you 
cannot fly the speed that ATC needs due to limitations.” 
• “A better phase of flight logic for speed changes.” 
• “I thought it worked quite well, once you got through a few IM operations.” 
• “Earlier clearances the better. However, since IM would not pair up until past constrained 
waypoints, controllers need to understand that we will not get paired until passing those 
points. Some ATC controllers were impatient on waiting until that waypoint passage.” 
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14. Please rate the intuitiveness of entering IM clearance information into the EFB. 
This section provides additional information for Section 5.8.5.1. Of 24 responses, only one rating 
was less than ‘6’, which was a ‘5’ rating given with the comment, “I think every EFB page should 
have a touch screen home option. A few times I was confused on how to reach the home page.” 
Most ‘6’ and ‘7’ ratings were associated with comments saying, “No issues,” “Very intuitive,” or 
a similar phrase. Some comments had suggestions for improvement; and are listed below: 
 
• “Very easy to do, except that the full call sign should be displayed so as to reduce 
unessential radio communications.” 
• “The Enter button is usually on the lower right of the screen, except for the call sign manual 
entry. It would be helpful to always have the enter button in the same place.” 
• “Somehow avoid the manual inputs for IM aircraft. Maybe show all aircraft that will be 
arriving over a certain point in a certain window. That way entering an incorrect IM aircraft 
would not be possible.” 
 
 
Figure 136. Pilot rated intuitiveness of entering IM clearance information into the EFB. 
 
 
Table 72. Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Intuitiveness of Entering IM Information 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 6.7 0.6 5 7 7 
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15. Please rate the usefulness of the following elements on the EFB display. 
This section and the next (question 16) provide additional detail for the synopsis in Section 5.8.5.2. 
Pilots rated EFB display elements on a scale from ‘1’ as “Not useful at all (ignored)” to ‘4’ as 
“Somewhat useful” to ‘7’ as “Very useful (essential).” IM commanded speed and IM status had 
no ratings less than ‘5’. IM messages and the FAST/SLOW indicator had one rating each less than 
‘4’. The EARLY/LATE indicator had the lowest mean rating (4.1, standard deviation = 3.0) and 8 
ratings less than ‘4’. 
Table 73. Descriptive Statistics for Usefulness Ratings of EFB Display Elements 
EFB Display Elements N Mean SD Min Median Max 
IM commanded speed 24 6.7 0.6 5 7 7 
IM status (i.e. PAIRED) 24 6.5 0.7 5 7 7 
IM messages 24 5.5 1.3 2 6 7 
FAST/SLOW indicator 24 5.3 1.8 1 6 7 
EARLY/LATE indicator 24 4.1 3.0 1 4 7 
 
All comments are listed below: 
 
• “We were given command speed changes that were sometimes contrary to the 
EARLY/LATE indicator. For example, a speed up when we were indicating early and 
range to the Target was in acceptable parameters with no signs of closure or opening to the 
Target (referencing the Target range/bearing selection).” 
• “Include an aural alert when the IM speed changes or IM status changes.” 
• “Just a note, that once the IM software is set up and engaged I really rely on the CGD for 
most operational data. I do use Target name data and position on the display for situational 
awareness.” 
• “Never did get the hang of the FAST/SLOW indicator. The EARLY/LATE indicator 
helped me to understand if I was about to get another speed change, albeit the opposite of 
what I was anticipating.” 
• “I found that my own interpretation of Target groundspeed track and bearing worked better 
that the early/late indicator. I could predict when speed changes would occur and anticipate 
configuration changes to comply with IM.” 
• “EARLY/LATE was least useful. It could be eliminated.” 
• “I liked the early/late indicator. Get rid of the FAST/SLOW indicator...integrate that onto 
the speed tape on the EHSI.” 
• “I would leave the EARLY/LATE feature on so as to increase the pilot’s situational 
awareness. However, using that feature has been a little misleading on what the next 
command would be (i.e., we are early, but it asks us to speed up). A little confusing.” 
• “The EARLY/LATE indicator is not useful, and was not relative in this operation.” 
• “The EARLY/LATE indicator was good for situational awareness, but not very useful for 
anything else.” 
• “ARMED waiting condition messages could be more intuitive.” 
• “You could ditch the EARLY/LATE indicator; no one would notice.” 
• “[Status] messages and FAST/SLOW on EFB are nice but not necessary...more applicable 
to the CGD.” 
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• “Some messages did not make sense. Maybe produce a list of what the messages were 
telling us and why we were getting them.” 
• “Blinking should occur when it changes status. Add seconds to the range of the 
EARLY/LATE indicator (i.e. 45s).” 
• “CGD needs some sort of positive annunciation when changing from ARMED to 
AVAILABLE [or else it] will be easily missed in the real world.” 
• “Maybe with more experience using IM messages the FAST/SLOW indicator and 
EARLY/LATE indicator will be brought into the pilot’s scan more.” 
• “I found the early/late indicator the least useful.” 
• “If the EARLY/LATE indicator it is just a predicting tool, and there is nothing we can do 
to change it, then get rid of it.” 
• “I would like to see all these indicators on the CGD so I do not have to look back at the 
EFB once data is entered and confirmed. We will need the EFB for other things like 
approach plates, airport diagrams, unusual approach briefing pages (like RNV (RNP) 
approaches), etc...” 
• “The FAST/SLOW indicator should be less sensitive.” 
• “If the IM messages are clear in meaning, it would help situational awareness.” 
• “IM messages are good advisories on status of the IM operation. EARLY/LATE is okay to 
know, but not actionable. All others are MUST HAVE.” 
 
 
 
16. Please rate the usefulness of the following elements on the EFB display. 
Pilots rated the usefulness of EFB display elements on a scale from ‘1’ as “Not useful at all 
(ignored)” to ‘4’ as “Somewhat useful” to ‘7’ as “Very useful (essential).” Note: Some pilots 
responded “N/A” to certain elements, which were not included in the analysis for Table 74. 
Table 74. Descriptive Statistics for Usefulness Ratings of EFB Display Elements 
EFB Display Elements N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Altitude Filter 20 4.4 2.5 1 4.5 7 
Bearing and Range 23 4.9 2.4 1 6 7 
Target Route 23 6.1 1.3 2 7 7 
Merge Point/ Way Point 21 5.0 1.9 1 5 7 
Target Ground Track and Speed 22 5.2 2.4 1 6.5 7 
Terminate Point 22 4.8 2.5 1 6 7 
Ownship Route 22 6.1 1.6 2 7 7 
 
Comments apart from “none” or similar are listed below: 
 
• “When using a CROSS clearance, the EFB should auto select bearing/range, Target route, 
and merge point. When paired, display the Target on the navigation display.” 
• “I would have a data link block with IM uplinked clearance!” 
• “The bearing [filter output] was always incorrect.” 
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• “I like the filters, they improved my situational awareness. It would be helpful if the 
navigation display also displayed id targets similar to TCAS displays.” 
• “Seeing other aircraft helped increase situational awareness by better understanding what 
traffic was doing around you.” 
• “The bearing [output] did not work, but could be estimated (very useful). The above N/A’s 
did not seem to work [Target Route, Merge Point/Way Point, Terminate Point].” 
• “It is intuitive to use and helpful with getting and maintaining situational awareness.” 
• “It is likely with more experience many of these features would be useful.” 
• “Sometimes less is better and there seemed to be filters that did not work in the simulator... 
the operation worked fine without those things.” 
• “More info on what the Target aircraft is doing.” 
• “I liked all the filters.” 
• “The altitude and bearing and range filters are not needed.” 
• “The above things marked useful were [Altitude, Target Route, Waypoint, Ownship 
Route], but it would be better on the ND where we have our TCAS information.” 
• “Perhaps a magenta line or hashed line depicting the Target’s route could be useful.” 
 
 
 
17. Please rate the usefulness of the following elements on the CGD display. 
This section provides additional detail for Section 5.8.5.3. Pilots rated CGD display elements on a 
scale from ‘1’ as “Not useful at all (ignored)” to ‘4’ as “Somewhat useful” to ‘7’ as “Very useful 
(essential).” 
Table 75. Descriptive Statistics for Usefulness Ratings of CGD Display Elements 
CGD Display Elements N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Target Aircraft Call Sign 24 6.2 1.5 1 7 7 
IM Commanded Speed 24 6.9 0.3 6 7 7 
IM Status (i.e. PAIRED) 24 6.3 1.3 2 7 7 
IM Messages 24 5.5 1.7 1 6 7 
FAST/SLOW Indicator 24 5.1 2.1 1 6 7 
 
All comments (excluding “None” or similar) are included below: 
 
• “Speed, status, and FAST/SLOW give the most info quickly and are needed in the forward 
field of view.” 
• “A tone to call attention to changes would be helpful.” 
• “Positive alert for change in status of ARMED to AVAILABLE.” 
• “Maybe with the FAST/SLOW indicator, if you overcompensate more than the desired rate 
the + or - speed would change to an alert color of some sort.” 
• “Target call sign is important. Fast/slow is not. I would change the Execute light when IM 
becomes available to flash or change color.” 
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• “Would like to see all messages that were on the EFB on the CGD. Also, would like to see 
the Early/Late indicator. Never noticed if the aircraft’s call sign was on the CGD. As 
mentioned above, once the EFB IM information is entered and confirmed, I would like to 
never have to refer back to the EFB for IM information. It is easier to keep the CGD in my 
scan than the EFB.” 
• “The IM speed, IM status are very useful. I probably looked at CGD display 30% of the 
time.”   
• “FAST/SLOW indicator...now that I understand better that it is a TREND indicator and 
not a STATE indicator, I am better at using it. However, it still has behaviors that are not 
well understood (like big deviations that occur almost instantly after speed changes).” 
• “When there is a large deviation indicated by a numeric value, make the fast/slow indicator 
value blink or in red to garner attention that the acceleration/deceleration rate needs to be 
corrected in order for smoother IM command speed changes.” 
• “Useful as they enhance SA.” 
• “Looked at the IM clearance for the call sign. Used the commanded speed all the time, 
never really viewed the paired, messages or fast/slow because we used the EFB.” 
• “Fast/Slow indicator needs a delay to allow the crew to enter the commanded speed. Plus 
some more detail to better describe the desired speed/rate.” 
• “Display works well and is pilot’s field of view which is essential.” 
• “Again, FAST/SLOW indicator was good for SA but not very useful for anything else.” 
 
 
 
18. Please rate the effectiveness of the CGD in providing adequate information to conduct 
an IM operation. 
This section provides additional detail for Section 5.8.5.3 where summary statistics and a synopsis 
of the following comments can be found.  
 
 
Figure 137. Pilot ratings of CGD effectiveness. 
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All comments are included below: 
• “Looked at the IM clearance for the call sign. Used the commanded speed all the time, 
never really viewed the paired, messages or fast/slow because we used the EFB.” 
• “This is somewhat artificial here ...I get the requirement for forward field of view in the 
cockpit, but reading the EFB was far more effective in the lab.” 
• “Outside my normal field of view and flow.” 
• “It is a workable solution to conducting IM spacing. In the 777 the same information could 
be one of the selectable displays. Not only is there little space to put an extra display, this 
would let pilots put away the IM display when it is not needed.” 
• “It is very effective, however, improvements can always be made.” 
• “It would be helpful if the information could propagate back and forth with the FMS.” 
• “Would be nice to have an execute button on the CGD so that we would not need to go 
back to the EFB to execute.” 
• “If it were located in a different place, closer to the top of the instrument panel with a larger 
presence it would that much more effective.” 
• “Sometimes, the EFB commands more attention because of situational awareness.” 
• “Was good, but would like to see more info on it. If some pilots want less on it, you could 
have a declutter switch that would eliminate certain unessential things.” 
• “Maybe add range bearing and delta groundspeed when paired.” 
• “No real changes at this time.” 
• “Once paired I rarely looked at EFB. The CGD was placed properly next to airspeed tape.” 
• “Very effective and essential. I think when the execute button becomes active something 
should flash in the cockpit because unless you are looking right at the CGD it is hard to see 
the greyed out IM commanded airspeed.” 
• “It worked well.” 
• “Only issue is that it does keep our heads down more in critical phases of flight.” 
 
19. Please rate the operational acceptability of the IM phraseology used during the 
simulation. 
This section provides additional detail for Section 5.8.4.6, where a synopsis of all comments can 
be found. Mean operational acceptability of IM phraseology ratings were all greater than or equal 
to ‘6’ on a scale from ‘1’ as “Not at all clear” to ‘4’ as “Moderately clear” to ‘7’ as “Very clear.” 
Table 76. Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Operational Acceptability of IM Phraseology 
Phraseology N Mean SD Min Median Max 
CAPTURE clearance 24 6.9 0.3 6 7 7 
CROSS clearance 24 6.9 0.3 6 7 7 
MAINTAIN clearance 24 6.5 1.5 1 7 7 
Reporting “IM Paired” 24 6.9 0.3 6 7 7 
Check in with TRACON 24 6.7 0.7 4 7 7 
Amendments to IM clearance 24 6.5 0.9 4 7 7 
IM clearance Suspension 24 6.0 1.5 2 7 7 
IM clearance Resume 24 6.1 1.3 3 7 7 
IM Status reporting Unable 24 6.0 1.6 2 7 7 
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One pilot rated the Maintain clearance ‘1’ and commented, “The ‘maintain current spacing’ 
clearance is confusing when one cannot make an instant input to pair with the IM device.” Another 
pilot rated the maintain clearance ‘3’ with the comment, “The most confusing clearance was the 
Maintain clearance. It did not follow the normal format, did not state report paired. Seemed that 
information was missing.” All other ratings for this phraseology were greater than ‘4’. 
One pilot rated the IM clearance suspension phraseology ‘2’ with the comment, “Early on, we 
were paired, then given speeds by ATC - the same speed we were flying. So did he mean to give 
us the speed or did he mean for us to suspend IM or cancel IM. Pilots really need to hear the 
‘Suspend’ or ‘Cancel’ word before/as ATC assigns us a speed. Then it is very clear.” Another pilot 
rated this phraseology ‘3’ with the comment, “Some confusion between controllers and crews 
about what action should follow on after suspension, sometimes confusion over suspend versus 
cancel. Need a more positive communication between both parties.” All other ratings were greater 
than or equal to ‘4’. One pilot gave a ‘4’ rating and commented, “We had a couple of times when 
it was not clear if we were suspending ourselves or the controller was supposed to suspend us. I 
think it was more to do with the controller not knowing if we were paired or not, possibly because 
we had just been handed off to another controller.” 
One pilot rated the IM clearance resume phraseology as ‘3’, but did not comment on it. All other 
ratings for this phraseology were greater than or equal to ‘4’. 
One pilot rated the IM unable phraseology as ‘2’ and another pilot rated this phraseology as ‘3’ 
but neither commented on the rating. 
 
 
20. Did you experience any confusion when hearing your aircraft call sign used as the 
Target aircraft in an IM clearance issued to another aircraft? 
This section provides additional detail for Section 5.8.4.7. Of 24 responses, 4 pilots (16.6%) 
responded “Yes,” 17 pilots (70.8%) responded “No,” and 3 pilots (12.5%) responded “Did not 
hear this occur.” All comments associated with “Yes” responses are included below: 
 
• “Heard it happen more than once. It took additional read-backs to get fixed.” 
• “Specifically on call signs that I do not frequently hear.” 
• “We had issues when given just a call sign not in IM software form. We learned to ask 
rather quickly for that information as we knew how important it was. At the very least I 
would issue clearances by the phonetic alpha numeric rather than ‘Jetspeed 23’.” 
• “It is a minor distraction, but also aids in situational awareness, as you get to hear who is 
following whom.” 
 
 
21. Please rate the operational acceptability of using the Target aircraft’s call sign in the 
IM clearance. 
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This section provides additional detail for Section 5.8.4.8 where a synopsis of the comments can 
be found. All ratings were greater than or equal to ‘4’ on a scale from ‘1’ as “Completely 
unacceptable” to ‘7’ as “Completely acceptable.” 
 
 
Figure 138. Pilot operational acceptability of Target aircraft’s call sign in IM clearance. 
 
Table 77. Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Acceptability of Using Target Call Sign in IM 
Clearance 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 6.1 1.0 4 6 7 
 
All comments in response to question 21: 
 
• “For the major carriers it is fine as it is well known. But for everyone else, the IM clearance 
should include either the ID tag/the call sign.” 
• “I would suggest giving the IM clearance with the phonetic (Romeo Poppa Alfa) call sign, 
which reduces the confusion that would result from the usual call sign, and aids reliability 
in Target entry.” 
• “I would assign by phonetic alpha numeric from the get go.” 
• “It is very clear and acceptable. You have to know for situational awareness.” 
• “Since most flight crews do not know all the Target identifiers, ATC should always issue 
IM with those IDs versus an airline name.” 
• “It works well, but as I said earlier, it would be helpful to have the full call sign on the 
Target ID page.” 
• “There were several times when we had to manually input the Target aircraft call sign and 
it was unclear what the three letter identifier was. My suggestion is using the entire airline 
name as well as the three letter identifier in the EFB.” 
• “Possibly a threat, but had no occurrences across clearances. Longer clearances definitely 
clutter the radios and there were multiple instances of blocked communications.” 
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• “No problem unless the Target aircraft was out of range of ADS-B. If I needed to manually 
enter the Target I had to query ATC to get correct Target ID.” 
• “The three letter abbreviations are not common knowledge to most pilots.” 
• “It is essential in my opinion.” 
• “It is important and would have it said phonetically to prevent mistakes.” 
• “Worked well.” 
• “Well known call signs are fine, but some obscure ones will be a big problem. ATC needs 
to anticipate this.” 
 
 
22. Describe any suggestions to improve the clarity and/or completeness of the IM 
clearance phraseology. 
This section provide additional detail for Section 5.8.4.9. All comments are listed below: 
• “Use data link messaging.” 
• “‘United 123’ for the usual ATC communications, and Uniform Alfa Lima 123 for IM 
Target ... until we get the clearances by data link.” 
• “1) Need data link. 2) Clearance should be via phonetic alpha numeric if by voice, and data 
block characters if by message uplink.” 
• “Worked for me.” 
• “Change the Maintain clearance terminology. It is confusing to me. See previous comments 
on how to comply with current spacing.” 
• “Since most flight crews do not know all the Target identifiers, ATC should always issue 
IM with those IDs versus an airline name. Data link clearances avoid this problem.” 
• “No improvement needed.” 
• “Reporting ‘paired’ should be a required report that does not have to be communicated by 
ATC.” 
• “Standardize the clearance between Cross, Maintain, and Capture. Give the Target aircraft 
route even with the Maintain clearance and include the "report paired" statement.” 
• “Standardization that will come with time, education, and evolution of the product.” 
• “ATC should give name and three letter abbreviation of the Target aircraft in all 
clearances.” 
• “Regarding airspeed issuance by ATC: ATC must notify the pilot when he may resume the 
IM clearance. It should not be assumed.” 
• “Stress more adherence to the suspend/resume/cancel events.” 
• “Common call signs were no problem, but unusual ones should be given phonetically.” 
• “Use phonetic spelling all the time to avoid mistakes or excessive radio talk.” 
• “If ATC gives a paired aircraft a speed assignment, preface it with ‘Suspend/Cancel IM 
and fly XXX speed’. 
• “Like it as it is.” 
• “Keep it simple stupid. I thought the phraseology was completely within reason in a normal 
cockpit operating environment.” 
• “Well known call signs are fine, but some obscure ones will be a big problem. ATC needs 
to anticipate this.” 
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23. How difficult do you think it would be for a typical crew to learn and integrate the 
IM spacing procedures into their current daily operational flight procedures? 
The mean pilot rating was between “Neutral” and “Slightly Easy” (Mean = 4.4, standard deviation 
= 1.5) on a scale from ‘1’ as “Very Difficult” to ‘4’ as “Neutral” to ‘7’ as “Very Easy.” There was 
no comment entry associated with this question. 
 
 
Figure 139. Responses to difficulty of integration into daily flight procedures. 
 
Table 78. Descriptive Statistics for Difficulty Integrating IM into Current Flight 
Procedures 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
24 4.4 1.5 1 5 7 
 
 
24. Describe the challenges (if any) you perceive to the operational implementation of IM 
operations. 
This section lists all responses to this question to provide additional detail for Section 5.8.4.10 
where a synopsis of these comments is available. 
• “1) Confusion of call sign ID tag - radio congestion. 2) Proper use of the fast/slow 
deceleration indicator. 3) Proper use of power and speed brakes to maintain path when in 
VNAV speed. 4) Preferred Target filters that enhance situational awareness, especially on 
cross/merge clearances (Target id/tag, range/bearing, Target route, merge point, Target 
groundspeed).” 
• “Some training will be required, which is an expense to management.” 
• “I rated Neutral as an overall answer. With proper simulator training I would probably rate 
this as Very Easy. If training were just a bulletin, then it could be slightly to moderately 
difficult.” 
• “We need data link to reduce the chatter!” 
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• “High rates of distractions trying to slow a Boeing 737 with constant speed changes close 
to the airport. It is relative easy if IM is terminated further out from FAF. I think there are 
too many additive conditions and increased task loading with IM procedures. Errors may 
not be caught by crews trying to comply close to airport.” 
• “Like anything new it would be developing trust in the concept.” 
• “The long lead time typically experienced between training and actually conducting the 
operation (think PRM approaches ...9-12months). Most crews will forget what they 
learned.” 
• “It would require training and several LOFTs [line-oriented flight training events] to 
completely train line crews. Integrated training may be helpful but difficult to do.” 
• “The IM speed changes near altitude restrictions in the terminal arrival area interfere with 
configuration changes.” 
• “I think this is overall very easy to learn.” 
• “Like any new procedure, the knowledge imparted will fade if not used on a regular basis.” 
• “Training would be required including at least one simulator flight. Cost will be high; 
airlines will not implement this until mandated. The training will be easy to integrate into 
initial and upgrade training; the problem will be with the rest of the pilots. We might be 
able to add it to add it to the Advanced Qualification Program annual training.” 
• “For the end user the challenge will be the time involved to learn it and then continued use 
thereafter to hone it.” 
• “Like TCAS, it will require use and experience to gain the trust of line pilots.” 
• “Not to over compensate speed changes.” 
• “All pilots are able to comply with IM.” 
• “Depends on training offered. Depends on the pilot’s own abilities, and ability to study 
manuals. It also depends on the age of the pilot.” 
• “Training and the pervasiveness of it [IM operations conducted]. If only one or two airports 
are doing it, it will be more difficult.” 
• “Large speed changes may be difficult to accomplish. Each crew would also need to 
understand the importance of making a "gradual" adjustment, not a really quick adjustment 
when commanded.” 
• “The negative effect on VNAV PATH operations. Airlines are trending STRONGLY 
towards use of VNAV, and this will take them a step backwards in that regard. The 
potential or risk of altitude deviations on hard constraints is going to be elevated 
significantly, and this is going to be the biggest challenge to fleet introduction.” 
 
 
25. Of the IM clearances and operations you experienced in this experiment (CAPTURE, 
CROSS, MAINTAIN), which one do you believe is the most useful, and when would you use 
it?  
This section lists all responses to this question to provide additional detail for Section 5.8.4.11 
where a synopsis of these comments is available. 
• “It is not the decision of the pilot to select the type of clearance. Separation and arrival rate 
is an ATC function. However, the IMAC tools enable CROSS and CAPTURE 
functionality that does not exist now. MAINTAIN exists in the sense that a pilot can see 
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his interval visually or on TCAS, so CAPTURE & CROSS are new and would be useful 
with all the developing software & displays.” 
• “I think Capture is most useful and could be used to line up arrivals along a corridor.” 
• “I would say Cross, Capture, and then Maintain in that order, but really all have their uses 
depending on traffic and airspace.” 
• “All worked, but Maintain was the easiest to understand and input.” 
• “CAPTURE or CROSS. I think those both work well. Works well with LNAV less so 
during the RNP approach.” 
• “CAPTURE since most arriving aircraft in a given sector are using the same arrival and it 
seems that presently ATC gives many speed changes. This could alleviate some of their 
problems.” 
• “CAPTURE ...en route to a feeder fix.” 
• “Maintain seems to work the best with the least amount of large speed changes.” 
• “Cross and Capture.” 
• “CROSS is useful on arrivals. This could also be very useful when crossing the tracks on 
the Atlantic.” 
• “All.” 
• “All can be useful, but mainly for the controllers. Airline management will like the 
increased flow rates into the major airports.” 
• “CROSS is likely the most useful, but all three hold their own importance.” 
• “I like and would use all of the IM, but the cross clearance was the most problematic.” 
• “CAPTURE would be used frequently.” 
• “CROSS, because it is the most definitive.” 
• “All good.” 
• “Probably CROSS as it gives the controller a great tool to sequence the landing traffic.” 
• “MAINTAIN or CROSS, two common phrases pilots hear. It would be used when a time 
is used behind an aircraft or fix.” 
• “MAINTAIN is the easiest for the pilots, but ATC has to have the aircraft in the proper 
position to start off with. So the most useful overall may be the CAPTURE IM clearance.” 
• “MAINTAIN seems pretty easy and it would assure proper clearance and spacing in any 
phase of the approach.” 
• “Capture during nice days with long straight in approaches.” 
• “Cross IM clearance would be the most useful, because a typical controller clearance is to 
cross a fix at a certain altitude. Adding the time element is a no brainer. Plus, it gives you 
great situational awareness.” 
• “Maintain is easiest to issue and implement. Use Maintain when you need action NOW. 
Others will work for more deliberate situations.” 
 
 
26. Of the IM clearances and operations you experienced in this experiment (CAPTURE, 
CROSS, MAINTAIN), which one do you believe is the least useful, and why?  
This section lists all responses to this question to provide additional detail for Section 5.8.4.11 
where a synopsis of these comments is available. 
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• “MAINTAIN - The pilot can currently see his interval in front of him on TCAS (IMC) or 
visually (VMC) and do that now, albeit with a bit less precision, but it can be done, as it is 
a linear problem.” 
• “Maintain may be the least useful. It is almost redundant.” 
• “Maintain as ATC paired speed control can do that job.” 
• “Not sure the CROSS was as effective as the others.” 
• “Maintain. See previous comments” [Previous Comment: “Capture or cross. I think those 
both work well. Works well with LNAV less so during the RNP approach.”] 
• “MAINTAIN. This could be considered as CAPTURE clearance.” 
• “CROSS...seems to depend on too many other pieces of the puzzle falling into place.” 
• “Capture, as the Target A/C may have speed changes that would make your speed changes 
more dramatic.” 
• “All were essential to the IM operation.” 
• “MAINTAIN seemed to cause the most problems.” 
• “The least useful is probably the CROSS clearance as I do not think it will be used by the 
controllers very often.” 
• “CAPTURE... seems redundant with CROSS at times.” 
• “I like and would use all of them, but the CROSS clearance was the most problematic. The 
excessive speed reductions, shortly after the aircraft converge on the crossing fix are 
unacceptable.” 
• “All are useful depending on the situation.” 
• “MAINTAIN does not work as advertised.” 
• “All good. No problems noted.” 
• “MAINTAIN. It is the easiest but not the most useful.” 
• “CAPTURE. Too many speed changes and not a term most heard by pilots.” 
• “CROSS would be the hardest to control because of the different variables each aircraft is 
experiencing. One aircraft’s sixty knot tail wind might be the other aircraft’s sixty knot 
head wind. Though we put the forecast winds in our FMCs, they are not all that accurate 
for each piece of the sky we are flying through.” 
• “CAPTURE seems the vaguest and hardest to visualize.” 
• “CROSS. Requires too many speed changes and based on different aircraft operations is 
the hardest to make work.” 
• “Maintain. Seems like it could possibly set up a scenario whereby you may exceed an 
aircraft limitation more easily or miss a crossing restriction on an arrival (had such an event 
occur during this experiment).” 
• “All have their use. Keep them.” 
 
 
27. Do you have any additional comments about the experiment? 
• “Nothing more. All captured in the above comments. Great staff and design of 
experiments.” 
• “This would be ideal if we could get clearances via data link!!” 
• “Very interesting and I can see it as a useful tool. Do not let operators undertrain for its 
introduction.” 
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• “It was very informative and I appreciate the invite. I would be available if you required 
my assistance in the future.” 
• “Great experiment. When ADS-B is fully operational IM can be a very useful tool. 
Improvement of situational awareness is important if nothing else.” 
• “Great concept and I hope it comes to pass. Experiment was very well organized.” 
• “No, nice job by all involved!” 
• “Very well done, I learned a lot and would be interested to take part again in the future.” 
• “Overall, the experiment was great and I was happy to have the opportunity to participate!” 
• “The real time ATC arrival process is so dynamic. I can count on one hand the number of 
times ATC allows aircraft to fly the entire arrival routing unencumbered by changes!” 
• “I think that time and money might be well spent improving the 737 Simulator to more 
accurately model the IM operations. At time the bad VNAV response interfered. Enjoyed 
the experience.” 
• “Exciting advance for aviation and ATC going forward...opening situational awareness in 
the terminal area is long overdue...if the cockpit setup can be redesigned to allow for more 
heads up time this will be awesome. Nice job.” 
• “Had a great time, glad to help.” 
• “Enjoyed working with you all. Looking forward to coming back.” 
• “The team has worked especially hard to accomplish this experiment. My congratulations 
to those involved. It has been a great experience. Thanks again, [NAME DELETED] (can 
I say who I am?) Cheers!” 
• “Hope to see this operational before I retire.” 
• “I think it was very well conducted.” 
• “An excellent program and much need change to ATC.” 
• “Great personnel here. Really enjoyed it and hope to be back. Please, please put some 
plastic down in the briefing room so we can sip our coffee in the morning. For us west 
coast guys, it is 5am - our body-clock time. But the donuts almost made up for the lack of 
coffee. Thanks - a pleasure!!!” 
• “I enjoyed participating, and hope it turns out to be very successful and useful in safety and 
fuel efficiency. Also, in creating less ATC delays.” 
• “I think it is a great concept and can lead to much greater situational awareness for pilots.” 
• “I am really excited about the potential that IM can bring to the national airspace and our 
operations. However, it will not be a simple training with PowerPoint and a couple runs in 
the simulator. This will require INTEGRATION into existing training tracks with constant 
use to get proficient.” 
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Appendix G: Data Removed from Analysis 
This Appendix lists the criteria used to remove specific aircraft from data analysis, and fell into 
two categories. The first category was defined during the experiment design phase, and all 
quantitative and qualitative data aircraft were removed if any of the criteria were met. The three 
criteria in this category were: 
1) All aircraft flying autonomously (not controlled by human ATC nor flown by a human 
pilot) were removed (that is, all the aircraft arriving into Denver on the opposite side of the 
airspace and landing on the parallel runway to all the human controlled and flown aircraft). 
2) The first two aircraft (always flown by pseudo-pilots) to land in every run were removed 
due to the low-workload and potentially unrealistic behavior for high-density operations. 
3) Aircraft landing after the last subject-piloted aircraft landed, since the scenario was 
terminated at that point and data from aircraft flown by pseudo-pilots was not analyzed. 
 
After the data had been filtered based on the criteria above, the remaining aircraft operations were 
examined for operationally unrealistic behavior or simulation artifacts that impacted the arrival 
operation (ref. 19, para 3.1.1). These aircraft are identified in Table 79. For these aircraft, all 
quantitative data was removed, but the qualitative data was included in the analysis (surveys from 
the ASTOR, DTS, and IFD pilots). [Note: for some data analysis, in particular the inter-arrival 
spacing error (Section 5.4.1), if an aircraft was removed due to one of the criteria above, the data 
point for that aircraft was removed, as well as for the following aircraft.] 
 
Summarizing the number of flights, below is the number of operations for various categories: 
• Total number of aircraft in IMAC: 422 
• First two aircraft in each scenario: -40 
• All aircraft after the last IM aircraft landed: -142 
• Other aircraft with operationally unrealistic or simulation artifacts (Table 79): -11 
• Number of aircraft operations remaining in the data analysis: 229 
o Total number of subject operations (ASTOR, DTS, IFD; non-IM & IM) 113 
o Number of subject IM operations (ASTOR, DTS, IFD)  79 
o Number of subject non-IM operations (ASTOR, DTS, IFD) 34 
 
  
Appendix G: Data Removed from Analysis 280 
 
Table 79. Aircraft Removed From Quantitative Analysis 
Group Scenario Call sign ID (type) 
Target 
Aircraft Notes: 
1 B SWA154 (MACS) n/a 
Odd behavior: descended to 10,000 then climbed to ~14,000’, drastic speed 
changes 
1 G FFT70 (MACS) n/a 
Target changed route when transition to different MACS station, triggering 
off route, in turn causing IM of SWA3036 to go to SUSPENDED. 
1 G SWA3036 (IFD) FFT70 
IM operation for SWA3036 was SUSPENDED because of software issue 
with Target. Therefore the subsequent IM aircraft (DAL1605) data is also 
excluded from analysis. (1) 
1 G DAL1605 (DTS) SWA3036 
Data and results were good, however to be consistent, run was removed 
from analysis since the Target aircraft was removed. 
3 B AAL1691 (MACS) n/a 
(MACS) Aircraft terminated (removed from simulation) prior to FAF for 
unknown reason. IM operation not being conducted. 
3 B UPS896 (MACS) n/a 
No spacing data available since lead aircraft removed from simulation. IM 
operation not being conducted. 
3 C FDX1162 (MACS) n/a Aircraft flying 360 knots at FL200. 
3 C ASQ7044 (ASTOR) FDX1162 Data removed due to unrealistic Target speed. 
(1) 
3 H SWA3036 (IFD) UPS702 
Software bug that caused IFD to terminate, in turn causing ASTAR to 
switch to UNABLE prior to FAF. (1) 
3 H ASQ7044 (ASTOR) SWA3036 Removed since Target was removed. 
(1) 
3 I DAL1605 (DTS) n/a 
Programmed incorrect runway, causing significant overshoot on final. The 
DTS was not a Target for any other IM operation, therefore no additional 
data was lost. 
 
Note (1): Qualitative data from pilot post-run surveys were also removed for these four aircraft. 
 
 
 
  
Appendix H: Effectiveness of Training 281 
Appendix H: Effectiveness of Training 
This Appendix analyzes mean controller acceptability, mean pilot acceptability, and mean pilot 
workload as a function of run order, to provide a limited validation of the effectiveness of the 
training provided. Data is shown for the two groups of participants described in Section 5.2. 
A visual inspection of the acceptability and workload ratings during the data collection scenarios 
as a function of run order seem to be fairly constant, potentially indicating that the training sessions 
were sufficient to achieve an adequate level of understanding and proficiency prior to commencing 
data collection. 
 
 
 
Figure 140. Mean controller acceptability of IM operations by scenario run order. 
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Figure 141. Mean pilot acceptability of IM operations by scenario run order. 
 
Figure 142. Mean pilot workload of IM operations by scenario run order. 
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Appendix I: Oculometers 
An oculometer is an electro-optical infrared tracker which measures pupil diameter and corneal 
reflection relative to the center of the pupil to determine eye direction.  
For this experiment, the IFD was equipped with two linked digital Smart Eye Oculometer systems, 
each comprised of six small Basler acA640-100gm cameras and four flashes that operate in the 
infrared spectrum (outside perceptible range). The Smart Eye system uses image processing with 
a 60Hz sampling rate to detect head and eye location and rotation to calculate Point-of-Gaze (POG) 
for each pilot (software version 6.1). Optimal camera-to-eye distance typically falls within 30-300 
cm depending on lens adjustment. A predetermined region of the flight-deck environment, called 
an Area of Interest (AOI), is reported when a POG falls within its boundaries. The system reports 
head position and gaze direction. Quality metrics are used to select appropriate data for further 
analysis.  Analyses of POG data determines the time taken for a subject to reorient attention to 
relevant events.  Analyses of AOI data characterizes the distribution of visual attention.   
 
Figure 143. A Smart Eye oculometer camera. 
 
Video recording consists of two feeds, oculometer data and diagnostics data. The left and right 
systems for each data type are merged into a single feed. 
The oculometer system can provide the following raw data in real-time: 
• Gaze vectors for each crew and each eye 
• Head and eye position (each eye) for each crew 
• Eyelid closure distance for each eye for each crew 
• Pupil size for each eye for each crew 
 
Just prior to data collection, the researcher with oculometer expertise and human factors 
background was moved to another project, resulting in the data being collected during the 
experiment but not analyzed in time for this document.  
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